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Crescat scientia; vita excolatur.
~ Paul Shorey
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ABSTRACT
Despite perennial interest in Pliny the Elder’s Natural History as a record of the prodigious, the
quotidian, and the useful in Rome in the first century AD, for over half of a millennium Pliny has
been considered little more than an inept compiler of facts and marvels intellectually incapable
of formulating a cogent argument supported through the selective marshalling of his materials. It
is my contention that Pliny’s encyclopedic text is in fact a first-rate work of political philosophy
constituting an apology for Roman imperial expansion grounded in a sophisticated conception of
man as the only being capable of passing down its discoveries to its descendants. According to
Pliny’s theory of human nature, man is distinguished from the beasts by his ability to acquire
new faculties and forms of knowledge through time. Once acquired, man’s capacities for speech
and memory provide him with the unique ability to share his discoveries with his children, and
the process of development characteristic of the life of the individual is thereby recapitulated at
the level of the species as a whole, with the accumulation of discoveries through time uniting
men as men across the succession of generations. Prior to the establishment of the Roman
Empire, however, political and linguistic boundaries had divided the human race, preventing the
inclusion of all men within a single process of species development. Importantly, for Pliny, the
supersession of the bounded forms of human order characteristic of the Hellenic and Hellenistic
worlds by the unbounded form of the Roman Empire was thus a necessary precondition for the
fullest realization of the human animal. Pliny’s Natural History, written in a newly established
universal language, incarnates the collective memory of the human race, and in the encyclopedist
and his encyclopedia, the process of human development is brought to perfection at both the
level of the individual and the level of the species. The publication of Pliny’s text is thus itself
the ultimate justification for Rome’s conquest of the world.

x

INTRODUCTION
Much has been written about the life and career (and perhaps no less about the death) of
Gaius Plinius Secundus, known today as Pliny the Elder. 1 According to the Roman historian
Suetonius, at the acme of his career as an official within the Roman imperial administration,
Pliny served as the procurator, or the chief financial officer, of several Roman provinces in
immediate succession, and although Suetonius does not provide his readers with a list, Gallia
Narbonensis, Gallia Belgica, Africa, Hispanica Tarraconensis, and Syria have all been
proposed. 2 Among these possibilities, a procuratorial post in Syria has been rejected by leading
contemporary scholars, and only the procuratorship of Hispanica Tarraconensis receives definite
attestation in one of the letters of his nephew and testamentary heir, Pliny the Younger. 3 In his
abridged biography, Suetonius merely refers to Pliny’s procuratorships as “uninterrupted”
(continuas) and “very distinguished” (splendidissimas), specifications which led the great
classicist Sir Ronald Syme to infer a minimum of three posts, at least one of which would have
been in Belgica, the only conjectured office meriting “the epithet splendidissima.” 4 Additional
evidence for Pliny’s procuratorial career must be gleaned from the text of Pliny’s one extant
1

On Pliny’s life and career, see Pliny the Younger Ep. 3.5, 6.20; Suetonius Vita Plinii Secundi; P. G. MaxwellStuart, “Studies in the Career of Pliny the Elder and the Composition of his Naturalis Historia” (PhD diss., St.
Andrews, 1996); J. Reynolds, “The Elder Pliny and His Times,” in Science in the Early Roman Empire: Pliny the
Elder, his Sources and Influence, ed. Roger French and Frank Greenaway (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books,
1986), 1-10; A. N. Sherwin-White, The Letters of Pliny: A Historical and Social Commentary (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1966), 216-24; Ronald Syme, “Consular Friends of the Elder Pliny,” in Roman Papers, vol. 7, ed.
Anthony R. Birley (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991), 496-511; Ronald Syme, “Pliny the Procurator,” in
Roman Papers, vol. 2, ed. E. Badian (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 742-73. For his death, see Pliny the
Younger Ep. 6.16; Richard M. Haywood, “The Strange Death of the Elder Pliny,” The Classical Weekly 46 (1952):
1-3; Richard M. Haywood, “Again the Death of the Elder Pliny,” The Classical World 68 (1974/5): 259; Conway
Zirkle, “The Death of Gaius Plinius Secundus (23-79 A.D.),” Isis 58 (1967): 553-59.
2

Suetonius Vita Plinii Secundi; Theodor Mommsen, “Eine Inschrift des Ältern Plinius,” Hermes 19 (1884): 644-48;
F. Münzer, Beiträge zur Quellenkritik der Naturgeschichte des Plinius (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung,
1897).

3

Sherwin-White, Letters of Pliny, 220-21; Syme, “Consular Friends of Pliny,” 497; Syme, “Pliny the Procurator,”
745-46; Pliny the Younger Ep. 3.5.
4

Suetonius Vita Plinii Secundi; Syme, “Pliny the Procurator,” 765.

1

work, the Naturalis Historia, a massive encyclopedic text in which the use of foreign terms and
suggestions of autopsy provide clues regarding the scope and the timing of Pliny’s travels
throughout the Empire. 5
For present purposes, the unknown details of Pliny’s career are less significant than that
which is widely accepted about the general course of his life: birth into a family of equestrian
rank in Novum Comum in Transpadane Gaul in AD 23 or 24; education as an adolescent in
Rome; service as a cavalry officer in Germania Inferior and Superior in the 40s and the 50s;
high-ranking official positions under Vespasian, who reigned from 69 to 79, including provincial
procuratorships and service as a personal advisor to the emperor when in Rome; and death in the
eruption of Mt. Vesuvius on 24 August 79 while serving as the commander of the imperial fleet
at Misenum on the Bay of Naples. 6 It is perhaps no accident that the missing decade in Pliny’s
biography, beginning in the late 50s and ending with the commencement of the Flavian dynastic
period in 69, largely coincides with the reign of the deranged and vicious emperor Nero, and it is
often assumed that Pliny spent much of the Neronian principate quietly engaged in literary
pursuits. 7 Nevertheless, although Nero’s rise to power would have made a retreat from public
life and a period of sequestered literary activity a prudent path, as A. N. Sherwin-White has
argued a procuratorial post under Nero cannot be ruled out. 8 Regardless of how Pliny spent
Nero’s reign, it is undisputed that he was a prolific author throughout his life. The Younger

5

See, for example, John F. Healy, Pliny the Elder on Science and Technology (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1999), 1-22.

6

Surprisingly, there appears to be some confusion over the year of Pliny’s birth, which scholars have listed
variously as AD 22, 23, or 24. Pliny the Younger writes that his uncle died in his fifty-sixth year, or as we would
say, at the age of fifty-five (Ep. 3.5.7). In order to be fifty-five on 24 August 79, Pliny had to have been born
between 25 August 23 and 24 August 24.

7

E.g., Reynolds, “Pliny and His Times,” 6-7.

8

Sherwin-White, Letters of Pliny, 220-21.
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Pliny has preserved his uncle’s bibliography, a list comprising seven works filling over 100
volumes: On Throwing the Javelin from Horseback; On the Life of Pomponius Secundus; The
German Wars; The Scholar; On Ambiguity in Language; A Continuation of the History of
Aufidius Bassus; and the Natural History, the focus of the present inquiry. 9 The Younger Pliny
states that he is listing his uncle’s works in chronological order, but it is unclear whether this
refers to the date of their composition or to the date of their publication. It has long been
observed that Pliny’s description of Titus, Vespasian’s son and the man to whom the Natural
History is dedicated, as “six times consul” (sexies consul) in the work’s epistolary preface,
establishes AD 77 as the year of the work’s completion, although Barry Baldwin makes a strong
case that “Pliny had been working on the NH in terms of research and drafting for a good number
of years before that” – an assessment to which the sheer size and the diverse contents of the
encyclopedia lend immediate plausibility. 10
As Trevor Murphy has emphasized in his recent exposition of the Natural History,
insofar as an exhaustive inventory of the contents of the world would have been impracticable
for, if not completely inconceivable to, anyone whose career had not caused him to travel
regularly between the center and the periphery of an imperial state with at least the pretense of
global dominion, Pliny’s encyclopedic project is intimately related to both his curriculum vitae
and Roman imperial power. Murphy writes,
As a Roman eques, he had spent a lifetime in the service of his empire, upholding and
managing its power at both its periphery and its centre. At first a cavalry officer, then a
9

Pliny the Younger Ep. 3.5.3-6. Karl Mayhoff’s Teubner edition provides the standard Latin text of Pliny’s
Naturalis Historia. Gaius Plinius Secundus, Naturalis Historia Libri XXXVII, ed. L. Jan and C. Mayhoff (Leipzig:
Teubner, 1875-1906). I have used Mayhoff’s text as the basis for my English translations, although I have departed
from the Teubner edition on several occasions, relying upon the suggestions of other editors and on the manuscript
tradition itself to fix what I perceive to be corruptions of Pliny’s original text. All emendations are marked with
brackets in the footnotes, and all translations contained herein, unless otherwise specified, are my own.

10

Pliny Naturalis Historia praef. 3; Barry Baldwin, “The Composition of Pliny’s Natural History,” Symbolae
Osloenses 70 (1995), 80.

3

provincial financial administrator, in direct contact with subject peoples, he would have
had first-hand knowledge of the military and fiscal instruments that created and sustained
Roman power. Then, far from the frontiers, as a counsellor helping to make policy for
the Flavian emperors, he would have seen how government was conducted, and authority
transmitted, over vast distances. In sum, he would have seen how knowledge of the
periphery was gathered, how it was used locally, in what shape it was sent to the centre of
power, and the uses to which it was put when it arrived there. His encyclopedia reflects
this experience: for the Natural History, Roman power is what has united the world and
opened it up to be looked at. 11
Over 400 years before the publication of Pliny’s Natural History, Plato had provided a
prescriptive re-theorization of the Greek polis as an integrated set of institutions capable of
sustaining and perhaps even furthering man’s trans-generational pursuit of knowledge, using his
deeply ironical Republic to illumine the limits of political order and his Laws to give a more
serious account of its practical possibilities. 12 That which Plato had merely prescribed for the
polis, certain Roman imperial officials during the Julio-Claudian and Flavian dynastic periods
believed they had actually achieved through the establishment and maintenance of Rome as an
outwardly-expanding hegemon. Indeed, whereas Plato’s Seventh Letter, regardless of its
authenticity, was tantamount to a confession of the failure of the Hellenic philosophers’ project
of turning kings into philosophers or philosophers into kings, works such as Caesar’s Gallic War,
Strabo’s Geography, and Pliny’s Natural History depict the extension of the boundaries of the
Roman Empire to the limits of the natural world as the fundamental means for substituting
knowledge for myth, the self-professed aim of the philosophers. 13 For Pliny, an historian and
natural scientist “deeply involved in the machinery of empire,” whose last and greatest work was
born of the confluence of imperial power and the love of knowledge, the failure of the Platonic
11

Trevor Murphy, Pliny the Elder’s Natural History: The Empire in the Encyclopedia (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2004), 5.

12

Cf. Cicero De Re Publica 2.52.

13

Cf. Julius Caesar De Bello Gallico 5.12-13 (with Plutarch Caesar 32.2-3); Strabo Geography 3.4.19, 11.6.4; Pliny
Naturalis Historia 6.141, 37.31.

4

political project appeared the inevitable consequence of the circumvallating walls of the polis,
walls which set artificial boundaries to the scope of human inquiry and empirical observation and
thereby ensured the continued authority of the poets as the originators and propagators of
mythical explanations. 14 Plato had erred in his attempt to integrate the institutions of the polis
into the philosophers’ “search” – in Greek, zētēma – for true knowledge, as the division of the
world into separate political communities precluded knowledge of the whole and guaranteed that
man’s perspective would always be relative and particular rather than universal and absolute. 15
In other words, the substitution of knowledge for myth required the historical supersession,
rather than the mere re-theorization, of the polis. Pliny’s career united the desire for knowledge
with Roman imperial power, and while the publication of his encyclopedia, providing its readers
with an exhaustive account of the whole, validated the central intuition underlying Plato’s
political project – namely, that the success of the philosophers’ zetemic quest depended upon the
marriage of philosophy and power – it at the same time justified the destruction of the Greek
polis as a mode of human order.
If Pliny’s life and career are defined by the union of the love of knowledge with imperial
power, his death reveals a third essential characteristic of the image of the encyclopedist as it

14

Sorcha Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture: Art and Empire in the Natural History (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2003), 14. Syme, like Murphy and Carey, notes the significance of Pliny’s procuratorial career for his
encyclopedic project: “More diligent perhaps and exacting than senators and consuls were the knights in the
imperial service; and the financial duties of a procurator might stimulate precision and the spirit of inquiry. When
his friend Lucilius was made procurator of Sicily, Seneca [Ep. 79.1] expected that he would promote scientific
investigation. One man speaks for a whole class: Pliny the knight from Comum, whose fanatical zeal compiled the
vast encyclopedia in thirty-seven books.” Syme, “Pliny the Procurator,” 743.

15

As will be discussed in Chapter 4, in addition to frequently making absolute and universal claims throughout the
text of his encyclopedia (for example, at 9.166, 11.240, 11.253, and 31.80), Pliny asserts on several occasions that
his topic is not a specific land or a particular part of the universe but rather the “world” or “Nature” as a whole (such
as at 3.2, 7.7, 17.132, and 18.214).

5

emerges from his nephew’s letters: his philanthropic spirit. 16 While dramatic depictions of the
Elder Pliny as a “protomartyr of experimental science,” climbing Mt. Vesuvius amidst flames,
poisonous fumes, and falling ash, and both risking and ultimately accepting death as a small cost
for the advancement of human understanding, is far more glorious than the picture actually
presented by his nephew of a corpulent asthmatic, fleeing volcanic effluvia with a pillow tied to
his head and dying while exhibiting behaviors symptomatic of a heart attack, Pliny’s death was
ultimately due not to his natural curiosity, which would have perhaps brought him to the same
end if it had not been superseded by a stronger impulse, but rather to his humanitarianism. 17 The
unusually-shaped cloud of smoke rising in the distance was first brought to Pliny’s attention by
his sister, and after gaining a better vantage from which to observe this peculiar phenomenon of
nature, Pliny called for a light vessel from the imperial fleet over which he had command to be
made ready for an expedition to the mountain whence the cloud of smoke appeared to be
ascending. Before he could embark, however, Pliny received a message containing a plea for
help from an acquaintance living at the foot of Mt. Vesuvius, and as the Younger Pliny relates, in
consequence, “that which he had begun in a spirit of inquiry he performed in a spirit of
greatness.” 18 Substituting a set of quadriremes for his light vessel, Pliny set out from Misenum
with the intention of rescuing all those living along the coast in the vicinity of Vesuvius. The
Younger Pliny records that despite his new mission, his uncle had such presence of mind as to be
able to dictate scientific observations to an amanuensis while simultaneously directing the ships
16

The following account of Pliny’s death is based on the famous letter of his nephew to Tacitus (Pliny the Younger
Ep. 6.16) and the sober reexamination of the evidence by Conway Zirkle, “Gaius Plinius Secundus,” 553-59.

17

Italo Calvino, “Man, the Sky, and the Elephant,” in The Uses of Literature: Essays, trans. Patrick Creagh (New
York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986), 321. Pliny is also described as a “martyr” to science by William Stahl,
Roman Science: Origins, Development, and Influence to the Later Middle Ages (Madison: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1962), 107. Cf. Mary Beagon, The Elder Pliny on The Human Animal: Natural History, Book 7
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 2; Murphy, Empire in the Encyclopedia, 4.

18

Pliny the Younger Ep. 6.16.9. quod studioso animo incohaverat obit maximo.

6

under his command straight into the heart of the conflagration. After landing at Stabiae on the
other side of the Bay of Naples and supping at the home of his friend Pomponianus, Pliny found
it impossible to escape a sudden increase in falling ash and debris by ship due to unfavorable
winds and high waves, and it is there that Pliny, having reclined on a sail cloth, twice called for
draughts of cold water and then died while attempting to rise to his feet with the assistance of
two slaves.
As both Gian Biagio Conte and Mary Beagon have observed, the text of Pliny’s Natural
History is animated by a philanthropic spirit, and the Younger Pliny’s depiction of his uncle
standing on the deck of a Roman quadrireme giving orders to steer toward Mt. Vesuvius in the
hours preceding its eruption over the objections of his helmsman proves that Pliny’s
humanitarianism was not limited to his literary activities. 19 Indeed, the picture painted by the
Younger Pliny unites all three dimensions of the Plinian persona in a single image: Pliny the
imperial official courageously leading his men into danger in service to the Roman Empire; Pliny
the lover of knowledge recording changes in atmospheric conditions, the behavior of the sea, and
the smoking volcano itself despite being in the middle of a perilous rescue operation; and Pliny
the humanitarian combining his official duties and his scientific pursuits by subordinating both to
the needs of his fellow man. The same “spirit of greatness” with which Pliny undertook his
efforts to save the people of Stabiae, Heraculaneum, and Pompeii inspired his encyclopedic
enterprise, and Pliny’s desire to serve humankind and the humanitarian purpose for which the
Natural History was composed and published will be a recurring theme in each of the following
chapters. In Conte’s words: “The virtue that emerges from [Pliny’s] noble death is thus
philanthropy and the spirit of service … the [same] virtue that drove Pliny to the immense
19

Gian Biagio Conte, Latin Literature: A History, trans. Joseph B. Solodow (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1994), 499; Mary Beagon, Roman Nature: The Thought of Pliny the Elder (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1992), 18, 55-56.

7

undertaking of the Naturalis Historia, a work intended in its entirety to be of service to
mankind.” 20 As Pliny himself declared in one of his more famous apothegms, “For man to assist
man is god.” 21 Although it is aphoristic in character and in need of unpacking, the gist of Pliny’s
definition of the divine is clear, and Beagon rightly refers to the apothegm as a statement of
Pliny’s “humanitarian ideal.” 22 It is in fact the motto by which Pliny both lived and died.
Writing less than a century after the eruption of Mt. Vesuvius, Aulus Gellius noted that
Pliny “was considered to be the most learned man of his time” (existimatus est esse aetatis suae
doctissimus), and he continued to be held in high esteem for another 1,300 years, with his
reputation as a scientist and as a scholar being left unquestioned until the publication of Niccolò
Leoniceno’s highly critical appraisal of the Natural History at the end of the fifteenth century. 23
Even as late as 1924, E. W. Gudger, having gathered evidence of 220 print editions in a wide
variety of languages, could argue that Pliny’s encyclopedia remained “the most popular natural
history ever published.” 24 Nevertheless, only two short years after Gudger’s analysis of the
continued popularity of Pliny’s Natural History across the millennia, Harold Axtell offered the
following lament, perhaps indicating that Gudger’s essay had in fact been less an encomium than
a eulogy:
Sad is the present fate of Gaius Plinius Secundus. After all his tireless efforts to acquaint
mankind with the wonders of the world, ungrateful posterity in the twentieth century,
even the lovers of the veteres, has all but forgotten him. Nobody cares to contribute a
20

Conte, Latin Literature, 499.

21

Pliny Naturalis Historia 2.18. deus est mortali iuvare mortalem.

22

Beagon, On The Human Animal, 8.

23

Aulus Gellius Noctes Atticae 9.16.1; Niccolò Leoniceno, De Plinii et plurium aliorum medicorum in medicina
erroribus (Ferrara: 1492). See also Charles G. Nauert, Jr., “Humanists, Scientists, and Pliny: Changing Approaches
to a Classical Author,” The American Historical Review 84 (1979): 72-85.
24

E. W. Gudger, “Pliny’s Historia Naturalis: The Most Popular Natural History Ever Published,” Isis 6 (1924): 26981. In comparison, Gudger’s research uncovered only twelve print editions of Aristotle’s Historia Animalium.
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volume on “Pliny and His Influence,” or to annotate his work, or even to constitute a
reliable text for it. No university offers a course in it and no classical reading circle
includes it in its program. Except as an old worked-over mine to dig in at odd times for
the extraction of curious information with which to complete the treatment of some
special topic, the Naturalis Historia is not glanced at. 25
As shall be shown in the pages which follow, the neglect observed by Axtell at the beginning of
the twentieth century begat contempt, and despite a more recent resurgent interest in Pliny’s
encyclopedia, contemporary Plinian scholarship continues to be dominated by an image of Pliny
as little more than an inept and neurotic compiler of facts and prodigies. 26 My purpose in the
following four chapters is twofold: to redeem the Elder Pliny as one of the great thinkers of
antiquity and to suggest that the Natural History is not simply a compilation of secondhand
materials, but also a first-rate work of political philosophy constituting a sophisticated apology
for the Roman Empire. It is my belief that the very structure of the Natural History provides
sufficient grounds for such a reevaluation of the life and writings of the Elder Pliny, and I shall
accordingly begin my exposition of Pliny’s political thought in Chapter 1 with an examination of
the architecture of his encyclopedia. I shall then examine Pliny’s theory of human nature, his
political philosophy, and his philosophy of science in turn, attempting in the process not only to
explicate the central ideas contained in Pliny’s encyclopedia and to restore his reputation as one
of the greatest thinkers of his time, but also to situate Plinian thought within a philosophical
tradition originating both in ancient Greece and in the abiding questions of man’s perilous,
uncertain, and always ultimately inscrutable existence.

25

Harold L. Axtell, “Some Human Traits of the Scholar Pliny,” The Classical Journal 22 (1926), 104.

26

For the renewed interest in Pliny, beginning with an international conference held in Como in 1979, the nineteenth
centenary of Pliny’s death, see Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 11-12.
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CHAPTER 1
THE STRUCTURE OF PLINY’S NATURAL HISTORY
To other nations land has been allotted with a fixed boundary:
But the extent of the city of Rome is the same as that of the world.
~ Ovid Fasti 2.683-684 1
A. The Architecture of the Encyclopedia
The annular structure of the Elder Pliny’s Natural History, no less than the universe of
which the encyclopedia was intended to provide an exhaustive account, is a “whole, finite and
yet resembling the infinite.” 2 The carefully designed plan of the Natural History, however, has
long gone unnoticed, hidden from view within a generation of its publication by an error of
interpretation committed by Pliny’s adopted son, repeated shortly thereafter by the historian
Suetonius, and concealed from modern scholars by a long-standing prejudice concerning Pliny’s
ineptitude as an author. 3 In an extant letter to Baebius Macer, the Younger Pliny, the Elder’s
nephew and testamentary heir, briefly describes the encyclopedia as a thirty-seven volume work
“no less diverse than nature itself.” 4 Suetonius, in his abbreviated biography of the Elder Pliny,

1

Gentibus est aliis tellus data limite certo: / Romanae spatium est Urbis et orbis idem.

2

Pliny Naturalis Historia 2.2. immo vero ipse totum, finitus [et][in]finito similis. The applicability of the
adjectives used by Pliny in his description of the “external world” in the proem to Book 2 of the Natural History to
the “world in words” constituted through the text of the encyclopedia has also been observed by Sorcha Carey; see
Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 18-20.

3

As one commentator has noted, for “many classicists, Pliny was simply not an author at all,” but rather merely a
compiler of facts received only second- or third-hand. Even Pliny’s admirers offer self-negating laudations similar
to those that might be spoken by a high school teacher referring to the book report of a mediocre student: “It [i.e.,
the Natural History] is not thought so badly, and not compiled so badly either.” A. Locher, “The Structure of Pliny
the Elder’s Natural History,” in Science in the Early Roman Empire: Pliny the Elder, his Sources and Influence, ed.
Roger French and Frank Greenaway (Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books, 1986), 20, 29. The conventional
description of Pliny as an inept scholar has been traced to the publication of Niccolò Leoniceno’s De Plinii et
plurium aliorum medicorum in medicina erroribus at the end of the fifteenth century; see Roger French, Ancient
Natural History: Histories of Nature (London: Routledge, 1994), 207; Healy, Pliny on Science, 80; Nauert,
“Humanists, Scientists, and Pliny,” 72-85.

4

Pliny the Younger Ep. 3.5.6. “Naturae historiarum triginta septem,” opus diffusum eruditum, nec minus varium
quam ipsa natura.
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likewise refers to the “thirty-seven books of the Natural History,” confirming the Younger
Pliny’s count of the number of volumes contained in his uncle’s mastodonic text and ensuring
the failure of virtually all subsequent efforts to discern its architectonic scheme. 5 An
examination of the praefatio to the Natural History reveals the error. In his own description of
the great novelty and scope of his undertaking, Pliny observes that his encyclopedia, the world’s
first, contains “20,000 noteworthy facts… in thirty-six volumes” (XX rerum dignarum … XXXVI
voluminibus). 6 Whereas the Younger Pliny counted the extensive index inserted between the
epistolary preface and the opening book of the Natural History as a separate volume, increasing
by one the total number of books comprising the encyclopedia, the Elder Pliny explicitly notes in
his preface that the index is “appended” or “subjoined” (subiunxi) to the epistle itself, and it thus
does not belong to the Natural History proper. 7 The presence of occasional references in the text
of the encyclopedia to nonexistent, separate indexes preceding each book, the residue of an early
stage in the Natural History’s composition, and the structure of the index itself, which remains
divided according to volume, provide additional evidence that the encyclopedia was originally
conceived, initially composed, and ultimately meant to be read as a thirty-six volume work. 8
5

Suetonius Vita Plinii Secundi. Itaque bella omnia, quae unquam cum Germanis gesta sunt, XX voluminibus
comprehendit, itemque “Naturalis Historiae” XXXVII libros absolvit.

6

Pliny Naturalis Historia praef. 17 (emphasis added). As I shall make clear in Chapter 3, I agree with Aude
Doody’s contention that the Natural History’s identity as an encyclopedia is due more to modern reconstructions of
the text than to any inherent properties distinctive of an ancient literary genre. Doody is also right to suggest,
however, that Pliny’s text was uniquely different from all of the previous works with which it is sometimes
compared. Aude Doody, Pliny’s Encyclopedia: The Reception of the Natural History (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2010); Aude Doody, “Pliny’s Natural History: Enkuklios Paideia and the Ancient Encyclopedia,”
Journal of the History of Ideas 70 (2009): 1-21.
7

Pliny Naturalis Historia praef. 33. On the evolution of the ordinary letter soliciting feedback for an early draft of a
work into the “epistolary preface,” as well as the increased popularity of epistolary prefaces during the Flavian
period, see Tore Janson, Latin Prose Prefaces: Studies in Literary Conventions (Stockholm: Almqvist & Wiksell,
1964), 106-12.

8

For instance, in the eighteenth book, according to the conventional division of the text, Pliny refers to “the other
authors whose names we have prefixed to this volume (volumini huic).” alii auctores prodidere ea quos
praetexuimus volumini huic. Pliny Naturalis Historia 18.212. The presence of references to separate indexes is

11

An error in the interpretation of the structure of the Natural History nearly as old as the
encyclopedia itself would be unworthy of comment if the Elder Pliny was incapable of writing
such an immense text according to a conscious design, as most scholars presume, or if a failure
to appreciate the structure of the encyclopedia did not also result in a failure to understand its
content. Once the organization of the encyclopedia into thirty-six books is granted, however,
attention to the text itself not only suggests that Pliny deliberately and self-consciously wrote the
Natural History in accordance with a preconceived plan, but also exposes a number of widely
accepted misinterpretations of Plinian thought, especially in regard to his philosophical
anthropology (or theory of human nature), his philosophy of history, and even his true purpose in
publishing the encyclopedia.
When describing the structure of the Natural History, Pliny’s commentators generally
present variations of the following architectonic schema: Book 1 – Index; Books 2-6 – The
Cosmos and the Geography of the World; Book 7 – Man; Books 8-11 – Animals; Books 12-19 –
Plants; Books 20-27 – Medicines Derived from Plants; Books 28-32 – Medicines Derived from
Animals; and Books 33-37 – Metals and Minerals, with Sections on Sculpture and Painting. 9

noted by H. J. Rose, A Handbook of Latin Literature: From the Earliest Times to the Death of St. Augustine
(London: Methuen, 1936), 437n55. It is also possible that Pliny published both a comprehensive index along with
his prefatory epistle as well as separate indexes before each book. Indeed, the existence of manuscripts with both
separate indexes and a comprehensive summarium subjoined to Pliny’s preface lends support to such an inference.
Aude Doody, on the basis of Pliny’s explicit reference to a single, comprehensive index in his preface, has proposed
that the extant manuscripts containing thirty-six separate indexes are the product of a subsequent innovation
“developed in response to the needs of readers who wanted the convenience of being able to consult the relevant
section without having to return to the start of the work,” but she concedes that “this is, to some extent, an argument
from silence.” I suspect that Pliny either had not finished revising the encyclopedia at the time of his death, and
therefore did not have an opportunity to remove all of his references to the separate indexes contained in his original
draft of the Natural History but later compiled into a single summarium for the entire work, or had in fact included
both a comprehensive index and thirty-six separate indexes in the work’s final draft. In either case, he originally
conceived of the encyclopedia as a thirty-six volume work, adding the comprehensive summarium after the Natural
History was substantially finished. Aude Doody, “Finding Facts in Pliny’s Encyclopaedia: The Summarivm of the
Natural History,” Ramus 30 (2001), 2-4.
9

Beagon, On the Human Animal, 21; Robert Collison, Encyclopaedias: Their History Throughout the Ages (New
York: Hafner Publishing, 1966), 25; Gian Biagio Conte, Latin Literature, 498; Doody, Pliny’s Encyclopedia, 27; J.
Wight Duff, A Literary History of Rome in the Silver Age: From Tiberius to Hadrian (London: Ernest Benn, 1927),

12

Upon presenting their readers with the foregoing schema, commentators typically ridicule Pliny
for his failure to employ a sophisticated principle of composition, noting the text’s “curious lack
of symmetry,” describing Books 28-32 on medicines derived from animals as an interruption of
“the regular succession of subjects,” and referring to the chapters on art in the books on metals
and minerals as a series of “digressions” or as a “large excursus” manifestly beyond the easily
distracted author’s intended theme. 10 Indeed, chapters on art in books ostensibly concerned with
the subjects of “metals,” “soils,” and “stones,” in which works of art are catalogued according to
the material from which they are made, seem odd, an inversion of the proper relationship
between matter and form, and the overall sequence of seemingly self-contained units suggests
nothing else than a lack of forethought, with the volumes on medicines derived from animals
disrupting the text’s linear development and downward progression through the strata of being
from the highest to the lowest realities. 11 These and similar observations have led one recent
scholar to conclude summarily on the behalf of generations of commentators that “[i]n fact,
failure to proceed according to set principles is a general characteristic of the Natural History.” 12

354; David E. Eichholz, “Pliny,” in Dictionary of Scientific Biography, ed. Charles Coulston Gillispie (New York:
Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1975), 39; F. R. D. Goodyear, “Technical Writing,” in The Cambridge History of Classical
Literature, vol. 2, ed. E. J. Kenney (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 670; Jacob Isager, Pliny on Art
and Society: The Elder Pliny’s Chapters on the History of Art (London: Odense University Press, 1991), 48-49;
Locher, “Structure of Natural History,” 21; Murphy, Empire in the Encyclopedia, 6; Rose, Handbook of Latin
Literature, 437.
10

Conte, Latin Literature, 498; Duff, Literary History of Rome, 354, 355; Isager, Pliny on Art, 9, 81; Rose,
Handbook of Latin Literature, 437. See also E. Sellers, The Elder Pliny’s Chapters on the History of Art, trans. K.
Jex-Blake (Chicago: Ares Publishing, 1927), xciii; Stahl, Roman Science, 103.

11

Gian Biagio Conte’s dual assertion that “the real principle generating the text” is nothing more than “the
proximity … of [Pliny’s] notecards” and that Pliny’s admiration for Nature and for the authors who preceded him is
the only unifying force holding the text of the encyclopedia together, typifies, and thus perhaps slightly exaggerates,
the standard scholarly assessment of the sophistication of the architecture of the Natural History. Gian Biagio
Conte, Genres and Readers: Lucretius, Love Elegy, Pliny’s Encyclopedia, trans. Glenn W. Most (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1994), 101, 104.

12

Murphy, Empire in the Encyclopedia, 44.

13

Momentarily setting aside the mistake of counting the index as the first of thirty-seven
books, a mistake committed by all of Pliny’s commentators hitherto, the first indication of the
inadequacy of the foregoing division of the text is the resulting contradiction between the
encyclopedia’s purported lack of internal structure and Pliny’s recurring metatextual references
to the constraints placed upon him by the “plan of the work” (institutum operis) and by the text’s
“established order” (institutus ordo) – constraints that explain, for example, why he has
introduced a new subject or why he must defer a discussion until a later point in the
encyclopedia. 13 More frequently, displaying both his self-consciousness as the creator of a text
and his complete control over its contents, Pliny simply informs his readers that he will discuss,
or has already discussed, a topic relevant to the matter at hand “in its proper place” (suo loco). 14
Pliny’s repeated willingness to postpone the treatment of a subject so that it might be discussed
in its “proper” location, with “proper” or “improper” locations within a text having no possible
meaning except in reference to the author’s preconceived arrangement of its contents, certainly
suggests the presence of a principle of composition more sophisticated than the accidental
“proximity … of [his] notecards.” 15
Previous attempts to isolate the text’s architectonic structure have been only partly
successful. A. Locher, for instance, in his essay on “The Structure of Pliny the Elder’s Natural
History,” quickly abandons the search for a sophisticated principle of composition. Dismissing
the need for such a search on the grounds that “the comprehensive composition [of the text] … is

13

Pliny Naturalis Historia 4.91, 16.10, 22.109, 29.58, 35.1, 35.53, 37.1.

14

Ibid., 2.30, 2.153, 2.221, 6.28, 8.193, 8.228, 10.203, 11.67, 11.132, 13.3, 14.111, 15.91, 16.14, 16.188, 17.72,
18.281, 18.322, 19.6, 19.47, 20.173, 21.76, 21.112, 21.120, 22.116, 22.133, 23.2, 23.14, 24.3, 24.6, 24.184, 25.8,
25.13, 25.41, 25.86, 26.20, 26.39, 28.13, 28.77, 28.135, 28.144, 29.51, 29.58, 29.76, 29.122, 31.110, 32.21, 33.64,
33.100, 33.120, 34.5 34.117, 34.147, 37.151; see also 6.161, 16.99, 16.134.
15

Conte, Genres and Readers, 101. Cf. Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 28-29; R. J. Starr, “Cross-References
in Roman Prose,” American Journal of Philology 102 (1981), 433, 436, 437.

14

clear and has frequently been presented: the universe, earth, human beings, animals, medicines
from plants and animals, [and] minerals,” Locher instead focuses his inquiry on the presence of
certain subordinate “structural units” organizing the “diffuse flow of information” with which
Pliny was confronted into “a meaningful sequence.” 16 According to Locher, Pliny employed
“editorial categories” while compiling facts prior to writing the text of the encyclopedia, as well
as “key-words” in the composition of the text itself. Although such “smaller structures” do not
constitute a coherent architectonic scheme, they nonetheless reveal “a working method which is
thoroughly thought out from a technical point of view.” 17
More fruitfully, in separate works, Sorcha Carey and Mary Beagon have each suggested
that in composing his encyclopedia Pliny structured his text in accordance with the structure of
the universe itself. Beagon merely hints at the possibility of such an architectonic scheme in her
commentary on Book 7, referring to the Natural History as a “microcosmic reflection” of the
world and noting in passing that Pliny’s decision to use “nature and her parts as the framework”
for his encyclopedia gave it “an unchallengeable inclusiveness and totality.” 18 In her excellent
treatment of the relationship between art and Roman imperial thought in the Natural History,
Carey elaborates on the strategic significance of Pliny’s supposed decision to use the world as a
“blueprint” for his work:
16

Locher, “Structure of Natural History,” 21, 23, 27.

17

Ibid., 25. Locher’s assessment is only slightly more favorable than that offered by Trevor Murphy, “The book
does have organizing principles, a broad hypotactic architecture, which is laid out in great detail in book 1, the
index, the Natural History’s skeleton. On this level its contents are subordinated to a definite taxonomic syntax, as I
have described above. But what you actually encounter when you read the body of the book sequentially is detail
juxtaposed with detail, parataxis, particularity, multiplicity, and self-contradiction.” Murphy, Empire in the
Encyclopedia, 30.
18

Beagon, On the Human Animal, 5, 21. Similarly, in an earlier work, Beagon writes: “The structure of his
inquiries is dictated by that of the natural world as viewed by man, starting with the cosmos as a whole, in book 2,
and progressing through all its subdivisions, animal, vegetable, and finally mineral. It is within this unique structure
that theory and scholarship are united with the practical arts of agriculture and seafaring, of government and warfare.
Philosophy is united with practical philanthropy.” Beagon, Roman Nature, 13.

15

Th[e] relationship between the material and its arrangement is important. If both the
content and the structure of a work appear to replicate what the work describes (in Pliny’s
case, the world), then the world as presented by the author in his text can be seen to
reproduce the reality of the world external to his text. Indeed, a “systematic” (as opposed
to alphabetical) arrangement of knowledge already facilitates the development of themes
important to the authorial agenda. Discussions of related issues can be placed side by
side, unaffected by the fragmenting rigour of the alphabet, while the system dictating the
overall arrangement of the text encourages the reader to consider the whole, not just
isolated entries according to letters. But these factors are greatly enhanced, when, as in
the Natural History, the arrangement of information in a text seems to mirror what the
text itself describes. Through this relationship between structure and content, a particular
literary presentation of the world can appear directly to reflect the world itself. 19
For Carey, within the Natural History, the complementarity of structure and content, or the
correspondence between the arrangement of the material and the material itself, results in an
“equation of external reality and internal representation,” that is, in an identification of the world
of the text with the world of nature. 20 In Carey’s words, “In seeming to detail the contents of the
world in their entirety, while at the same time structuring his work according to a system
apparently devised by Nature herself, Pliny can suggest that his own representation of the world
exactly replicates the world as its exists outside of his text.” 21
Although Carey and Beagon’s shared description of the Elder Pliny’s encyclopedia as a
microcosmic representation of the natural world is insightful, and in fact partly accurate, such a
description ultimately fails to account for the arrangement of the text itself. 22 Indeed, neither
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Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 19.

20

Ibid., 20.

21

Ibid., 30.

22

It is worth noting that Beagon, in a separate essay, takes the structure of the encyclopedia into account in her
interpretation of the proem to Book 18. Beagon’s argument, however, is perplexing, as it hinges on the strange
assertion that the eighteenth book “marks the middle point of the work.” In a thirty-seven volume work, the
nineteenth volume, rather than the eighteenth, constitutes the central book. Beagon evidently made a simple
arithmetical error in her haste either to adduce additional support for her otherwise persuasive interpretation of the
book’s proem or to contribute an essay to the festschrift in which it was published. Indeed, in the concluding
paragraph of her essay, Beagon erroneously asserts that by the time the “reader [of Pliny’s encyclopedia begins the
eighteenth volume, he or she] is deeply involved in the work itself, having covered no less than seventeen books and
with another seventeen to go.” In reality, nineteen volumes would remain for Beagon’s hypothetical reader. Mary

16

Carey nor Beagon offers a convincing explanation of the actual sequence of topics contained in
the encyclopedia, with neither author, for instance, demonstrating why the text’s supposed
structure necessitates the placement of the books on medicines derived from animals after the
books on medicines derived from plants or even the inclusion of the sections on painting and
sculpture, which seem to concern subjects that are not part of the natural world at all. In fact,
both Carey and Beagon offer highly simplified schemata of the architecture of the text, making
the text fit their account of its structure by ignoring dissonant elements and thereby concealing
apparent departures from the work’s purported principle of composition. Carey, for example,
asserts that the encyclopedia begins with a description of the universe as a whole and “then
mov[es] on to detail successively smaller components,” describing lands, peoples, animals,
stones, and minerals in turn. 23 Similarly, Beagon writes that following “a description of the
world as a whole (book 2), and its geographical divisions (books 3-6), Pliny proceeds down the
[Aristotelian] scale [of being], starting with the human race at the top (book 7) and continuing
through the other animal species, birds, fish, insects, plants, and finally minerals.” 24 In both of
these simplified schemata, the books on the medicinal properties of plants and animals and the
chapters on art, inconsistent with or only tangentially related to Pliny’s purported purpose, are
left out altogether. Unless the inadequacies of Carey and Beagon’s shared structural
interpretation are the product of Pliny’s inability to adhere strictly to his own principle of
composition rather than the result of deficiencies inherent in the interpretation itself, their
common account of the structure of the text should be accepted only provisionally, as it would

Beagon, “Burning the Brambles: Rhetoric and Ideology in Pliny, Natural History 18 (1-24),” in Ethics and Rhetoric:
Classical Essays for Donald Russell on his Seventy-Fifth Birthday, ed. Doreen Innes, Harry Hine, and Christopher
Pelling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 118, 132.
23

Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 18.

24

Beagon, On the Human Animal, 21.
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seem to be a general rule of interpretation that a description of the structure of a text that both
conceals and reveals certain elements of the actual arrangement of its material content should be
abandoned as soon as an interpretation that better accounts for the observable features of the text
can be provided. 25
A recognition of Pliny’s initial conception of the encyclopedia as a thirty-six volume
work permits a more satisfying account of the text’s structure. A multivolume work, the number
of volumes of which is a prime number, such as thirty-seven, cannot be divided into subordinate
units of equivalent length. A thirty-six volume work, on the other hand, is amenable to division
into two, three, four, six, nine, twelve, or even eighteen sections of equal size, permitting the
author to organize the contents of the work according to a variety of possible compositional
principles. The simplest compositional arrangement, of course, would consist of a division of
the text into two equal parts, and once the possibility of such a division is entertained, the true
structure of Pliny’s Natural History almost immediately emerges. The reader must merely
juxtapose a list of the topics contained in the first set of eighteen books with a list of the topics
contained in the second set of eighteen books to see that the sequence of subjects in the first
through eighteenth books recurs in reverse order in the nineteenth through thirty-sixth books.
Further reflection reveals that the primary structural units of the text are not sets of books
ordered according to a poorly conceived or improperly executed linear plan, in which the
sequence of subjects proceeds in a single direction down the Aristotelian hierarchy of being, but
rather sets of books arranged within an annular or ring-like structure, in which the sequence of

25

Such a rule of interpretation, it should be noted, provides a link between scholarship in the humanities and
scholarship in the hard sciences, wherein the advance of science proceeds through the replacement of older theories
by newer ones accounting for a larger set of observable phenomena. Cf. Imre Lakatos, “Falsification and the
Methodology of Research Programmes,” in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Proceedings of the
International Colloquium in the Philosophy of Science, ed. Imre Lakatos and Alan Musgrave (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1970), 91-196.
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subjects engenders a circle by doubling back at the start of the second half of the text: ten books
on inanimate matter (Books 1-5 and Books 32-36), ten books on animals (Books 6-10 and Books
27-31), and sixteen books on plants (Books 11-18 and Books 19-26). 26 The institutum operis,
first detected in Pliny’s own references to the constraints under which he is writing, is thus both
symmetrical, with equivalent numbers of books concerning the same subjects contained in the
corresponding structural units located on either side of the text’s midpoint, and circular, with the
work as a whole beginning and ending with a treatment of inanimate matter. 27 It is thus probably
not a coincidence that Pliny begins the thirty-second book of his encyclopedia, the book with
which the “ring” of the work is closed, with an examination of the history of gold rings. 28
Importantly, Pliny begins his subsequent discussions of silver, copper, bronze, iron, and lead
with accounts of their respective characteristics and the lands in which they have been
discovered, opening only his discussion of gold, the first topic in the text’s final architectonic
structural unit, with an examination of the history of rings. This apparent lack of consistency in
Pliny’s presentation of his subject matter does not constitute proof of his inability to manage his

26

To my knowledge, Michael von Albrecht (A History of Roman Literature: From Livius Andronicus to Boethius
(Leiden: Brill, 1997), 2:1266) is the only previous commentator to note the encyclopedia’s annular structure,
although he leaves the traditional thirty-seven book scheme of the work unquestioned and does not offer an
explanation of Pliny’s principle of composition or the relationship between the two halves of the text, as I shall
attempt to do in the following pages. For the use of “ring-like” or “framework” structural patterns in ancient Greek
and Roman (and even Hebraic) texts, see Samuel Eliot Bassett, The Poetry of Homer (Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1938), 119-28; George E. Duckworth, Structural Patterns and Proportions in Vergil’s Aeneid: A
Study in Mathematical Composition (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962), 21-24; Cedric H. Whitman,
Homer and the Heroic Tradition (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1958), 249-84.
27

It is perhaps worthy of note, though only as an incidental matter, that Pliny, following Vitruvius, attempted to
introduce the Greek word for symmetry, symmetria, into Latin. Pliny Naturalis Historia 34.65.

28

Ibid., 33.7-41. Although I am unable to find an example of an ancient author who uses the image of a ring to
describe the annular compositional scheme of his own or another’s text, as Cedric Whitman intimates
Protogeometric and Geometric works of art incarnating the principles of circularity and concentricity, especially
painted vases and sculpted temple friezes in which figures ordered in an A – B – B – A sequence form an unbroken
circle, would have provided classical authors with a physical analogue in terms of which to conceptualize their own
literary creations. Whitman, Homer and Tradition, 253-55, 284. The peculiar placement of the section on gold
rings in the Natural History, however, is sufficient to suggest that Pliny, making proleptical use of a metaphor
employed by the classicists of a future age, found the image of a ring a fitting model for his own work.
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material, as previous commentators undoubtedly would have assumed if they had noticed the
deviation from the pattern present in Pliny’s subsequent descriptions of other metals, but rather
evidence of the close relationship between the structural form and the material content of the
text. 29
Perhaps the greatest evidence of the extent to which Pliny sought to adhere to his
preconceived annular compositional arrangement can be found in the lists contained within each
structural unit comprising the encyclopedia’s larger architectonic structure. Whereas the lists
contained in the first half of the encyclopedia generally proceed from wholes to their constitutive
parts, the lists in the second half of the encyclopedia generally proceed from component parts
back to the larger, integrated wholes to which they belong. Thus, in passing from the first to the
second book, Pliny moves from the universe as a “whole” (totum) to its various “parts” (partes),
and in the tenth book, Pliny proceeds from an analysis of the different species of animals found
in the world to an examination of “the parts of their bodies” (corporum partes). 30 In his books
on the medicinal properties of plants and animals contained in the second half of the
encyclopedia, on the other hand, Pliny repeatedly turns from an examination of remedies for
maladies affecting the body’s individual members to remedies for maladies affecting the body as
a whole. 31 Moreover, in his examinations of plant- and animal-based remedies for maladies
affecting the head, one of the body’s individual members, Pliny moves from maladies affecting
29

Isager, for instance, points out that in Pliny’s discussion of silver, which immediately follows his discussion of
gold, the encyclopedist “adheres to a more systematic pattern of description,” and he attributes Pliny’s opening
examination of gold rings, where “we might have expected” a “treatment of gold occurrences and gold mines,” to
his desire to frame his account of metals with historical and moral considerations. Although such an explanation of
the structure of the text of Pliny’s thirty-second book seems to reflect well on its author, it nevertheless presupposes
that entire sections of the text fail to conform to the underlying plan of the work – the very presupposition upon
which Isager bases his entire exegesis of Pliny’s chapters on art. Isager, Pliny on Art, 9, 65, 66.
30

Pliny Naturalis Historia 2.1, 3.1, 11.121.

31

Ibid., 25.132, 26.107, 28.163, 28.224, 30.21, 30.82.
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particular features of the face to maladies affecting the face itself. In his initial description of the
parts of the body in the first half of the encyclopedia, Pliny had moved in the opposite direction,
beginning with an examination of the face as a whole before turning to its separate features. 32
Hence, even the subsidiary lists contained within the larger lists comprising the primary
structural units of the encyclopedia are organized in accordance with Pliny’s annular plan. 33
In light of the structural sophistication of the Natural History, it is perhaps already
apparent that the conventional depiction of the Elder Pliny as a “neurotic collector of facts,”
ultimately “overpowered” by his own material, “whose chief tools of scholarship” were “an
abundant supply of books, index cards, paste, and scissors,” is an unfair legacy for the world’s
first encyclopedist. 34 The inherited prejudice that “the organisation of … data [in Pliny’s
encyclopedia] is probably the sloppiest in the history of bookmaking” simply cannot withstand
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Cf. Ibid., 11.138-11.159, 25.142-26.8, 28.167-28.188.
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Perhaps providing additional evidence of his concern for structure, at various points in the text Pliny refers to the
topics he will be discussing in subsequent sections, mapping out in advance the arrangement of his materials.
Interestingly, on at least one occasion, the sequence of topics to which he refers does not actually appear in the text.
In the nineteenth through twenty-sixth books, constituting the encyclopedia’s second section on plants, Pliny divides
the first part of his treatment of botanical remedies into five subsections: medicines derived from garden plants
(20.1-20.264), medicines derived from flowers (21.1-21.185), medicines derived from plants with prickles and
thorns (22.1-22.118), medicines derived from grains (22.119-22.164), and medicines derived from trees (22.16424.137). In general, this reverses the tripartite division of the eleventh through eighteenth books: trees (12.117.267), grains (18.1-18.365), and garden plants (19.1-19.189). Sections in the eleventh through eighteenth books
corresponding to the sections on the medicinal properties of flowers and the medicinal properties of prickly plants,
however, are noticeably absent, perhaps providing evidence of the work’s unfinished state upon Pliny’s death in the
eruption of Mt. Vesuvius (although it should be noted that Barry Baldwin has forcefully rejected the standard
scholarly opinion that Pliny’s death prevented him from making the final revisions to his text). Regardless of why
these sections do not appear in the text, the evidence that Pliny intended their inclusion is arguably more significant
than their absence. Pliny opens the seventeenth book of the encyclopedia, which follows his discussion of the nature
of trees, with the statement that his next subject “is the nature of grains (fruges), gardens (horti), and flowers
(flores), as well as the other things (alia), besides trees and shrubs (arbores aut frutices), that spring forth from the
generous earth.” natura frugum hortorumque ac florum quaeque alia praeter arbores aut frutices benigna tellure
proveniunt. Ibid., 18.1. Although the terms arbores aut frutices, fruges, and horti all serve as headings for
identifiable sections of the text, the words flores and alia denote nonexistent categories, providing headings for lists
that cannot be found in the first half of the Natural History. These headings were undoubtedly listed in accordance
with the encyclopedia’s preconceived design, a design that Pliny, for whatever reason, left incomplete. Cf. Baldwin,
“Composition of Natural History,” 75-76; Duff, Literary History of Rome, 354.
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scrutiny. 35 As has been shown, Pliny’s attention to the structure of his work extended well
beyond the primary architectonic units comprising the text’s annular compositional scheme to
various subordinate structures, including the very lists at the heart of his encyclopedic “inventory
of the world.” 36 Nevertheless, although the posited architectonic schema accounts for Pliny’s
otherwise inexplicable decision to include a list of medicines derived from animals after a list of
medicines derived from plants rather than in the books immediately succeeding his examination
of the various species of animals, the preceding interpretation of the architecture of the text not
only appears to fail to account for Pliny’s “digressions” on art, but also raises new questions
concerning Pliny’s motive for ordering his subject matter annularly in the first place. The
division of the text and the consequent duplication of each of the extensive lists contained in the
first eighteen books seem to complicate unnecessarily the purported Plinian project of providing
an inventory of the world and to conflict with the inherited understanding of the Natural History
as a reference book designed to make the products of Nature readily accessible to its readers. 37
Indeed, the organization of information “in order to preserve it and make it accessible to a large
audience” would seem to be the primary function of an encyclopedia, and yet the duplication of
lists in the Natural History renders the reader’s task more difficult by dividing each of the topics
covered in the encyclopedia between two separate lists occupying different locations in the
text. 38 If the supposition of an annular compositional schema renders the general arrangement of
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the text intelligible, a mystery still shrouds Pliny’s motive for rejecting a linear compositional
arrangement, more suited to his purported purpose, for a more complex ring-like structure.
In his epistolary preface, Pliny issues an almost oracular pronouncement concerning the
subject of his encyclopedia that provides the interpretive key for unlocking the purpose of the
dynamic, annular movement of the text. In an oblique reference to the substance of his
undertaking, Pliny emphasizes the difficulty of his task, which consists, he writes, of giving “to
all things indeed nature and to nature of her own all things” (omnibus vero naturam et naturae
sua omnia). 39 Pliny’s sententious description of his undertaking, which could be stated more
clearly as to give “indeed nature to all things and all of her own things to nature,” has been
translated literally in order to preserve its chiastic structure, as it is possible to discern within the
chiasmus omnia – natura – natura – omnia the same annular sequence structuring the
encyclopedia. 40 Insofar as Pliny’s aphoristic description of his task constitutes an outline of the
Natural History’s fundamental structure, the two halves of the chiasmus correspond to the two
halves of the text as a whole: in the first through eighteenth books, Pliny extends nature to all
things, describing separately the nature of each item contained in Nature’s manifold, while in the
nineteenth through thirty-sixth books, he reintroduces each item into Nature’s all-encompassing
teleological order, describing how all things sustain the life of man (for whose sake, Pliny
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informs his readers in the opening words of the nineteenth book, all things exist). 41 The two
halves of the encyclopedia thus correspond to two different aspects of the natural world: the
natural world as an aggregation of individual items, each with its own peculiar nature, and the
natural world as an encompassing teleological order in which each of the products of Nature is
defined in relation to the needs of human life and thereby integrated into a meaningful whole. 42
Beagon and Carey’s insight that Pliny used the architecture of the universe as a model for his
encyclopedia is therefore confirmed, although both authors were wrong to assert that the
universe provided a blueprint for the text as a whole. In fact, both halves of the text contain
microcosmic representations of the natural world, with the two sets of eighteen books each
replicating the cosmos as it appears from a different perspective. 43
In the text immediately preceding his chiastic description of his task, Pliny offers an
explicit statement of the subject matter of his encyclopedia that appears to confirm the propriety
of using the chiasmus as a shorthand description of the work’s structure – a statement that has
frequently been cited but perhaps never fully understood: “The subject of my discourse,” writes
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Pliny, “is the nature of things, or in other words, life” (rerum natura, hoc est vita, narratur). 44
Pliny again provides a twofold characterization of his subject, in this instance implicitly equating
the content of the natural world with the content of human life. Although such an equation is
consistent with classical teleological conceptions of nature, as shall be shown in succeeding
chapters, Pliny did not consider this equation an eternal verity but rather a contingent, historical
achievement – an achievement made possible by Pompey’s military victories in Asia, realized
with the establishment of the principate, and dependent for its continuation upon the maintenance
of Roman global imperium. Indeed, according to Pliny, the total integration of the world of
nature into human life through the use of Nature’s products as aliments, medicaments, building
materials, and so on, presupposes global intercommunication, transportation, and trade,
conditions that in turn presuppose the establishment of a universal language, the construction of
worldwide highways and waterways, and the preservation of global peace and security through
the deployment of an unrivalled military force. For Pliny, these preconditions for the unification
of the spheres of nature and life were a recent achievement in the history of man. As Pliny
writes with exuberance and evident satisfaction, “For who would not admit, now that the
greatness of the Roman Empire has caused communications to be established throughout the
world, that life (vita) has been advanced by the interchange of goods and by a partnership in the
blessings of peace, as well as by the fact that all those things that previously had been hidden are
now available for general use?” 45 In short, for Pliny, the complete integration of the world of
nature into human life required the alignment of the limits of a unified political order with the
limits of the natural world, an alignment that Pliny and his contemporaries believed had been
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achieved under Augustus. 46 Accordingly, the second half of Pliny’s encyclopedia does not
simply describe the integration of the products of Nature into human life during the course of the
history of human development, providing a phylogenetic account of the teleological “order of
life” (ordo vitae), but more fundamentally offers a description of the political history of Nature,
a history culminating in the establishment of the principate and in the publication of the Natural
History itself, a book that explains the human uses of all of Nature’s gifts. 47
Strangely, the centrality of the concept of time to Pliny’s encyclopedia has been largely
overlooked by previous scholars, causing most of Pliny’s commentators to posit the existence of
a static relationship between “nature” and “culture” in Plinian thought. 48 On one extreme,
Andrew Wallace-Hadrill has discerned an “antithesis of nature and culture … at the heart of the
Natural History.” 49 According to Wallace-Hadrill, Pliny, in the guise of a proto-social contract
theorist, advances a particular conception of nature in the Natural History as a standard against
which to measure “competing social-value systems” with the ultimate intention of legitimizing
the “traditional [Roman] social ethic.” 50 The image of Pliny as a conservative, aristocratic

46

As Trevor Murphy contends, “Pliny’s encyclopedia could only be written because Roman power had already
organized the world for it. In his lifetime, to an extent previously inconceivable, centuries of thought, the
knowledge of three continents, and of their mountains, herbs, seas, animals, and histories, became available to be
apprehended by a single mind. And this hypothetical mind, if it ever existed, belonged to Pliny, who occupied a
particularly favourable vantage-point … If the Natural History has a unity, it is the unity of Roman power; for the
limits of the world, of Roman imperium, and of knowledge are all the same.” Murphy, Empire in the Encyclopedia,
50.

47

Pliny Naturalis Historia 12.2.

48

The one exceptional scholar in this regard appears to be Roger French, who has observed that “Pliny’s account of
human progress is the story of how man has learned to use the natural world” and that “Pliny’s use of history implies
that providence’s plans are only now coming into effect, for all the arts … came into being historically, and by
human ingenuity.” Nevertheless, French neither attends adequately to the implications of these elements of Pliny’s
thought, nor explores the possibility that they are part of a larger philosophy of history, merely asserting in harmony
with inherited interpretations of Pliny’s encyclopedia that Pliny “does not seem to have a theory of history.” French,
Ancient Natural History, 213, 253.

49

Andrew Wallace-Hadrill, “Pliny the Elder and Man’s Unnatural History,” Greece & Rome 37 (1990), 82.

50

Ibid., 92.

26

reactionary is one of the standard caricatures present in the scholarly literature, and its
application to questions regarding the Plinian conception of Nature is in itself unsurprising. 51
Much more important for present purposes is his claim that within such an interpretive
framework the “Natural History of the earth is by inversion the Unnatural History of Man,” for
even though it evinces a concern for the role of history in Pliny’s thought, the relationship
between the history of nature and the history of culture is itself depicted as completely atemporal: derived from the permanent antithesis of nature and culture, the history of culture is
always the inverse of the history of nature. 52
On the other extreme, Mary Beagon, Gian Biagio Conte, and others have asserted that in
Pliny’s mind “nature” and “culture” are identical rather than antithetical. Beagon, for instance,
writes,
His nature is not a scientific entity, but the theatre of human life in which the focus is
human interaction with nature, the ‘natural history’ of the title: thus, the HN’s books on
plants are not merely classificatory lists of species, but are based primarily around the
plants’ usefulness to the human race in medicine, agriculture, and horticulture. The
description of minerals is actually subsumed into a history of human art, since the bulk of
human contact with them revolves around their use in painting, sculpture, and agriculture.
In the HN, nature meets culture and is indistinguishable from it. 53
Beagon’s description of the Natural History, however, is not entirely accurate, as Pliny’s initial
books on plants in fact constitute little more “than classificatory lists of species,” and she is
forced to admit elsewhere that the items covered in the encyclopedia are not mentioned solely

51

Cf. French, Ancient Natural History, 196; Nicholas Phillies Howe, “In Defense of the Encyclopedic Mode: On
Pliny’s Preface to the Natural History,” Latomus 44 (1985), 575; Reynolds, “Pliny and His Times,” 1-2.

52

Wallace-Hadrill, “Man’s Unnatural History,” 81.

53

Beagon, On the Human Animal, 21. Similarly, Conte argues that “Pliny’s nature is not conceived as an
autonomous reality different from man, but lives the same life as humankind does, simultaneously a projection of
human beings’ desire and an image of their existential drama … The [Plinian] universe is entirely founded upon the
intrinsic solidarity of nature and culture, an indivisible unity, which in fact models the former upon the latter.”
Conte, Genres and Readers, 76, 88-89. Isager also refers to a “synthesis of nature and culture” in Pliny’s chapters
on art. Isager, Pliny on Art, 78.

27

“when it is apposite to cite their purpose in men’s lives,” but on occasion appear to be “described
in and for themselves in so far as they are examples of the varietas of Natura.” 54
The confusion that arises from Beagon’s conflicting descriptions of the text and the
seemingly irreconcilable interpretations of the relationship between nature and culture advanced
by Beagon and Wallace-Hadrill dissipates once the relationship between the first and second
halves of the encyclopedia is recognized: in the first set of eighteen books, the products of
Nature are indeed generally “described in and for themselves,” while in the second set of
eighteen books, they are described in terms of the various ways in which they sustain human life.
In other words, the antithesis between nature and culture implicit in the first eighteen books is
redescribed as a synthesis in the nineteenth through thirty-sixth books. Beagon and WallaceHadrill are in a sense both right, but each is right only in reference to one half of the text. It is
thus unsurprising that in the quoted passage Beagon appears to draw all of her examples of the
synonymity of “nature” and “culture” from the final eighteen books of the Natural History.
Although Beagon and Wallace-Hadrill offer incompatible interpretations of the
relationship between nature and culture in Pliny’s Natural History, they are in agreement
concerning this relationship’s a-temporal character: whether nature and culture are identical or
antithetically opposed, the relationship between them is constant and immutable. As has been
suggested, however, for Pliny the “history” of Nature consists precisely in the integration of the
natural world into human life, a gradual process through which the varied products of Nature,
each with its own peculiar nature, one by one become “the things through which we live”
(quibus vivimus). 55 This process, consisting in a movement from the non-identity to the identity
of nature and human life, is recapitulated by Pliny’s readers as they pass from the first half to the
54
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second half of the encyclopedia. Such a conception of natural history temporalizes the
relationship between man and nature, making the extent of the overlap between the realm of
human activity and the realm of nature, and ultimately the very distinction between these two
realms, a function of the progress of history. 56 Indeed, if the concept of “culture” can be found
anywhere in Pliny, it refers not to a sphere of human activity either permanently identified with
or forever gaining its identity in opposition to the sphere of nature, but rather to the process of
cultivating life through the progressive introduction of the natural world into the world of man, a
process inextricably linked to the historical supersession of the Greek polis by the Roman
Empire and the gradual extension of the boundaries of the Roman authority to the edges of the
earth. 57 As has been observed, for Pliny, this process culminates in the publication of the
Natural History itself, a work that formally introduces the contents of the universe into
mankind’s collective memory, making the varied uses of the products of Nature known to all
men throughout the world for all time and thereby establishing the identity of nature and life. 58
Although the Plinian concept of cultivation, embracing both the cultivation of the individual
human being and the cultivation of the human species as a whole, as well as the relationship
between the publication of Pliny’s encyclopedia and the general course of human history, will be
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examined more carefully in the following two chapters, it is worth noting here that a
commitment to human flourishing is the origin of Pliny’s sense of purpose and the source of the
dogged determination evident in his assertion, written as he approached the midpoint of his
encyclopedia, that despite the animadversions of his critics “we will continue to cultivate life”
(pergemus excolere vitam). 59
The foregoing description of Pliny’s purpose in publishing his encyclopedia is only
preliminary and perhaps at present lacks sufficient textual support to gain the reader’s
unqualified assent, but additional evidence for the more limited claim that Pliny’s text can be
divided into two halves corresponding to the two aspects of the natural world denoted by the
concepts “the nature of things” and “life” is readily available. 60 First and foremost, such a
division of the text accounts for Pliny’s so-called “digressions” on painting and sculpture in the
work’s thirty-second through thirty-sixth books. A description of the greatest works of art
known to the ancient world, catalogued according to the materials from which they are made,
does not lie outside the scope of Pliny’s encyclopedic enterprise, as virtually all scholars
heretofore have assumed, but is instead intrinsically related to the very purpose of the second
half of the text, in which Pliny seeks to explain how the products of Nature have been integrated
into human life. The categories of the natural world remain the text’s organizing principle, and
the thirty-second through thirty-sixth books are divided accordingly into sections on metals
59
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(33.1-34.178), soils (35.1-35.202), and stones (36.1-37.200). Within each of these sections,
however, Pliny examines the ways in which the material world has been integrated into human
life, including the role played by various metals, stones, and pigments in the production of works
of art. 61 The inherited assumption that Pliny’s sections on art were “inserted into the Historia
Naturalis as a digression, which was artificially linked to the history of mineralogy on the pretext
of the materials employed,” a belief reinforced by their frequent treatment as “an episode
sufficiently complete in itself to be made … the subject of a special inquiry [isolated from the
larger text],” rests almost entirely upon the belief that Pliny was incapable of maintaining control
over his own materials. 62 In light of the concern for structure evident in the architectonic
arrangement of the text of the Natural History, a sophisticated understanding of the world of
nature, rather than authorial incompetence, provides a much more convincing explanation of
Pliny’s decision to include chapters on the history of art in his massive tome. 63
Second, in Pliny’s own metatextual comments directing his readers’ attention to other
sections of the encyclopedia, Pliny refers to the topics covered in these sections in a manner
61
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consistent with a division of the text into two halves dealing successively with the subjects “the
nature of things” and “life.” When a particular item covered in the first half of the encyclopedia
is reintroduced in the second half, for instance, Pliny frequently refers to the previous section in
which the “nature” of that item was originally discussed. Thus, in his presentation of the
medicinal properties of oysters in the encyclopedia’s thirty-first book, Pliny refers his readers to
the section in the eighth book in which he examined “the nature of aquatic animals” (natura
aquatilium), and in his presentation of the medicinal properties of mulberries in the
encyclopedia’s twenty-fourth book, he likewise directs his readers to his discussion of the
“nature” (natura) of the mulberry tree in the fifteenth book. 64 Elsewhere in the second half of
the encyclopedia, Pliny makes similar references to the separate “natures” of sponges, oxen, and
bees, each time citing a passage contained in one of the first eighteen books. 65 Pliny’s sections
on bees are especially illuminating, as he not only refers his readers to the section in the tenth
book on the “nature” of bees on three separate occasions in the twenty-second book, but also
explicitly defers treatment of honey-based remedies during his discussion of bees in the tenth
book, noting that remedies derived from bees will be examined “in their proper places” (suis
locis). 66 “For at present,” Pliny continues, “my discourse concerns their nature.” 67
Finally, at two structurally significant locations in the text, Pliny explicitly states that he
is treating the “natures” of things and their medicinal properties separately. First, at the end of
the eighteenth book, in the concluding sentences of the first half of the encyclopedia, Pliny
explains that his “well-ordered plan” (iusta ratio) has prevented him from intertwining with each
64
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successive subject (res) a consideration of its medicinal properties. “As it is,” Pliny writes,
“each topic will remain fixed in its own part of the text, and they can be connected by those who
wish to do so.” 68 A similar concern for keeping his analysis of the distinct natures of the various
items contained in his inventory of the world in the first half of his encyclopedia separate from
his examination of their medicinal and other life-sustaining properties in its second half is
evident in the passage that marks the beginning of his books on medicaments derived from
animals. Pliny writes:
We have already related the natures of animals (naturas animalium) and the things that
have been discovered by each of them – for they have benefited us by discovering
medicines, and these are no less beneficial than those they supply – but now that which is
of assistance in the animals themselves is being made known, even though these things
have not been omitted entirely in our previous discussion; for although this is a different
subject, the two are nevertheless intimately connected. 69
Introducing the penultimate architectonic unit of his encyclopedia, Pliny alludes to the two
aspects of the natural world as they are manifested in animals and to the difficulty of treating
them separately. The peculiar “nature” of a particular animal and the animal’s role in sustaining
human life within Nature’s larger teleological scheme are different subjects, but they are
“nevertheless intimately connected.” The world of nature is in fact a single, unified reality, such
that the “true nature” (vera natura) of a particular plant cannot be understood without knowledge
of its “healing effect” (medicus effectus), but it can appear either as an aggregation of individual
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entities or as an integrated, teleologically-ordered whole depending upon the perspective of the
observer. 70 Pliny’s concern for addressing all things in their “proper places,” a concern that
pervades the text, is a product of his awareness of the difficulty of keeping Nature’s two faces
distinct while nonetheless giving a complete description of the single underlying reality. Total
knowledge requires a vision of the whole, but the whole itself has two aspects which must be
treated separately if they are to be understood fully and without distortion. As Pliny explains,
“[T]he plan of my work has necessitated the division of those things that must be combined
again by those who wish to know thoroughly the nature of things.” 71 The tension between the
division of the text and its annular structure, a tension manifest in the seeming contradiction
between the duplication of lists and the supposition of a single universe, the very premise of
Pliny’s encyclopedic project, is consequently ultimately a reflection of the finitude of man and
the resulting distinction between appearance and reality – a distinction first formulated by the
philosophers of ancient Greece, the representatives of a superseded age. 72
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B. Man’s Place in the World of the Text and in the World of Nature
As was mentioned above, the revelation of a long-standing error in the interpretation of
the architecture of the Natural History, though perhaps interesting in itself, would be of little
consequence if a failure to appreciate the structure of the encyclopedia had not also resulted in a
failure to understand its content. The close “relationship between [Pliny’s] material and its
arrangement,” proposed by Carey and already detected in Pliny’s treatment of gold rings,
however, suggests that errors in the standard schematization of the structure of the work are
related to errors in the inherited interpretation of Plinian thought. 73 In fact, once observed, the
annular arrangement of the contents of the Natural History immediately comes into conflict with
the conventional scholarly understanding of Pliny’s purportedly Stoic conception of human
nature, according to which man is a rational being endowed with a share of the divine reason
permeating and governing the cosmos and thereby distinguished from all other beings existing
within the world. 74 Such an understanding of the Plinian conception of human nature not only
fails to cohere with Pliny’s actual description of man, who nowhere in the Natural History is
defined as a rational being, but also runs afoul of his depiction of the universe, which according
to Pliny is governed more by blind rage rather than by divine reason. Yet, the attribution of a
stoical philosophical anthropology to the Elder Pliny has gone almost completely unchallenged,
shielded from critique by a misinterpretation of the architectonic structure of the text and by the
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entrenched scholarly prejudice, now over half a millennium old, that Pliny possessed only a
mediocre intellect.
The assumption that the world’s first encyclopedist, whose task without question
consisted overwhelmingly in the compilation of facts, merely absorbed the prevailing
philosophical doctrines of his age without actually being engaged in philosophical inquiry or
being the source of any original philosophical doctrines is understandable. Indeed, the very idea
of an encyclopedia as “a neutral instrument, receptive in every direction, continually written by
past texts,” seems to lend support to a corresponding vision of the encyclopedist as someone
whose own philosophical views are mostly if not entirely determined by the currents of thought
to which he has been exposed. 75 Thus, Beagon, perhaps the world’s foremost authority on
Pliny’s Natural History, writes that “Pliny’s Stoicism … was not the carefully worked-through
theorizing of the specialist philosopher,” but rather “a world-view in effect almost unconsciously
absorbed and displayed.” 76 As shall be shown in greater detail in the next chapter, this depiction
of Pliny as a sponge, mindlessly soaking up information without generating any novel ideas of
his own, a depiction closely linked to the standard description of his encyclopedia as “nothing
more than a compilation from other records,” has played a crucial role in the perpetuation of the
myth of Pliny’s Stoicism. 77 The inherited caricature of Pliny as “an uncritical epitomist,” an
“obsessive compiler” of facts, and an “average intellectual” whose virtue lay more in his
“archivistic commitment” and his “drive for totality” than in his innate mental vigor, not only
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predisposes interpreters to read Stoic ideas into Pliny’s text, but also allows commentators to
explain away the seemingly un-Stoic statements scattered throughout the encyclopedia as a
product of Pliny’s inability to comprehend fully the esoteric teachings of the philosophers whose
doctrines he had received only second-hand. 78 Hence, whenever convenient, the proponents of
the existence of a Stoic philosophical anthropology beneath the surface of the text of Pliny’s
encyclopedia are able to dismiss the incontestable presence of Epicurean and even skeptical
strains of thought in the Natural History by drawing a distinction “between the exponent of Stoic
philosophy and Pliny the writer with Stoic beliefs.” 79 Statements in the Natural History
inconsistent with Stoic teachings are taken as proof of Pliny’s intellectual mediocrity rather than
as evidence of the complexity and sophistication of his thought, and an image of Pliny as
someone congenitally incapable of grasping the larger philosophical system whence his hodgepodge of beliefs primarily derived, and who consequently lacked a framework within which to
notice the contradictions present in his own thought resulting from his unconscious adoption of
doctrines from multiple philosophical schools, emerges to complement the traditional image of
the world’s first encyclopedist as “a careless compiler of other people’s facts.” 80
Importantly, Beagon, whose exposition of the Plinian conception of Nature has become
the typical point of departure for, as well as the standard reference cited in, subsequent
discussions of Pliny’s Stoicism, ultimately bases her interpretation of Pliny’s theory of human
78

Isager, Pliny on Art, 29; Calvino, “Man, Sky, and Elephant,” 316; Conte, Genres and Readers, 68, 103; Carey,
Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 20, 180. For examples of stances taken by Pliny inconsistent with contemporaneous
orthodox Stoic opinions, see Healy, Pliny on Science, 30, 32, 108-109; Klaus Sallmann, “Reserved for Eternal
Punishment: The Elder Pliny’s View of Free Germania (HN 16.1-6),” The American Journal of Philology 108
(1987), 115-17.
79

Beagon, Roman Nature, 30. Cf. Beagon, Roman Nature, 33, 72-4 (esp. 72n33); Healy, Pliny on Science, 74;
Simon Sepp, Pyrrhoneische Studien (Freising: Erlangen, 1893), chap. 2.
80

French, Ancient Natural History, 207. Beagon, for instance, in a statement intended to exculpate Pliny for his
supposed failings as a Stoic philosopher, contends that it “is hardly fair to blame Pliny too much for careless error
and inconsistency. What we see is an imprecise absorption of such subtleties by a layman.” Beagon, Roman
Nature, 16.

37

nature on the traditional schematic outline of the structure of the Natural History and not on
Pliny’s actual statements in the text of his encyclopedia. 81 Beagon, clearly cognizant of the lack
of textual support for Pliny’s purportedly Stoic philosophical anthropology, writes,
It is typical of Pliny that he makes no direct philosophical statements about man’s unique
superiority and central position in the universe. Instead, he expresses it through the
cumulative effect of the HN; that is, through the actual structure of the work and through
the ideas emphasized within it. His main discussion of the human race in book 7 follows
the books describing the world and its features but precedes those devoted to the rest of
the animal kingdom (bks. 8-11). 82
Beagon’s description of the structure of the first eleven books of the Natural History conforms to
the standard schema: the first book serves as an index for the remaining thirty-six; the second
through sixth books treat “the world and its features”; the seventh book concerns man; and the
eighth through eleventh books are devoted to animals. Such a schematization of the first eleven
books, in which Book 7 is presented as “a self-contained unit” existing independently of both the
preceding and the succeeding sets of books, is shared by the vast majority of Pliny’s
commentators. 83 The structure of the work thus appears to reflect a Stoic view of man’s place in
the universe, with human beings occupying a unique position subordinate to the whole but
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nevertheless elevated above everything else existent within the whole. 84 Man’s “share in the
divine mind,” the basis of his privileged place in the cosmos, opens “a gulf between man and
beast,” a gulf replicated in the structure of the encyclopedia itself through the treatment of the
nature of man in a separate book preceding the remaining sets of books on animals, plants, and
minerals. 85
That Beagon’s position concerning the Plinian conception of man is untenable is apparent
in light of the foregoing examination of the annular structure of the Natural History. The sixth
book within Pliny’s original scheme is not “a self-contained unit,” but rather a subordinate
element within a larger architectonic unit encompassing five books on the diverse natures of the
various species of animals. 86 Although prominently placed within this larger architectonic unit
in accordance with Pliny’s teleological conception of the natural world, the structure of the work
belies the notion that Plinian man stands outside the animal kingdom rather than within it.
Hence, Beagon’s assertion of the existence of “an unbridgeable gap” between man and animals
in the Natural History resulting from man’s capacity for rational thought, a gap supposedly
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reflected in the structure of the work, cannot withstand scrutiny. 87 Contra Beagon’s claim that
“there is more evidence for stressing rather than underplaying the gap between man and the other
animals in the HN,” the very plan of the work, which Pliny evidently conceived prior to its
execution and to which he self-consciously adhered throughout, indicates that Pliny considered
man a member of the same superordinate category structuring the natural world as the other
species of animals. 88 Although man is the ultimate beneficiary of all of Nature’s products, he
exists fully within the natural world rather than in opposition to it. For Beagon, the devotion of
an entire book to the separate treatment of human nature was a reflection of Pliny’s twofold
belief in man’s “uniqueness” as the sole being capable of “deliberative rational thinking” and in
the resulting “gulf existing between man and animal,” a description of man and his relationship
to the natural world which she admits cannot be found anywhere in the text of the Natural
History but which is nevertheless “characteristic of … Late Stoic thought” as transmitted through
the extant writings of “other ancient authors.” 89 Assumptions regarding Pliny’s utter
dependence on “other” authors in the completion of his “monumental compilatory task” thus
combine with a mischaracterization of the structure of the encyclopedia to ensure that Pliny’s
true understanding of man’s place in the natural world has remained hidden from view. 90
Whereas Pliny’s inclusion of his book on the nature of man (natura hominum) within a
larger superordinate category encompassing all animal life is inconsistent with his supposed
conception of man as a rational being essentially different from all other existents and “set apart”
from the animal kingdom, an inconsistency that contradicts efforts to find a Stoic philosophical
87
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anthropology reflected in the architectonic structure of the encyclopedia, the internal structure of
the sixth book provides a more fruitful starting point for an investigation into Pliny’s true
conception of man. 91 Indeed, although the location of the book on man within the structure of
the encyclopedia as a whole indicates that Pliny considered the human race one species of animal
life among others, confuting the claim that man is sui generis in Plinian thought, the structure of
the book itself nevertheless suggests that for Pliny the human animal is distinct from the other
species of animals contained in Nature’s manifold. The structure of the sixth book of the
Natural History, though seldom noted, is easily discerned: Chapters 1-5 – Proem on the Paradox
of Man as Both the Pinnacle of Nature and Nature’s Most Pitiful Product; Chapters 6-32 – The
Marvelous Diversity of the Different Races of Men; Chapters 33-67 – Pregnancy, Gestation, and
Birth; Chapters 68-76 – Child Development; Chapters 77-152 – Adulthood; Chapters 153-190 –
Human Longevity and Death; and Chapters 191-215 – A Catalogue of Inventors and Inventions.
Although Beagon offers a slightly different breakdown of the book’s primary divisions, Pliny’s
organizing principle is unmistakable, with the sequence of topics tracing “the natural history of
man from birth to death.” 92 Following the proem, the chapters on the diverse races of men
delimit Pliny’s field of investigation by using descriptions of the prodigious and the
extraordinary to establish the general contours of the human species, a method of conceptual
definition that recurs at the level of the individual in subsequent chapters. 93 Chapters 33 through
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190 then treat of the nature of man. The catalogue of inventors and inventions, comprising the
final twenty-five chapters of the book, initially seems out of place, and these chapters are indeed
often treated as an “appendix” to the book’s central sections on the birth, maturation, and death
of the human animal. 94 As with other instances in which Pliny appears to digress from his
theme, that is, to violate the preconceived scheme of his work and to introduce extraneous
content into his encyclopedia, Pliny’s catalogue of inventions, as shall be shown shortly, is in
fact integral to his apologetic purpose.
It is significant that the human animal is the only animal described in Pliny’s
encyclopedia in terms of its individual developmental history, and it is even more significant that
the framework within which Pliny discusses the nature of man in his sixth book thus corresponds
to an explicit statement in the book’s proem concerning that which distinguishes man from the
other species of animals: “All other animals feel the force of their own natures, with some
making use of their speed, others their swiftness in flight, and still others their ability to swim,
but man knows nothing except by learning – neither how to speak nor how to walk nor how to
eat; and in brief, he knows nothing by the will of Nature other than how to weep!” 95 Content is
once again correlated with form, and the structure of the sixth book reflects its substance. Man is
distinguished from the other animals by the possibility of development, and just as Pliny’s
concern for the development of the human race as a whole, evident in his phylogenetic account
of the introduction of nature into human life, finds expression in the architecture of the entire
encyclopedia, his concern for the development of the individual finds expression in the plan of
Empire in the Encyclopedia, 88. I will return to the subject of Pliny’s method of conceptual definition in the
following chapter.
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the book he devotes to human nature. 96 As shall be shown in greater detail in the following two
chapters, these two developmental processes are inseparably linked, with individual human
flourishing being dependent upon the progress of the species and with the progress of the species
being dependent upon the discoveries and inventions of its individual members. Consequently,
the catalogue of inventors and inventions that concludes the sixth book is not an ornamental
excursus appended to Pliny’s description of man, but rather an account of how human nature has
gained concrete expression across history through discoveries and inventions that have resulted
in the advancement of the species – an account that links the preceding sections on the
development of the individual with the larger developmental process recorded in, and brought to
completion through, the Natural History.
As in other contexts, scholarly assumptions regarding Pliny’s authorial ineptitude have
concealed the centrality of the catalogue of inventors and inventions to Pliny’s project. In her
recent translation of Pliny’s sixth book, for instance, Beagon renders the sentence with which
Pliny introduces his catalogue in the following words: “Before we leave the subject of man’s
nature, it seems appropriate to append a list of inventions and inventors.” 97 The original Latin
text, however, gives a very different description of the relationship between Pliny’s list and the
text of the book as a whole. Pliny writes, Consentaneum videtur, priusquam digrediamur a
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natura hominum, indicare quae cuiusque inventa sint. 98 In addition to deemphasizing the phrase
Consentaneum videtur (“It seems fitting” or “It seems appropriate”), with which Pliny begins the
sentence, Beagon translates the word indicare, meaning “to make known,” “to point out,” “to
indicate,” or “to betray,” as “to append,” and thus in a manner that accords more with her
presuppositions regarding Pliny’s style of writing and his abilities as an author than with the
attested uses of the word in the Latin of the Silver Age. Beagon, who suggests in her
commentary that the list of inventors and inventions was “added as an afterthought,” allows her
belief in Pliny’s intellectual mediocrity to affect her translation of Pliny’s own description of the
relationship between the list and the larger book in which it is embedded. 99 The list was not
simply “appended” to the chapter, an addendum falling outside the original plan of the work and
providing evidence of Pliny’s assumed lack of forethought, but instead contains items that Pliny
believed ought to be “made known” in a complete description of the nature of man.
A closer examination of Pliny’s catalogue of inventors and inventions reveals that it is
more than a simple list and that it, too, has a complex structure, which, if recognized, sheds
additional light on the interrelationship between the development of the individual and the
development of the human race in Plinian thought. Indeed, Pliny’s catalogue, which in reality
has more in common with Hesiod’s account of the sequence of historical ages or Polybius’s
description of the cycle of regimes than with a modern grocery list, is structured according to a
sophisticated principle of composition and constitutes a structural whole located within the
developmental structure of the sixth book, a structure which in turn can be understood fully only
in terms the larger architectonic unit on the natures of animals to which it belongs. Pliny’s
purportedly paratactic organization of his materials, in which “synonymic contiguity,” “a
98
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designation’s assonance,” or “features of analogy … are enough to throw a series into disorder,
authorizing an insertion or an entirely gratuitous digression,” an organization within which facts
and anecdotes are juxtaposed in an almost endless sequential chain with no source of continuity
beyond the particular and often unspoken association linking each pair of contiguous
encyclopedic entries, must be rejected for a more sophisticated understanding of the
encyclopedia’s encompassing hypotactic organization in which superordinate structural units
contain successively smaller subordinate structures through which every datum of information
recorded in the encyclopedia has a “proper place” within the whole. 100
After an introductory section in which Pliny dutifully records customary tales about the
divine origins of commerce, the insignia of royal authority, corn, flour, laws, and writing, he
gives an account of over 150 discoveries and inventions, usually providing the names of those
credited with their introduction into human life. Although Pliny presents his record of inventions
prosaically, his staccato style and the almost total absence of rhetorical embellishments give the
concluding chapters of the sixth book an inventorial character that can be reproduced with little
loss of information in the form of a list, such as the one depicted in table 1.
Previous commentators have found little worth noting about Pliny’s list. Roger French,
who is generally one of Pliny’s most generous interpreters, merely describes the catalogue as an
“account of human progress” and as a reflection of Pliny’s belief that man’s “[k]nowledge of
nature and the arts … was continually improving.” 101 Beagon, who at her most generous is able
to describe the catalogue of inventors and inventions only as an excursus not “totally irrelevant
to the HN’s portrayal of man in nature,” nevertheless also discerns an account of human progress
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Table 1. Pliny’s Catalogue of Inventors and Inventions
Invention
Inventor
Brick-Kilns and Houses

Euryalus and Hyperbius

Building with Clay

Toxius

Towns

Cecrops, King Phoroneus, or the
Egyptians

Roof Tiles

Cinyra

Copper Mining

Cinyra

Tongs, Hammer, Crowbar, and Anvil

Cinyra

Wells

Danaus

Stone Quarrying

Cadmus

Walls

Thrason

Towers

The Cyclopes or the Tirynthians

Woven Fabric

The Egyptians

Dyeing Wool

The Lydians

Spindle

Closter

Rope and Net

Arachne

Fulling Cloth

Nicias

Shoemaking

Tychias

Medicine

The Egyptians or Arabus

Herbology and Pharmacology

Chiron

Smelting and Working with Copper

Lydus or Delas

Forging Bronze

Chalybes or the Cyclopes

Forging Iron

The Dactyli of Ida

Silver

Erichthonius or Aeacus

Mining and Smelting Gold

Cadmus, Thoas, Aecus, or Sol

Medicines Derived from Metals

Sol

Tin

Midacritus

Working with Iron

The Cyclopes

Pottery

Coroebus

Potter’s Wheel

Anacharsis or Hyperbius
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(table 1 cont.)
Carpentry

Daedalus

Saw, Ax, Plumb Line, Auger, Glue, and Isinglass

Daedalus

Square, Plumb Rule, Lathe, and Lever

Theodorus

Measures and Weights

Phidon or Palamedes

Striking Fire from Flint

Pyrodes

Preserving a Flame in a Fennel Stalk

Prometheus

Four-Wheeled Vehicle

The Phrygians

Trade

The Phoenicians

Viticulture and Arboriculture

Eumolpus

Mixing Wine with Water

Staphylus

Oil and Oil Press

Aristaeus

Honey

Aristaeus

Ox-Drawn Plow

Buzyges or Triptolemus

Monarchical Government

The Egyptians

Democratic Government

The Athenians

Tyranny

Phalaris

Slavery

The Spartans

Capital Trials

The Members of the Areopagus

Cudgel

The Africans

Shield

Proetus and Acrisius or Chalcus

Breastplate

Midias

Helmet, Sword, and Spear

The Spartans

Greaves and Helmet Plumes

The Carians

Bow and Arrow

Scythes or Perses

Light Spear

The Aetolians

Javelin Slung with a Thong

Aetolus

Spear for Light-Armed Soldiers

Tyrrhenus

Javelin for Infantrymen

Tyrrhenus

Battle-Ax

Penthesilea
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(table 1 cont.)
Hunting Spear and Scorpion 102

Pisaeus

Catapult

The Cretans

Ballista and Sling

The Syrophoenicians

Bronze Trumpet

Pysaeus

Tortoise-Screen

103

Artemo

Battering-Ram

Epius

Horse-Riding

Bellerophon

Reins and Saddles

Pelethronius

Fighting on Horseback

The Thessalians

Harnessing Pairs of Horses

The Phrygians

Harnessing Teams of Four Horses

Erichthonius

Military Formation, Passwords, Watchwords,

Palamedes

and Sentries
Watchtower Signals

Sinon

Truces

Lycaon

Treaties

Theseus

Auguries from Birds

Car

Auspices from Animals Besides Birds

Orpheus

Extispicy

Delphus

Pyromancy

Amphiaraus

Divination from the Entrails of Birds

Tiresias

Interpretation of Portents and Dreams

Amphictyon

Astronomy

Atlans, the Egyptians, or the
Assyrians

Astronomical Globe

Anaximander

System of Winds

Aeolus

Music

Amphion

102

A missile engine

103

A device used to protect soldiers while assaulting enemy fortifications
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Pipe and Flute

Pan

Slanting Flute

Midias

Double Flute

Marsyas

Lydian Mode

Amphion

Dorian Mode

Thamyras

Phrygian Mode

Marsyas

Lyre (with Four Strings)

Amphion, Orpheus, or Linus

Lyre with Seven Strings

Terpander

Lyre with Eight Strings

Simonides

Lyre with Nine Strings

Timotheus

Lyre Playing without Singing

Thamyris

Lyre Playing with Singing

Amphion or Linus

Composition of Songs for Lyre and Voice

Terpander

Singing with the Flute

Ardalus

Dancing in Armor

The Curetes

Pyrrhic Dancing

Pyrrhus

Hexametric Poetry

Pythian Oracle

Poetry

Unknown

Prose

Pherecydes

History

Cadmus

Gymnastic Games

Lycaon

Funerary Games

Acastus

Wrestling

Pytheus

Playing with a Ball

Gyges

Painting

The Egyptians

Ship

Danaus

Raft

King Erythras or the Mysians and
the Trojans
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(table 1 cont.)
Warship

Jason, Parhalus, Samiramus, or
Aegaeo

Bireme

The Erythraeans

Trireme

Aminocles

Quadrireme

The Carthaginians

Quinquereme

The Salaminians

Ship with Six Banks of Galleys

The Syracusans

Ship with Ten Banks of Galleys

Alexander the Great

Ship with Twelve Banks of Galleys

Ptolemy Soter

Ship with Fifteen Banks of Galleys

Demetrius

Ship with Thirty Banks of Galleys

Ptolemy Philadelphus

Ship with Forty Banks of Galleys

Ptolemy Philpator

Cargo-Ship

Hippus

Cutter

The Cyrenians

Skiff

The Phoenicians

Yacht

The Rhodians

Yawl

The Cyprians

Astronomical Navigation

The Phoenicians

Oar

The Copaeans

Oar Blade

The Plataeans

Sails

Icarus

Mast and Yard

Daedalus

Cavalry Transport Ship

The Samians or Pericles

Warship with a Deck

The Thasians

Warship with a Beak

Pisaeus

Anchor

Eupalamus

Double-Fluked Anchor

Anacharsis

Grappling-Iron and Claw

Pericles

Tiller

Tiphys
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(table 1 cont.)
Naval Fleet

Minos 104

Universal Use of the Ionian Alphabet

Unspoken International Agreement

Universal Custom of Shaving

Unspoken International Agreement

Universal System of Timekeeping

Unspoken International Agreement

in Pliny’s list. 105 According to Beagon, Pliny’s catalogue advances from “the material basics of
civilization” through “developments in the arts” to the widespread adoption of customs that “take
the process of human civilization a step further on from the initial stage of inventions by
individual persons or cities to the history of its spread and development.” 106 Beagon, however,
cannot resist pointing out parenthetically that Pliny appears to include the invention of fire after
the invention of “fire-based crafts,” a seeming anachronism consonant with the conventional
caricature of Pliny, although in this instance Pliny’s intellectual mediocrity can be reaffirmed
only through the willful denial of a difference between the discovery of how to strike a flame
with a piece of flint and the discovery of fire simpliciter. 107 Beagon is surely aware that Pliny is
describing Pyrodes’ discovery of a property of flint, a means for lighting a fire rather than fire
itself, but mockery, especially when supported by popular prejudice, seldom seeks precision.
Like Beagon, Isager appears to observe the presence of a chronological or progressive
scheme underlying Pliny’s list, as well as a flaw in its execution. Describing the catalogue of
104

The manuscript tradition includes two additional items following Minos’s deployment of the world’s first naval
fleet but prior to the concluding list of international conventions: the first killing of an animal by Hyperbius and the
first killing of an ox by Prometheus. Following Mayhoff, who brackets this portion of the text, I have excluded
these two items from the list as either an interpolation or (more likely) a piece of transposed text added by a scribe at
the end of the catalogue of inventions attributed to individuals and particular peoples after having been omitted
inadvertently earlier in the text.
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Beagon, On the Human Animal, 416.

106

Ibid., 426, 465.
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Ibid., 426.
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inventors and inventions as “an extensive and varied enumeration of the productions of
mankind,” Isager divides Pliny’s list into three basic sections: 1) a list of “fundamental
artifacts”; 2) “an extensive section on armament”; and 3) a series of “discussions of auguries,
music, poetry, sports, painting, navigation, the art of writing, shaving and ways of measuring
time.” 108 It is unclear, however, whether or not Isager believes his tripartite division reflects a
temporal order, as he writes that Pliny’s “enumeration [of fundamental artifacts] is suddenly
interrupted” by the account of various political developments with which he introduces his
chapters on armament. 109 It would thus appear that for Isager either the three sections of the
catalogue are mutually unrelated or Pliny was unable to provide an adequate explanation of how
the three stages of human progress form a continuous pattern of development. Whether Pliny
lacks literary skill as the composer of a list or philosophical sophistication as an historian
intellectually committed to the idea of human progress, Isager’s assertion that the catalogue is
“suddenly interrupted” by Pliny’s discussions of monarchy, democracy, tyranny, slavery, and
capital trials certainly suggests that the catalogue, despite its tripartite structure, does not form a
coherent whole, and that each invention it contains, though logically placed in one of three
exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories, is not integral to a single, continuous pattern of
human development.
In reality, Pliny’s chapters on monarchy, democracy, tyranny, slavery, and capital trials
do not constitute a “sudden interruption” in Pliny’s list of fundamental artifacts, disrupting the
flow of the text and breaking the catalogue into discontinuous parts, but rather form a unit within
a complex, spiraliform structure reflective of the pattern of human progress, as depicted in figure
1. Within the spiral of human history, as mirrored in the structure of Pliny’s catalogue of
108

Isager, Pliny on Art, 36.
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Figure 1. The Spiraliform Structure of Natural History 7.191-215

Mining, Wells, & Stone Quarrying

Textiles, Medicines, Metallurgy, Pottery, & Carpentry

Arboriculture, Viticulture, Oil, & Honey

The Art & Instruments of War

Divination, Music, Poetry, Athletics, & Painting

Unspoken International Agreements

Ships & Astronomical Navigation

Truces & Treaties

Forms of Government

Four-Wheeled Vehicles & Trade

Walls & Towers

Brick-Kilns, Houses, & Towns

inventors and inventions, political developments create the conditions for advances in the arts
and sciences, advances which in turn give rise to further political developments. Human history,
according to this scheme, begins with the invention of brick-kilns, the discovery of how to build
with clay, and the subsequent birth of towns comprised of brick and clay houses with tiled roofs
(7.194), a political development that gives human society the permanence and the stability
necessary for mining operations, the digging of wells, and the quarrying of stone (7.195). A
permanent supply of water and the availability of stones allow for the erection of walls and
towers (7.195), a political development that provides the requisite security for the development
of additional human skills. 110 Soon men learn how to weave, how to forge metals, how to make
pottery, and how to build structures out of wood, and they begin to produce textiles, shoes,
medicines, and goods made from copper, bronze, iron, silver, gold, clay, and timber (7.195-8). A
surplus of goods creates the conditions for trade and the need for the transportation of goods, and
the invention of four-wheeled vehicles and the consequent growth of trade (7.199) introduce new
and more luxurious goods into human life, with men gaining the knowledge of how to cultivate
trees and vines, make oil, collect honey, and efficiently plow fields for the cultivation of crops
(7.199). Only at this point in the history of human development do governments become
necessary, with a surfeit of goods and the presence of luxuries in society either giving rise to the
vices that would thenceforth plague humanity or merely creating the opportunity for their
expression. Monarchies, democracies, and tyrannies are established to ensure law and order;
men are enslaved as new relationships of power begin to structure human life; and systems of
justice are put into place, with tyrants and juries of men gaining the authority to put to death
those whose actions threaten the new order (7.199-200). The rise of multiple political regimes,
structured according to incompatible principles of justice and in competition for finite natural
110

Cf. Vitruvius De Architectura 2.1.6-7.
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resources, creates the conditions for conflict, and men quickly learn the art of warfare and invent
progressively more sophisticated means for spreading death: first rudimentary cudgels, followed
by more deadly weapons for single combatants, machines for attacking entire cities, and finally
the organization of men trained to work in unison for the sake of large-scale slaughter (7.200202).
Pliny’s history, however, is not a Rousseauistic recounting of man’s degeneration and
decline, as wars engender the desire for peace, and men therefore invent truces and treaties in
order to enjoy at least temporary cessations in the violence endemic to a divided world (7.202),
with the resulting periods of peace introducing a new phase in the history of human
development. Civilized man enjoys sciences, arts, and forms of entertainment unknown to the
noble savage, including augury and divination, astronomy, music, dancing, poetry, prose,
athletics, and painting (7.203-5). International peace, however fleeting, allows for the highest
forms of human self-expression, and the walls of the separate cities and kingdoms spread
throughout the world echo with the sound of music, are decorated with works of art, and enclose
arenas in which men engage in sportive competition.
Periods of peace also allow men to dream of visiting foreign lands and of exploring the
natural world, and civilized man begins building ships in order to travel to the mythical places
first introduced into the human imagination by the poets of the preceding age (7.206-9). As
Pliny makes clear, however, these ships are used for both peaceful and martial purposes, and this
newest era in the history of human progress thus fails to free itself from the conflicts of the past.
The benefits arising from contacts with foreign peoples are balanced by the wars that ensue, and
the joy of discovery is leavened with the suffering and the separation caused by battles fought in
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distant lands. Although man has become conscious of the world beyond his own borders and
those of his immediate neighbors, war remains a distinguishing feature of a divided world.
Global intercourse, however, slowly begets global customs, and Pliny concludes his
catalogue with a list of three unspoken universal agreements (7.210-15). All nations now use the
Ionian alphabet, men throughout the world now shave their beards, and the invention of the
sundial and the clepsydra permit all peoples to further divide day and night into hours.
Far more than an “afterthought” appended to his account of human nature, and even more
than a mere list of items produced through man’s interactions with the natural world enumerated
in chronological order, Pliny’s catalogue of inventors and inventions traces the whole history of
human progress and suggests that the integration of nature into history, the essential and
distinguishing activity of the human animal, is an inherently political process. Its complex,
spiraliform structure is generated through a cyclical movement in which political developments
and advances in the arts and sciences are mutually engendering and through which the natural
world is progressively introduced into human life. Pliny is indeed “the supreme connoisseur of
the list as an art form.” 111
Contrary to current opinion, Pliny’s evident craft in constructing his catalogue of
inventors and inventions and its prominent location at the end of his account of the nature of man
suggest that the catalogue is essential to his purpose in writing and publishing the Natural
History. Significantly, in his index, to which Isager rightly directs Pliny’s readers for insight into
the encyclopedist’s intentions, Pliny lists the three unspoken international agreements under a
different heading than the heading under which he enumerates the other items contained in his
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Carey, Pliny’s Catalogue of Culture, 180-1.
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catalogue. 112 The distinction between developments happening within particular cities and
developments occurring at a global level and thus embracing all of the world’s cities reflects
Pliny’s belief that the emergence of international agreements marked the beginning of a new era
in human history essentially different from all of the preceding ages outlined in his catalogue. It
also causes the attentive reader to wonder what the next cycle in the spiral of human history will
bring and whether or not the three international agreements, and the new world order they appear
to introduce, have prepared the way for man to escape the effects of history altogether. Indeed,
as shall be shown in the next two chapters, Pliny believes that through the publication of his
encyclopedia, one more rotation in the wheel of history is being brought to completion, with the
establishment of the Roman Empire having followed logically, if not inevitably, from man’s
emergent global consciousness and with the encyclopedic form of his own Natural History
serving as the archetype of a new literary genre for a new age. As Pliny, emphasizing both the
novelty of his work and the Romanness of the age it introduces, states in the opening words of
his prefatory epistle to Titus: “The books of my Natural History [are] a novel task for the native
muses of your Roman citizens.” 113
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Pliny Naturalis Historia praef. 1. Libros Naturalis Historiae, novicium Camenis Quiritium tuorum opus. As
Barry Baldwin explains, the fact that Pliny’s encyclopedia is a “Latin innovation” is “doubly pointed up” by his
particular choice of words: first, “by Camenis, the Greek Muses in Roman dress dating back to Numa (Livy 1, 21,
3),” and second, by “the equally nationalistic Quiritium,” a traditional name for the Roman citizenry supposedly
dating to the union of the Romans with the Sabines. Barry Baldwin, “Stylistic Notes on the Elder Pliny’s Preface,”
Latomus 64 (2005), 93. Dr. Kristopher Fletcher, in a private correspondence, has observed that the immediate
juxtaposition of these two words in the original Latin text further accentuates the Latin character of Pliny’s
encyclopedia, such that English translations fail to convey adequately the full weight of Pliny’s words.

57

CHAPTER 2
PLINIAN MAN
For them I set neither turning posts in space nor periods;
Empire without limit I have bestowed upon them.
~ Virgil Aeneid 1.278-279 1
A. Pliny’s Theory of Human Nature: The Traditional View
A theory of politics, like a great work of literature, begins with a theory of man. Homo
politicus and Hamlet, Downs’ rational citizen and Dostoevsky’s Raskolnikov, Aristotle’s
spoudaios and Sophocles’ Antigone are all “abstraction[s] from the real fullness of the human
personality,” with the only difference between science and art in this respect referring to the
level, rather than to the fact, of abstraction. 2 Characters in a literary work are never given
exhaustive descriptions, and a reader is unlikely to find information regarding the lengths of their
toes in ascending or descending order, their first spoken words as infants, or the identities of their
second-cousins on their mothers’ side, unless such details are somehow integral to the
development of the plot. 3 The climax and the denouement of a story depend upon the author’s
initial exposition of the relevant characteristics of the dramatis personae, the interaction of
which gives rise to the dramatic action around which the plot revolves, but without the isolation
of only the most salient features of each character, the story itself would quickly be lost beneath
an inundating flood of irrelevant biographical minutiae. In the greatest works of literature, these
characteristics reflect the universal impulses, limitations, and aspirations of man, even though
each individual character does not represent the human person with the wholeness, completeness,

1

His ego nec metas rerum nec tempora pono; / imperium sine fine dedi.

2

Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (Boston: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1957), 7.

3

Cf. Milton Friedman, “The Methodology of Positive Economics,” in Essays in Positive Economics (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1953), 32.
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and finality toward which a conceptual definition aspires, but rather incarnates a small subset of
the abiding features of the human experience, features that are often exaggerated with comic or
tragic effect in the artful simplicity of their isolation.
Likewise, a particular “model of man” lies at the foundation of every scientific
explanation of political reality. 4 Whereas the author of a work of literature describes the relevant
characteristics of particular real or imagined men for the sake of the development of a plot, the
political scientist isolates the essential characteristic or set of characteristics distinguishing all
human beings from all non-human beings within a single, encompassing, conceptual definition
either for the sake of the articulation of general statements about political reality or – especially
in the wake of the “behavioral revolution” within the field of political science in the midtwentieth century – for the sake of the formulation of universal laws analogous to those found in
the natural sciences. 5 As Milton Friedman argues, an “important” hypothesis in either the
natural or the social sciences “abstracts the common and crucial elements from the mass of
complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained and permits
valid predictions on the basis of them alone,” making parsimony one of the key virtues of a good
scientific theory. 6 Insofar as all political phenomena have their origin in the needs, desires, and

4

Donald J. Moon, “The Logic of Political Inquiry: A Synthesis of Opposed Perspectives,” in Handbook of Political
Science, vol. 1, Political Science: Scope and Theory, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby (Reading, MA:
Addison-Wesley Publishing, 1957), 192.

5

For a brief history of the major trends in political science in the twentieth century, see Kenneth Shepsle, “Studying
Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach,” in Political Science in History: Research
Programs and Political Traditions, ed. James Farr, John S. Dryzek, and Stephen L. Leonard (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 276-95.
6

Friedman, “Methodology of Positive Economics,” 14. It is often asserted that Friedman’s “instrumentalist” model
of scientific explanation permits the social scientist to make “unrealistic assumptions” about human nature, with the
implication that the assumptions of a scientific model can be untrue or lacking all connection to the real world so
long as the predictions the model generates turn out to be accurate. Such an interpretation of the instrumentalist
model runs afoul of two important aspects of Friedman’s argument. First, Friedman’s position is not that the realism
of the assumptions of a scientific hypothesis are unimportant but rather that it is not the case “that the conformity of
these ‘assumptions’ to ‘reality’ is a test of the validity of the hypothesis different from or additional to the test by
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decisions of human beings, the most fundamental abstraction within political science is the
scientist’s description of human nature, his so-called “model of man,” with such a description
constituting both a “negative heuristic,” or set of “regulative principles which must not be
violated in developing empirical theories,” as well as a “positive heuristic,” or set of “regulative
principles or directives for the articulation of a theory.” 7 In short, although a scientist’s
presuppositions must always be subject to question and to constant reevaluation, all scientific
theories concerning political phenomena must not contradict the political scientist’s fundamental
presuppositions about the nature of man, while these presuppositions can also provide guidance
in the interpretation of political reality and direction in the development of novel hypotheses.
The primary goal of this chapter is to illumine those features of the human animal that
Pliny considers crucial for the interpretation of political reality and thereby to shed light on the
fundamental premises upon which he bases his apology for empire. The examination of the
structure of the Natural History contained in the preceding chapter has already cast doubt on the
implications.” In other words, according to Friedman, to test the implications of a hypothesis is in fact to test the
realism of its assumptions. Friedman does indeed claim that “truly important and significant hypotheses will be
found to have ‘assumptions’ that are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality,” but his point, obscured
as a result of his desire to shock his readers by means of a bold formulation of his proposition, is that scientific
models attempt to explain much in terms of little and must therefore abstract the key determinants of the
phenomenon to be explained from a complex reality. To isolate those features of reality relevant to the phenomenon
is to simplify reality rather than to falsify it. As Friedman states, “To put this point less paradoxically, the relevant
question to ask about the ‘assumptions’ of a theory is not whether they are descriptively ‘realistic,’ for they never
are, but whether they are sufficiently good approximations for the purpose in hand. And this question can be
answered only by seeing whether the theory works, which means whether it yields sufficiently accurate predictions.
The two supposedly independent tests thus reduce to one test.” Second, Friedman explicitly notes that in the process
of constructing a hypothesis, that is, in the process of isolating the “crucial elements” of reality relevant to the
phenomenon to be explained, some assumptions are in fact better than others: “The particular ‘assumptions’ termed
‘crucial’ are selected on grounds of their convenience in some such respects as simplicity or economy in describing
the model, intuitive plausibility, or capacity to suggest, if only by implication, some of the considerations that are
relevant in judging or applying the model.” Ceteris paribus, assumptions that are “intuitively plausible” are to be
preferred to those that are not. Friedman, “Methodology of Positive Economics,” 14, 15, 26. Cf. Donald P. Green
and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications in Political Science (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 30-31; Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, “Reflections on Our Critics,” in The
Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered, ed. Jeffrey Friedman (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1996), 274n24; Terry M. Moe, “On the Scientific Status of Rational Models,” American Journal of
Political Science 23 (1979): 215-43. For the value of parsimony in scientific theories, see John Gerring, Social
Science Methodology: A Criterial Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 57-58, 106-7.
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Moon, “Logic of Political Inquiry,” 194-95.
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conventional belief that Pliny adhered to a Stoic “model of man” according to which man is a
rational being uniquely allotted a share of the divine reason permeating and governing the
cosmos and thus set apart from all other beings existent within the world. 8 In Marcia Colish’s
authoritative synoptic description of the relationship between man and Nature within the Stoic
philosophical system: “Man’s logos [or reason] is described by the Stoics as his hegemonikon,
or ruling principle. It is consubstantial with the divine logos. Just as the divine logos permeates
and orders the whole universe, so the human logos or pneuma [spirit] permeates man’s entire
being and accounts for all of his activities.” 9 Hence, according to the conventional scholarly
interpretation of Pliny’s encyclopedia, within Plinian thought rationality – rather than history, as
I have suggested in the preceding chapter – is that through which man qua man enters into a
relationship with the natural world. 10 Beagon, the most articulate proponent of the conventional
interpretation, thus writes that for Pliny the universe is governed by “the supreme ratio divinae
naturae,” the supreme reason of divine Nature, and reason (ratio) consequently “acts as a link
between Natura and man, since, man, too, has a share in it.” 11 Paradoxically, however, reason
also purportedly sets man apart from everything else contained within Nature’s manifold, for
whereas all other existents are “the passive instruments of Natura,” acting in perfect obedience
to the laws of nature, reason endows man with free choice, the exercise of which separates him
from the recurring processes and the natural instincts in accordance with which all other beings
8

Compare the definition of man offered by the Stoic philosopher Seneca, a close contemporary of the Elder Pliny:
“Man is indeed a rational animal” (Rationale enim animal est homo). Seneca Ad Lucilium Epistulae Morales 41.8.

9

Marcia L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, vol. 1, Stoicism in Classical Latin
Literature (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 27.
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Beagon rightly observes that “the relationship between man and Nature” is “the linking theme” of Pliny’s book on
the nature of man. Beagon, Roman Nature, 54.
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Ibid., 33. Cf. Mary Beagon, “Nature and Views of Her Landscapes in Pliny the Elder,” in Human Landscapes in
Classical Antiquity: Environments and Culture, ed. Graham Shipley and John Salmon (London: Routledge, 1996),
294-95.
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involuntarily behave. 12 Plinian man, therefore, seems to embody a contradiction, being both
Nature incarnate and an alien in exile in the natural world. This is in fact only the first of several
apparent paradoxes appertaining to Plinian man, but unlike the others, it is a mirage engendered
by the faulty assumptions of Pliny’s commentators and translators rather than a tension intrinsic
to Pliny’s actual conception of the human animal.
It is worth noting at the outset that the following repudiation of the conventional
depiction of Plinian man does not necessitate the conclusion that Pliny did not adopt any Stoic
doctrines or that his political philosophy was in no way influenced by the Stoic teachings popular
among the members of the equestrian and patrician orders in first-century Rome. 13 It could be
argued, for example, that Pliny’s description of the historical introduction of the “things through
which we live” into human life is based on a revolutionary application of the Stoic concept of
oikeiōsis to human history. 14 Oikeiōsis, often translated “affinity,” was a concept in reference to
which the Stoics claimed that the foremost desire of all living beings is “to appropriate those
things that are conducive to their survival and natural constitution, and to avoid everything that
threatens them.” 15 It seems likely that Pliny’s description of human history as a process of
12

As Beagon, once again drawing a false distinction between “man” and “animal,” writes: “Endowed as it is with
many wonderful instincts and senses, the animal is still essentially a passive instrument of Natura. Man, by virtue
of his unique ratio, is free: he can choose whether to follow or go against Natura.” Beagon, Roman Nature, 154,
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cultivation through which the products of Nature are integrated into human life rests on a novel
application of the concept of oikeiōsis, normally used in reference to the appropriation of a good
by an individual, to the appropriating activities of the human species as a whole. If this is indeed
the case, it cannot legitimately be claimed that Plinian thought bears no traces of Stoic teachings,
and this is not the claim being advanced in the pages which follow. The more modest argument
of this chapter is that in at least two extremely important respects Pliny clearly and consciously
rejects orthodox Stoic teachings: firstly, with regard to his conception of man, and secondly,
with regard to his conception of the natural world. 16 Moreover, it should be apparent that even if
Pliny’s philosophical beliefs have a certain eclectic character, philosophical eclecticism does not
necessarily involve a lack of intellectual acumen, as most of Pliny’s commentators appear to
assume. As Christopher Gill contends, and as the text of Pliny’s Natural History confirms,
eclecticism in the Roman imperial period was a more “considered kind of activity than has often
been recognised.” 17
i. The Supreme Reason of Divine Nature
In addition to the structure of the Natural History, which suggests that according to Pliny
that which men and the other animals have in common is more fundamental than that which
makes man unique, there are at least three considerations that cast doubt upon the standard
16

The two, as should already be clear, go hand in hand. As E. Vernon Arnold writes, “The doctrine that man is a
representation or reflection of the universe is of unknown antiquity. It seems to be clearly implied by the teaching of
Heraclitus, in so far as he lays it down that both the universe and man are vivified and controlled by the Logos. The
technical terms ‘macrocosm’ (megas kosmos) and ‘microcosm’ (micros kosmos), are, as we have seen, employed by
Aristotle. But even if we suppose that this conception is a commonplace of Greek philosophy, it is in Stoicism alone
that it is of fundamental importance, and knit up with the whole framework of the system.” Arnold, Roman
Stoicism, 240. Cf. Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers 7.40. The close relationship between the Stoic
theories of man and of nature as elements of a single, integrated system, within which each element derives its
meaning and its significance in part from its relationships with the other elements in the system, makes it all but
impossible to reject one without also rejecting the other. Insofar as Pliny’s Natural History is a political history of
Nature written as an apology for empire, his work can and should be examined as a work of political philosophy,
and as such, his conception of man provides the foundation for his argument, regardless of whether his objections to
Stoicism were directed primarily at its anthropological or its cosmological doctrines.
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reading of Pliny’s supposedly stoical philosophical anthropology, not the least of which is that
one searches in vain for the phrase ratio divinae naturae, employed by Beagon above in her
description of Plinian man’s relationship to Nature, in Pliny’s encyclopedia. 18 Instead, when
reading the text of the Natural History, one repeatedly encounters references to the vis and the
potentia of Nature, that is, to Nature’s force and power, rather than to its reason. 19 Indeed, a
careful reading of the text of the Natural History reveals that for Pliny the order of the universe
is maintained not through rational agency but through a balance of counterpoised forces, and
rage (rabies) rather than reason (ratio) animates the whole. 20 Healy, who appears on most
occasions to accept Beagon’s characterization of the Plinian understanding of the relationship
between man and Nature without qualification, observes that in at least this instance Pliny breaks
with orthodox Stoicism, “abandon[ing] the Stoic concept that the ‘intelligible principle’ gives
life to the world [and] substituting a struggle between obscure forces.” 21 As Pliny exclaims
following his description of the natural antipathy believed to exist between goat’s blood and
diamonds, “We must not seek reason (ratio) anywhere in Nature, but only will (voluntas)!” 22
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Pliny attributes a ratio to Nature six times in the Natural History, but in each instance the word seems to denote
something other than “reason”: at 2.113 Pliny describes lightning as a phenomenon that happens in accordance with
“no principle of Nature”; at 11.2 he exclaims that the “method” of Nature is most clearly observed in her smallest
products; at both 17.23 and 18.283 Pliny refers to the importance of planting crops in accordance with Nature’s
“system”; at 17.191 he states that it conforms to a “principle of Nature” never to prune plants before the rising of the
constellation called the Eagle; and at 21.57 he calls the inability of Attic thyme to survive without a breeze from the
sea a “principle of Nature.” The phrase ratio divinae naturae occurs nowhere in the text.
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Pliny refers to the rabies mundi, “the rage of the universe,” at Naturalis Historia 32.2.
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Healy, Pliny on Science, 109. For Healy’s general acceptance of Beagon’s interpretation of Plinian thought with
regard to man’s relationship to the natural world, see Healy, Pliny on Science, 26n80; John F. Healy, “The Elder
Pliny,” review of Roman Nature: The Thought of Pliny the Elder, by Mary Beagon, and Les Idée Politiques et
Morales de Pline L’Ancien, by Francisco de Oliveira, The Classical Review 44 (1994), 54-55.
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provide causal explanations illuminating the permanent and inviolable order underlying the apparent disorder and
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The power of Nature, naturae potentia, which Pliny says is that to which men refer when
they speak of “God,” is revealed in the violent forces human beings cannot help but observe in
the world around them: the interminable war between the elements (earth, air, fire, and water)
assuming the form of torrential rains, bolts of lightning, hailstorms, droughts, and floods (2.102104, 20.1, 31.2); the constant clash between land and sea along their unstable and disputed
boundary (4.9, 6.139-40, 16.2-4, 31.2); the recurring, savage battles between various species of
animals (8.32-34, 8.78-79, 8.88, 8.91, 8.118, 9.185; 10.9; 10.17; 10.24; 10.203-206); the
continuous competition between plants for light and nutriment (17.239); and the forces of
attraction and repulsion that subsist even between objects lacking sense and consciousness (20.2,
24.3, 34.147, 36.126-27, 37.59). 23 The interaction of these forces, which Pliny on multiple
occasions in the first half of his encyclopedia calls the “contest” (pugna) or the “battle”
(dimicatio) of nature, generates a complex and precariously balanced system, the internal
equilibrium of which is an indispensable condition for the continuation of human life. 24 Pliny
provides his readers with examples of the battle of nature and the resulting state of equilibrium in
some of the most vivid and exciting passages contained in the Natural History, including his
description of the “perpetual discord” (perpetua discordia) that exists between the elephant and
“Scientific explanation can only be founded upon universal rules; it must presuppose the regularity of nature. But if
it is not supposed to seek nature’s ratio, it might as well give up even seeking the phenomena’s specific causes.
Pliny knows this; indeed, he proclaims it quite explicitly: ‘Finally let each man form his own opinion, but our
purpose is to point out the manifest properties of objects, not to search for doubtful causes’ (nobis propositum est
naturas rerum manifestas indicare, non causas indagare dubias, 11.8). The aphoristic construction of this phrase,
structured conceptually by parallel and antithetic figures (manifestas indicare ≈ indigare dubias; naturas ≈ causas),
gives the serious tone of a deontological maxim, a motto assumed as a slogan. Indicare (to point out), and not
indagare (to search): the model of the encyclopedic description (collecting and registering the phenomenal world)
prevails upon that of problem-oriented exploration (investigating and trying to provide explanations that go beyond
appearances).” Conte, Genres and Readers, 85.
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Pliny Naturalis Historia 2.27. “Through which the power of Nature is unquestionably revealed, and what is more,
that this is what we call God.” per quae declaratur haut dubie naturae potentia idque esse quod deum vocemus.
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Natural History, 203-4; Murphy, Empire in the Encyclopedia, 148, 169.
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the snake, a discord giving rise to battles in which both combatants, locked in a fatal embrace,
are doomed to die, with the victorious snake being crushed beneath the weight of his vanquished
foe; his similar depiction of fierce, mid-air battles between eagles and snakes, in which the
snake, by employing its coils to fetter its enemy’s wings, presumably ensures their common
death; and his narrative account of the geographical course taken by the Euphrates, in which a
battle between the Euphrates and Mount Taurus ends in a draw, with the river ultimately
reaching its intended destination, but with the mountain blocking its intended route. 25
Although the rage of the universe is thus revealed through the manifold forces present in
the world of nature conceived as an aggregation of distinct entities forming an independently
existing system, within the realm of history, in which the world of nature is progressively
integrated into the sphere of human life, the naturae potentia appears differently, reduced to two
fundamental types of forces: forces of attraction, affinity, or friendship, on the one hand, and
forces of repulsion, antipathy, or discord, on the other. Significantly, in the opening sentences of
the second half of the Natural History, Pliny designates these two types of forces as forces of
“sympathy” (sympathia) and “antipathy” (antipathia), respectively, names first assigned to them
by the Greeks, and although he occasionally employs equivalent Latin terms such as concordia
and discordia when referring to these two forces in subsequent chapters, such dualistic
expressions recur throughout the final set of eighteen books contained in the encyclopedia,
assuming a place in the second half of the Natural History formerly occupied by the words
dimicatio and pugna, now virtually absent from the text. 26 Pliny later adds that knowledge of
25

Pliny Naturalis Historia 5.83-85, 8.32-34, 10.17. On Pliny’s account of the Euphrates, see Beagon, Roman
Nature, 199-200; Murphy, Empire in the Encyclopedia, 148-51. Cf. Trevor Murphy, “Pliny’s Natural History: The
Prodigal Text,” in Flavian Rome: Culture, Image, Text, ed. A. J. Boyle and W. J. Dominik (Leiden: Brill, 2003),
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Pliny Naturalis Historia 20.1-2. Cf. Ibid., 24.3, 24.67, 28.84, 28.147, 29.76, 32.25, 34.147, 34.150, 37.59.
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these two forces is the foundation of the practice of medicine, and despite the opacity of the
connection between the vast majority of the medicaments he lists and the sympathetic and
antipathetic forces he insists are at the bottom of every remedy, the implicit claim that man has
harnessed the forces of Nature is important: just as the products of Nature have been integrated
into human life, so too have the forces animating and sustaining the world as a whole. 27 The
rage of the universe, no less than its material content, has been rendered subservient to the end of
promoting human life.
ii. Man the Rational Being
Pliny’s apparent reticence regarding man’s true nature, despite his willingness to assign
all sorts of attributes and characteristics to “man alone” in his examination of the parts of the
bodies of animals in his tenth book, also casts doubt on the inherited description of Plinian man
as a rational participant in a rationally ordered universe. 28 Once the true structure of the Natural
History is discerned, and the illusory character of the image of an “unbridgeable gap” between
men and animals purportedly reflected in the architecture of the text becomes apparent, little if
any textual support for the attribution of a stoical conception of man to Pliny remains. 29 Indeed,
as stated previously, Beagon confesses that Pliny “makes no direct philosophical statements”
regarding the unique and privileged status of “man the rational being” in the text of his
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Ibid., 24.1-4, 29.61.
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Ibid., 11.131, 11.132, 11.136, 11.138, 11.141, 11.149, 11.157, 11.158, 11.175, 11.181, 11.230, 11.232, 11.243,
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Beagon, Roman Nature, 144. The fact that virtually all previous commentators have treated Book 7 of the
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entire encyclopedia, already cited in Chapter 1, see especially L. Bodson, “Aspects of Pliny’s Zoology,” in Science
in the Early Roman Empire: Pliny the Elder, His Sources and Influence, ed. Roger French and Frank Greenaway
(Totowa, NJ: Barnes & Noble Books, 1986); Thorsten Fögen, “Pliny the Elder’s Animals: Some Remarks on the
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encyclopedia. 30 Beagon attempts to compensate for this lack of textual support by referring her
readers to the writings of Seneca, Cicero, and Plutarch, among others, an interpretative strategy
resting on the commonly held, but highly dubious, twofold presupposition that Pliny’s
“acquisition of philosophy was more a matter of absorption than conscious critical analysis” and
that the writings of his contemporaries therefore provide a guide to what Pliny believed in
addition to – or perhaps regardless of – what he actually wrote. 31 Such a strategy, it should be
noted, allows commentators on the Natural History to ascribe virtually any belief or
philosophical position to its author, so long as the text of a contemporaneous author can be cited
to show its availability for absorption by Pliny’s spongoid mind. 32 Thus, in her foundational
work on the Plinian conception of Nature, Beagon cites Plutarch’s De Fortuna to justify the
claim that Pliny considered submission to fatalistic beliefs a rejection of the “independent life
appropriate for the possessor of ratio”; Aristotle’s Historia Animalium, Seneca’s De Ira, and
Philo of Alexandria’s De Animalibus in support of her assertion that Pliny discerned “a
30

Beagon, Roman Nature, 37, 98.
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Ibid., 50, 98.
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A belief that Pliny possessed an “ordinary” or “average” mind incapable of original thought and thus largely if not
entirely “determined” by the intellectual currents of his age pervades Plinian scholarship and has allowed numerous
commentators to make blanket statements concerning Pliny’s Stoicism, especially with regard to his views on man
and Nature. In addition to the previously cited passages from Beagon, see Beagon, Roman Nature, 14-15 (Pliny’s
views are those of “a more ‘ordinary’ subject” whose “acquaintance with philosophical ideas moulds his thought in
a general way and colours his attitude to everyday life”); Duff, Literary History of Rome, 364, 370, 371 (Pliny was
“too bookish to be original” and his “outlook on life was largely determined by his Stoic sympathies”); Eichholz,
“Pliny,” 39 (“Pliny generally adopts Stoic doctrines, directly or indirectly derived from Posidonius,” in his account
of the universe); W. H. S. Jones, introduction to Natural History: Books 20-23, by Pliny (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1969), xxii (“Pliny’s mind was of a very ordinary type”); A. C. Moorhouse, “A Roman’s View of
Art,” Greece & Rome 10 (1940), 30 (Pliny’s ideas reflect those of the “average Roman”); H. Rackham, introduction
to Natural History: Preface and Books 1-2, by Pliny (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949), x (Pliny’s
attitude toward life “may be styled a moderate and rational Stoicism”); Rose, Handbook of Latin Literature, 437
(Pliny “seems but seldom to have reflected on what he read” and wrote a work “with little or no evidence of original
observation”); Sellers, History of Art, xciii (“the tendency of modern research is to lessen more and more the
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difference between man and animal … connected with rational thought”; and even a fragment
from Musonius Rufus as evidence of Pliny’s purported belief that a “life of drudgery … denies
man’s rational supremacy.” 33
In addition to these external sources, Beagon proffers one passage from the pages of
Pliny’s text in support of the conventional depiction of Plinian man as a rational being. 34 After
recording that panthers are able to counteract the effects of the deadly poison aconite by tasting
human excrement, Pliny adds the following comment:
Surely no one doubts that this remedy has been discovered by chance (casu) and that no
matter how often it has happened, even now it is produced anew, since neither rational
knowledge (ratio) nor practical experience (usus) can be passed on (tradi) by wild
animals (feris) among themselves. This Chance (casus), therefore, this is the deity who
has discovered most things in life, this is the single name by which both the mother and
the teacher of all things is meant. Whether we judge that wild animals (feras) happen
upon these remedies every day or that they know them instinctively, either inference is
equally plausible. 35
Recently published English translations of these three sentences from the twenty-sixth book of
Pliny’s encyclopedia are either confusing or downright misleading, suggesting that wild animals
lack rational knowledge (ratio) and practical experience (usus) rather than the ability to pass on
(tradere) such knowledge and experience to other wild animals. 36 As the foregoing translation
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Beagon, Roman Nature, 97n9, 134, 168. It is revealing that in her subsequent works Beagon cites herself rather
than Pliny when describing his Stoic conception of “man the rational being.” Cf. Beagon, “Burning the Brambles,”
126n16; Beagon, On the Human Animal, 215.
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Pliny Naturalis Historia 27.7-8. quod certe casu repertum quis dubitet et, quotiens fiat, etiam nunc ut novum
nasci, quoniam feris ratio et usus inter se tradi non possit? hic ergo casus, hic est ille qui plur[i]ma in vita invenit
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Thus, in his abridged translation of the Natural History, Healy writes, “This remedy was surely found by chance,
and on every occasion – even today – it is surely a new discovery, since wild animals possess neither reason nor
memory of experience to enable them to pass on results among themselves?” Similarly, in the Loeb edition of
Pliny’s encyclopedia, W. H. S. Jones translates the relevant sentence as follows: “[S]urely nobody doubts that this
remedy has been found by Chance, and that on every occasion it is even today a new find, since wild animals have
neither reason nor experience for results to be passed from one to another.” Although it would have strengthened
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makes clear, however, Pliny remains silent on the question of whether or not wild animals
actually possess rational knowledge or practical experience, indicating only that wild animals are
unable to communicate such knowledge and experience among themselves. Indeed, it would
seem that if Pliny is implying anything, it is that at least some wild animals possess rational
knowledge and practical experience, as otherwise his added contention regarding the
impossibility of communicating the associated forms of information would be supervacuous at
best. Importantly, Beagon acknowledges that a wild animal’s “inability to communicate ratio
and usus does not of course rule out their possession of such faculties,” but she calls Pliny’s
phrasing “misleading,” with the implication that what he wrote does not correspond to what he
actually meant, and she proceeds to use the passage as the textual basis for her characterization
of Plinian man as a “rational being” and for her description of the capacity for “theoretical
knowledge and practical application” as “peculiar to man.” 37
In the excerpted passage, Pliny avoids using the word animalia, which would have
referred to “animals” or “living beings” in general. Instead, he twice uses a plural form of the
adjective ferus, meaning “wild” or “untamed,” substantivally, thereby denoting the smaller class

her argument to follow the translations of Healy and Jones, to her credit, Beagon is more faithful to Pliny’s Latin:
“Surely nobody doubts that an aconite antidote was discovered by chance (casu) and that even today its every
appearance is a new discovery, since wild beasts are unable to communicate theoretical knowledge and practical
application (ratio et usus) to each other.” Beagon, however, elides the sentence concerning the twofold character of
Chance, concealing a possible allusion to the Epicurean idea that cosmic order is a chance occurrence rather than the
product of a rational mind, as well as Pliny’s subtle reference to the importance of history as the process through
which the products of Nature, an alias for Chance, are introduced, apparently oftentimes fortuitously, into human
life. Just as Nature’s products can be viewed either as independently existing entities or as the aliments of human
life, Nature herself appears both as the mother of all things and as the teacher who shows man their human uses.
Beagon, however, does observe elsewhere that Chance and Nature “seem more or less identical” in the quoted
passage. Beagon, Roman Nature, 63, 133; Pliny the Elder, Natural History: A Selection, trans. John F. Healy
(London: Penguin Books, 1991), 249; Pliny, Natural History: Books XXIV-XXVII, trans. W. H. S. Jones
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 393.
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Beagon, Roman Nature, 98, 133, 134, 230. Remarkably, Beagon asserts that the “whole passage suggests Pliny is
unclear as to the exact nature of the animal faculties he is trying to distinguish from man’s,” implying that she has a
greater awareness of that which Pliny was “trying” to accomplish than Pliny himself. Ibid., 136.
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of wild animals within the architectonic category containing all forms of animal life. 38 Since this
larger category would encompass both men and beasts within Pliny’s taxonomic scheme, by
using a more specific term he is able to indicate to his readers that an inability “to pass on”
(tradere) rational knowledge and practical experience is that which distinguishes wild animals
from the human animal (and, by inference, that a capacity for such intercommunication is
peculiar to man). As shall be shown in the following chapter, tradere, the primary meaning of
which is “to hand over” or “to hand down,” is a key Plinian concept that recurs throughout the
Natural History. For present purposes, however, it is sufficient simply to note that the term is
polyvalent, that is, that it possesses a range of possible meanings, and although such polyvalence
often obscures an author’s intended meaning, in the present instance the use of a polyvalent term
seems purposive, with the range of meanings contained in the word reflecting the different
implications of man’s unique capacity “to pass on” his rational knowledge and his practical
experience to others: Plinian man is able not only “to report” that which he discovers to the
other men belonging to his own generation, but also “to teach” his children both the discoveries
of his ancestors and those he has made himself. A man is thus able to add to the patrimony of his
forefathers through his own discoveries as well as “to hand down” the accumulated knowledge
of the ages to his posterity. Such a range of abilities is precisely what Pliny denies to panthers in
the excerpted passage, in which he indicates not only that wild animals are unable to share
discoveries “among themselves,” highlighting the absence of intra-generational communication,
but also that they must make the same discoveries over and over again no matter how many
times they have been made before, highlighting the absence of inter-generational communication
as well. Hence, if Pliny’s description of the discovery of an antidote for aconite provides insight
into his philosophical anthropology, the inference warranted by the text is not that ratio is the
38
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peculiar possession of man, but rather that the ability to form a continuous tradition, uniting men
both within the same generation and across the succession of generations and consisting of the
gradual introduction of nature into human life by means of the accumulation of discoveries, is
that which distinguishes the human animal. 39 It once again becomes evident that the catalogue
of inventors and inventions at the conclusion of Pliny’s sixth book is not an appendix containing
materials only tangentially related to Pliny’s theme, but rather a record of the historical
integration of the world of nature into human life offered in support of a sophisticated conception
of man as the only being capable of passing on his discoveries to his offspring. 40
iii. The Boundaries of the Human
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, Pliny’s method of scientific definition consists in
using extreme instances of a phenomenon in order to establish the conceptual boundaries of the
particular class of entities to which it belongs. 41 Consequently, the limits of a concept within
Plinian thought have an ambiguous, zonal character, lacking the precision of essentialist
definitions but perhaps enjoying a greater fidelity to man’s actual experience of the world, in
which ambiguous cases and exceptional occurrences wreak havoc with the neat categories of the
39

Beagon herself comes close to this very position at a later point in the development of her thesis, although she
persists in making “theoretical knowledge and practical application” the distinguishing features of the human
animal. Beagon writes that according to Pliny those who refuse to share herbal remedies with others are “on the
same level as animals generally,” since “they are denying the unique blend of ratio and usus which is peculiar to
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generation and another.” Beagon abstracts rationality and practical knowledge from the processes of human
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thought derivative of rationality itself. As shall be shown both in the following pages, within a Plinian scheme, it is
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unique. Beagon, Roman Nature, 230.
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metaphysician and the binary oppositions of the powerful. 42 It is thus to be expected that the
boundary between “man” and “beast” is somewhat blurry in Pliny’s encyclopedia, even if
various concrete examples establish boundary stones demarcating the general range of
phenomena encompassed by both concepts. 43 As Trevor Murphy observes, within the Natural
History, it is by
means of their various absent qualities [that] savages mark out the margins between us
and the animals, between order and chaos. The Cynocephali, Monocoli, and
Struthopodes – the Dogheads, the One-Eyes, the Sparrowfeet – all the half-animal tribes
of India and Ethiopia, mouthless, noseless, forty or two hundred years in life-span, five
cubits or twenty-seven inches tall, demarcate in their deformities the limits of the body
and the biological confines of the human species in the continuum of Natura. 44
Attention to the prodigious in Pliny’s Natural History, however, provides a third reason for
questioning the conventional characterization of Plinian man as a rational being, as Pliny appears
to use the presence or absence of faculties other than rationality as criteria when attempting to
distinguish between the most bestial human beings and the most human beasts within the
spectrum of animal life. 45
According to Pliny, the most human-like animal is the elephant, and for this reason and
for reason of its immense size, Pliny begins his seventh book with an account of the nature of the
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pachyderm. 46 As Thorsten Fögen observes, “It is conspicuous that, throughout the text,
elephants are described in human terms.” 47 It is not a capacity for rational thought, or some
analogous faculty, however, which justifies the elephant’s proximity to man within the text of the
Natural History, but rather the elephant’s ability to understand the language of its native country
and thus to obey orders; to remember the duties it has been taught; to find delight in affection
and glory; and to display virtues such as honesty, prudence, fairness, and reverence toward
specific heavenly bodies. 48
Among the elephant’s human capacities, the first two listed by Pliny – the ability to
understand spoken words and the ability to remember that which it is taught – are perhaps the
most important, as these are two of the capacities Pliny explicitly notes as being absent among
the tribes of sub-human “men” described elsewhere in the Natural History. Pliny records, for
instance, that the members of the Atlas tribe, located in the African interior, have reportedly
fallen below the level of human civilization, “for they do not call one another by any names,”
and when they observe the rising and the setting of the sun, “they utter horrible curses against it”
as something inimical to their existence, presumably because they have forgotten the

46
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corresponding events of the preceding day. 49 Hence, just as the elephant’s proximity to man
within the continuum of animal life is due at least in part to its capacity to understand the
language of its native masters and its ability to remember instructions concerning its duties, the
absence of a power to assign names and a lack of memory are offered as proof of the Atlas
tribe’s inhumanity. 50
Three additional races of sub-human “men” described elsewhere in the Natural History
point to the special importance Pliny assigns to speech in establishing the boundaries of the
“human”: the Chinese, the most distant tribes of Ethiopia, and the Cynocephali of India. 51 Pliny
asserts that the Chinese “resemble wild animals” (feris similes), not in their physical appearance,
but rather because of their avoidance of the company of “other men” (reliquorum mortalium) and
their dread of human intercourse (commercia). 52 Significantly, Pliny later emphasizes the role of
speech in distinguishing the Chinese from other human beings, relaying that they shared “no
49
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spoken intercourse” (nullo commercio linguae) with a group of traders from Taprobane (modernday Sri Lanka) who had traveled to their shores. 53 Similarly, in his account of the outermost
regions of Ethiopia, an area reported to produce “monstrous likenesses of animals and men”
(animalium hominumque monstrificas effigies), Pliny describes six tribes, differentiated in the
first instance both from the human race and from each other according to their respective
physical deformities, and then solely from the human race through the additional piece of
information that some of these tribes communicate “through nods and gestures instead of
speech” and that some had been “ignorant of the use (usus) of fire” until a relatively recent
date. 54 Communally possessed practical experience (usus) and a spoken language are thus
indirectly identified as distinctively human characteristics.
Finally, of the Cynocephali, the “Dogheads” mentioned by Murphy, the encyclopedist
writes, “Moreover, on many of the mountains [of India] there is a race of men with the heads of
dogs who are clothed with the hides of wild animals (ferarum), who give out barks instead of
spoken words, and who – with their nails as weapons – feed by means of hunting and fowling.” 55
In the case of the Cynocephali, the already ambiguous boundary between man and beast seems to
dissolve completely. In contrast with the “wild animals” whose hides they wear, the
Cynocephali are described as a “race of men.” Pliny’s reference to the Cynocephali’s mode of
dress is in fact doubly significant, as Pliny not only draws a contrast between the Cynocephali
and the wild animals whose hides they wear by means of integumentary juxtaposition, but also
accentuates their humanity by alluding to their natural nakedness, for like man, whom Pliny
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describes at the beginning of his sixth book in a passage to be examined shortly as the one
animal born without a natural covering, the Cynocephali are dependent upon the skins of other
animals for their survival. 56 On the other hand, as noted in the previous chapter, Nature denies
man all but the capacity to weep on the day of his birth, and the Cynocephali are thus unlike man
in that they appear to have been born with claws to assist them in the procurement of food.
Moreover, as no less august an authority than Augustine of Hippo contends, the Cynocephali’s
lack of a human voice, at least when coupled with their caninal crania, is a potentially decisive
consideration that would seem to establish this dimorphous race once and for all as a non-human
species of animal. Although it is likely that Augustine’s concern for establishing an
impenetrable boundary between man and beast is a product of his commitment to Platonic rather
than Plinian principles, it is perhaps significant that Pliny himself subsequently describes this
“race of men” more ambiguously as a “herd of animals” (armenta animalium) supplying milk for
a nomadic Ethiopian tribe. 57
Regardless of whether or not Pliny, if pressed, would have been willing to assign any of
the aforementioned races to one of the mutually exclusive categories of “man” and “beast,” and
regardless of whether or not he would have even considered these two categories mutually
exclusive, the criteria he deems important for the evaluation of ambiguous cases is clear: for
even if they are never reformulated as a formal definition of the human essence, and even though
he appears to take a variety of additional factors including physical shape and mode of dress into
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account, he returns again and again to the capacities for memory and speech as the distinguishing
features of the human animal. Indeed, in contrast to Pliny’s reticence regarding human
rationality – a reticence typically explained by Pliny’s purported inability to rise to the level of
conscious philosophical analysis rather than by his lack of commitment to the beliefs attributed
to him – Pliny is explicit about the roles played by language and memory in sustaining human
life. In his tenth book, for instance, Pliny writes that the human voice (vox) allows for the “the
articulation of the mind, which has made us different from the wild animals” (explanatio animi,
quae nos distinxit a feris). 58 Although in English the antecedent of the relative pronoun “which”
is ambiguous, in Latin the pronoun’s gender leaves no room for doubt: it is the ability to
articulate the contents of the mind, that is, to give the contents of one’s mind verbal expression
and thereby to explain one’s thoughts to others, and not the mind itself, which has led to the
differentiation of man and beast. Pliny once again leaves the question of whether or not beasts
possess mental faculties in any way approximating or analogous to the mind of man
unaddressed: as in his comment on pantherine discoveries, Pliny’s concern is the capacity for
communication. Moreover, Pliny’s phrasing is significant. It is not the case that man’s capacity
for articulating his thoughts makes him different from the other animals, but rather that this
capacity has made him different, suggesting that it is not the capacity in itself that makes man
unique but the fact that it has been exercised in the past and has thus given expression to ideas
that have since been passed down across the succession of generations in the form of a
continuous tradition.
Pliny also singles out memory for its role in sustaining human life, giving equal emphasis
to the importance of the faculties of both memory and speech for the accumulation of knowledge
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regarding the salutary properties of Nature’s products. 59 In his book on the nature of man, Pliny
calls memory (memoria) “life’s most indispensable advantage” (necessarium maxime vitae
bonum), and although he does not specify that it is an advantage for a distinctively human life,
this is certainly suggested by both the statement’s immediate context – a passage concerning
feats of human memory – and the context provided by the book as a whole. 60 Pliny again
associates memory with human life in his twelfth book, in which he describes the use of paper as
something upon which “life’s humanity, or at least our memory, very much depends” (maxime
humanitas vitae constet, certe memoria), indicating the existence of a connection between man’s
capacity for memory and his humanity. 61 Importantly, in Latin the word memoria can denote
either “memory” or an historical “record,” and Pliny’s use of a polyvalent term once again
appears purposive, pointing to the parallels that exist between the process of development
characteristic of the life of the individual human being and the process of development
characteristic of the collective, trans-generational life of the human species: just as memory is a
necessary condition for the development of the individual, who knows nothing except by being
taught, the development of the human species depends upon the continuity of knowledge
regarding past inventions and discoveries across the succession of generations, a form of
collective memory aided by the invention of paper and the subsequent creation and preservation
of written records. As shall be shown in the following chapter, Pliny’s apology for empire rests
on the twofold claim that the publication of his encyclopedia, the incarnation of mankind’s
collective memory recording the contents of the universe in a newly established universal
language, introduces the final stage in the history of human development, and that its
59
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composition was made possible by the alignment of the limits of the Roman Empire with the
limits of the natural world. The very structure of Pliny’s book on the nature of man, in which a
record of the history of human inventions is placed after a series of sections corresponding to the
stages of individual human development, however, indicates that a full appreciation of the
relationship between Pliny’s encyclopedia and his philosophy of history depends upon an
antecedent examination of the complementary roles played by memory and speech in the
development of Plinian man as an individual. Indeed, insofar as each individual human being
must relearn the accumulated discoveries of his predecessors, the integration of the world of
nature into the life of the individual recapitulates the historical development of the human
species as a whole, with the life of the individual thus providing a paradigm for the construction
of a universal history of man and with the life of the encyclopedist in particular reenacting the
whole course of human phylogenesis and marking its completion. 62
B. The Paradox of Man
As discussed in Chapter 1, the structure of the central chapters of Pliny’s sixth book
corresponds to the stages of development traversed by an individual human being during the
course of a single lifetime. Indeed, once the introductory section examining the diversity of the
human race and thereby adumbrating the boundaries of the “human” (Chapters 6-32), on the one
hand, and the closing catalogue of inventors and inventions linking the development of the
individual to the development of the species (Chapters 191-215), on the other, are discerned as
distinct sections of roughly equivalent length framing the central portion of the text, it becomes
clear that the core of Pliny’s examination of the human animal is patterned after the life of an
individual man, with successive sections on gestation and birth (Chapters 33-67), childhood
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(Chapters 68-76), adulthood (Chapters 77-152), and death (Chapters 153-190). The opening
proem (Chapters 1-5), the beauty and the philosophical value of which should have given pause
to the propagators of the myth of Pliny’s mediocrity and would alone justify its translation in
full, provides the context in which the remaining sections of the book, including especially its
central chapters, are meant to be read. Following two brief sentences in which Pliny transitions
between his account of the material universe and his examination of animal life, the first and the
second architectonic units of the Natural History, Pliny commences his sixth book in earnest
with the word Principium, translated here as “The chief place,” a term signifying both man’s
rank in the animal kingdom and his corresponding privileged location within Pliny’s
encyclopedic text. Pliny writes,
The chief place will rightly be allotted to man, for whose sake Nature appears to
have engendered all other things, although her many gifts come with a cruel price, so that
it is not possible to judge whether she has been more a good parent to man or more a
harsh stepmother. First of all, man alone of all the animals she clothes with resources
belonging to others, while to the rest she allots their own diverse coverings – shells, bark,
quills, hides, fur, bristles, hair, down, feathers, scales, fleeces; even the trunks of trees she
has protected from the cold and the heat with bark, sometimes two layers deep: man
alone naked on the naked ground she casts on his natal day at once to the sound of crying
and wailing – among so many animals no other is more prone tears, and these
immediately at the beginning of life – whereas, by Hercules, that much-discussed first
smile, even at the quickest, is given to no child before his fortieth day. Chains, such as
are unknown even to the wild animals (feras) born among us, and the binding of all his
limbs follow after this first introduction to the light of day, and so, having succeeded in
being born, the animal (animal) who must rule the rest lies on the ground weeping with
his hands and feet bound, and his life begins with punishments on account of only one
fault: because he was born. Alas the madness of those who judge that from these
beginnings they were born for a proud estate!
His first promise of strength and the first gift of time make him like a quadruped.
When does man gain the ability to walk? When does he come to possess a voice (vox)?
When is his mouth firm enough for solid food? How long does the crown of his head
throb, a sign that he is the weakest among all the animals (animalia)? Then there are his
diseases, as well as all the cures contrived to counter his ills, which immediately
afterwards are also defeated by new diseases! And all other animals feel the force of
their own natures, with some making use of their speed, others their swiftness in flight,
and still others their ability to swim, but man knows nothing except by learning – neither
how to speak nor how to walk nor how to eat; and in brief, he knows nothing by the will
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of Nature other than how to weep! And so there have been many men who have
expressed the opinion that it is best not to be born or at least to cease to exist as swiftly as
possible.
To man alone among living beings (animantium) has been given cause for sorrow;
to him alone luxury, and that in countless forms and over each and every limb; to him
alone ambition; to him alone greed; to him alone an unbounded desire for living; to him
alone superstition; to him alone anxiety about his burial and even about what there will
be after his death. The life (vita) of no living being is more fragile (fragilior), the lust for
all things of no living being is greater, the fearful trembling of no living being is more
troubling, the rage (rabies) of no living being is more impassioned. Finally, other living
beings rightly pass their time among their own species: we see them assemble
(congregari) and stand against animals different from their own kind – the savageness of
lions is not displayed among themselves; the bite of serpents does not assail serpents; not
even the monsters of the sea or fish are ferocious except against different species. But for
man, by Hercules, most of his ills are on account of man. 63
Previous commentators are virtually unanimous in their description of Pliny’s proem. Isager,
whose interpretation of the proem is largely representative of those of the other commentators,
calls it a summary statement of the “ambiguous position of man in Nature,” in which man “is at
one and the same time Nature’s highest-ranking creature and Her most frail one.” 64 Beagon
likewise describes Pliny’s proem as an exposition of the “paradox of the human race” according
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to which man exists as both the “pinnacle” and the “misfit” of the natural world. 65 For Beagon,
the “paradox of man,” as presented both in the proem to Pliny’s sixth book and in the book as a
whole, consists in the fact that “human strengths and weaknesses are equally obvious” and that
“the assertion of [man’s] primacy” is inseparable from an account of his weakness and his
fragility. 66 The dynamic tensions discerned in the proem, which give rise to an image of an
animal whose existence is characterized by the interaction of its “potentials and limitations,” are
in fact the beating heart of Plinian man. 67 Man, for whom Nature appears to have engendered all
things, is cast onto the ground naked, defenseless, and weeping on the day of his birth. Pliny
emphasizes man’s pitiful beginnings at several points in his proem, counterbalancing a prophetic
description of man as the one animal destined to rule the rest with a series of images of a being
for whom the attainment of even an animal existence requires struggle and is in no way
guaranteed. The absence of a natural covering at birth signifies his vulnerability to the elements,
to predators, and to diseases and indicates that his very survival is largely fortuitous; his
unformed skull and his pulsating fontanelle evince his deficient condition upon emerging from
the womb; his own physical weakness and the swaddling-bands with which he is fettered as an
infant deny him even quadrupedal movement; his initial ignorance of his own nature marks him
as defective in comparison with the other animals; and the internal divisions and acts of
interpersonal violence characteristic of the human race, at least in its pre-imperial form, suggests
that humankind exists in a prototypembryonic state, exhibiting the distinguishing features of its
phylum but not yet fully realizing its potential as a separate and distinct species of animal life.
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As a result of her adoption of the conventional scholarly interpretation of Pliny’s stoical
theory of human nature, for Beagon the “paradox of the human race” is best resolved in terms of
man’s unique capacity for rational thought. According to Beagon, the rhetorical antitheses
contained in the proem are meant not only to illumine man’s physical inferiority relative to other
animals, but also to highlight his inherent superiority as the only being capable of rational
thought. Thus, Beagon writes that even though the “physical frailty of man compared to other
animals is a fixed fact,” his physical disadvantage “balances out in practice because of man’s
ratio.” 68 The tension that exists between man’s potentials and his limitations are reframed by
Beagon as the strange but seemingly providential coincidence of physical frailty and intellectual
strength in a single being.
Beagon’s characterization of Plinian man, however, fails to account for Pliny’s evident
concern for individual human development, an important feature of both Pliny’s proem and the
structure of his sixth book as a whole, and it gives no weight to the fact that a capacity for
rational thought is conspicuously absent from Pliny’s description of man. 69 Indeed, the proem
suggests that man’s fragility is not counterbalanced by his capacity for rational thought, a
capacity linked at least since Plato with man’s desire for the eternal and the unchanging, but
rather by the possibility for development, a possibility realized through a process of change for
which the first prerequisite is the passage of time. It is only through “the first gift of time,”
writes Pliny, that man advances from sub-animality to animality, gradually acquiring a fully
formed skull, teeth, and the power of quadrupedal movement. Insofar as Pliny’s proem provides
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a summary statement of his philosophical anthropology, it is clear that the temporal dimension of
man’s existence has a central place in the Plinian understanding of human nature. Implicit in
man’s pitiful, slavish, and seemingly deficient condition on his natal day, on which he differs
from all other animals in that he does not already embody all the possibilities of his existence, is
the freedom for self-transcendence possessed by man alone as the only animal capable of
developing through time and of acquiring faculties and forms of knowledge not possessed by his
progenitors and not limited to an antecedently established, permanently defined, and congenitally
acquired “nature” consisting of a static set of traits and abilities. It is not the capacity to escape
from time through a mystical, rational ascent into the realm of the eternal forms that makes man
unique, but rather the very temporality of his existence as the only being for which the
realization of its “nature” is an ongoing process requiring the passage of time.
The significance of the concept of development in Plinian thought comes into relief
against the backdrop provided by his description of the “fragility” of human existence, the first
premise of Pliny’s philosophy of man. As Pliny states in his proem, the life of no animal is more
fragile than the life of the human animal, and following a discussion of the trivial causes of
human miscarriage and death in a subsequent chapter, he adds that only a man who is “at all
times mindful of human fragility (fragilitatis humanae) will weigh life in an impartial
balance.” 70 Pliny’s point is in part moral, exposing the preposterous position of the proud who
consider themselves the “offspring of fortune” (fortunae partus), and perhaps even believe that
they are gods, when in fact, like Wells’ Mr. Polly, in other respects the antithesis of the Plinian
ideal, they “hover on the verge of non-existence.” 71 As Calvino observes, “What emerges from
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[Pliny’s sixth book] is a dramatic notion of human nature as something precarious and insecure,”
as well as an understanding of human existence as “a frontier zone, for everyone who exists
might very well not exist, or might be different, and it is there that it is all decided.” 72 How can
a man be a god, asks Pliny, when his incipient life would have been brought to an abrupt end if
his mother had sneezed or had inhaled a noxious whiff of smoke in the moments following his
conception? 73 How can a man be a god given the contingent, fleeting character of his existence
– when whether or not he is alive tomorrow morning depends on whether or not he chokes to
death on the seed of a grape or perhaps on a single hair floating in his glass of milk tonight?
Interestingly, Healy has observed that as part of his effort to establish a scientific vocabulary
adequate to the task of providing a complete description of the world of nature, Pliny makes
neological use of the word fragilitas, endowing it with the more specialized, technical meaning
of “brittleness.” 74 To the extent that Pliny intends this more specialized meaning of fragilitas
when applying it to man, he succeeds both in emphasizing the degree to which human life is
subject to the smallest changes of fortune and in exposing the lack of a middle ground between
existence and non-existence in a manner unavailable to the poets of Rome’s literary Golden Age.
The fleetingness and the contingency of human existence are accentuated by its humpty-dumpty
nature: easily shattered, once broken it is irrevocably lost.
In addition to the contingent character of man’s existence, the transience and the
uncertainty of human life are thematic elements of the Natural History, underlying Pliny’s praise
of the earth (terra) in his opening book as that which bears “our monuments and epitaphs,
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prolonging our names and extending our memory against the shortness of time” (monimenta ac
titulos… nomenque prorogans nostrum et memoriam extendens contra brevitatem aevi); his
refusal to include lists of poisons and abortifacients in the second half of his encyclopedia as
information contrary to his self-declared purpose of cultivating life; and his rejection of the
possibility of astrological or physiognomical prognostication as a denial of the power of
“changing Fortune” (fortuna varians) and of the consequent unpredictability inherent in human
events. 75 Indeed, Pliny’s commitment to the insecurity of human life is so thoroughgoing that
even before he defends the power of fortune against the astrologers and the physiognomists, he
finds it necessary to sharply curtail the scope of Lady Fortuna’s sway in order to deny man the
comfort and the security of even her bosom in his forlorn and vulnerable state. In a frequently
cited passage immediately following an Epicurean declamation against the belief that “the
highest being, whatever it is, is concerned with the affairs of men” (agere curam rerum
humanarum illud, quicquid est, summum), Pliny asserts that the deification of Chance is no less
in conflict with a true understanding of the human condition than the conviction that God directs
the course of human events and predetermines each man’s fate:
To be sure, throughout the world, in all places and at all times, Fortune alone is invoked
and named by all voices, she alone blamed, she alone accused, she alone pondered, she
alone praised, she alone – having been judged volatile, and indeed by most men blind as
well, fickle, inconstant, uncertain, variable, and a patroness of the unworthy – charged
and subjected to reproaches. To her is accredited all things spent, to her all things
received, and she alone fills both pages of the whole ledger of mortal affairs; and we are
subjected to chance to so great an extent that Fortune herself, by whom God is proven
uncertain, takes the place of God. 76
75

Pliny Naturalis Historia 2.154, 7.134, 7.160-167, 11.273, 21.178, 25.25, 27.9.

76

Ibid., 2.20, 2.22. toto quippe mundo et omnibus locis omnibusque horis omnium vocibus Fortuna sola invocatur
ac nominatur, una accusatur, rea una agitur, una cogitatur, sola laudatur, sola arguitur et cum conviciis colitur,
volubilis […] a plerisque vero et caeca existimata, vaga, inconstans, incerta, varia indignorumque fautrix. huic
omnia expensa, huic [omnia] feruntur accepta, et in tota ratione mortalium sola utramque paginam facit, adeoque
obnoxiae sumus sortis, ut prorsus ipsa pro deo sit qua deus probatur incertus. Cf. Beagon, On the Human Animal,
371; Beagon, Roman Nature, 28-29, 99, 119.

87

Pliny’s rhetoric is so engaging that the reader almost forgets that he is attributing such an
understanding of the power of chance in human life to others rather than defending its validity.
It quickly becomes clear, however, that Pliny rejects such a deification of Fortune as a form of
fatalism not dissimilar from the more conventional fatalism of the astrologers and the
physiognomists, juxtaposing the beliefs of the adherents of both fatalistic creeds in an effort to
expose their shared absurdity. Rejecting the security found in both the certitude of the
determinist and the more paradoxical certitude of the worshiper of Fortuna, Pliny propounds a
still more paradoxical form of certitude, one consistent with the insecurity intrinsic to the human
condition – the certainty of uncertainty: “Among these things,” writes Pliny, “but one is certain,
that nothing certain exists and that no being is more pitiable or more proud than man!” 77
Pliny thus carefully navigates between the Scylla of absolute randomness and the
Charybdis of an eternal decree, issued by God at the beginning of time and encoded in the
movements of the stars or in the features of the human face, predetermining the course of each
man’s life, insightfully recognizing both perfect randomness and perfect determinism as forms of
escapism through which man – the only being bearing responsibility for its own nature –
disburdens himself of the weight of his humanity. As Wethered has noted, among the three
possible cosmic “ruling powers” Pliny mentions – Fate, Fortune, and Nature – only the
lattermost leaves space “for personal initiative and responsibility” and is therefore consistent
with Pliny’s understanding of man. 78 Interestingly, during the course of his refutation of all
forms of certainty in human life beyond the certainty of human insecurity, Pliny uses census
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records and other documentary evidence to dispose of the claims made by astrologers about the
limits of human longevity and to prove that men born under the same star can lead dissimilar
lives – a testimony both to Pliny’s ingenuity as a natural scientist and to the important role
played by advances in imperial administration in the history of the progress of scientific
inquiry. 79 Such records, Pliny announces, prove that the day and the hour of a man’s death are
not foreordained, confirming his belief, to be examined more closely in Chapter 4, that the
establishment of the Roman Empire had furthered the philosophers’ project of replacing
superstition and myth with true knowledge, while nonetheless simultaneously accentuating the
uncertainty of human life. 80
As Pliny’s refutation of the astrologers regarding the existence of laws governing human
longevity indicates, in Plinian thought the uncertainty of a man’s life is closely linked to its
transience. 81 After enumerating dramatic instances of the “fickleness” (inconstantia) of fortune
as exemplified in the lives of various men, Pliny draws the following conclusion, emphasizing
both the uncertainty and the brevity of human life: “Truly, whatever is given to us, this gift of
Nature is uncertain (incertum) and fragile (fragile), and indeed it is niggardly (malignum) and of
short duration (breve) even in the case of those for whom provisions have been provided with the

79

Pliny Naturalis Historia 7.160-65. Cf. O. Pedersen, “Some Astronomical Topics in Pliny,” in Science in the
Early Roman Empire: Pliny the Elder, his Sources and Influence, ed. Roger French and Frank Greenaway (Totowa,
NJ: Barnes & Noble Books, 1986), 163-66.
80

As shall be shown in great detail in Chapters 3 and 4, Pliny considered political progress, especially the
supersession of the Greek polis by the Roman Empire, a necessary condition for the advance of science. For an
account of the development of population censuses during the transition from the Republic to the Empire, as well as
for the reciprocal relationship between politics and geography during this period of Roman history more generally,
see the seminal work by Claude Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics in the Early Roman Empire (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1991), especially pages 123-47.

81

Beagon, On the Human Animal, 375-76.

89

greatest abundance, at least when considered in relation to the whole time of eternity.” 82 The
“brittleness” of man’s existence ensures that both uncertainty and transience are characteristic
features of human life, such that even the most prosperous and fortunate men are but the flames
of candles, short-lived and impotent, flickering in ageless winds. In one of the more
philosophical sections of his sixth book, Pliny examines the lives of the richest, most powerful,
and most successful men, and determines that none of them, not even the deified Caesar
Augustus, can be considered truly happy. 83 Even the most fortunate man, writes Pliny, cannot
help but recognize that his good fortune might soon run its course, and once this possibility is
entertained, he must admit that the security provided by his wealth, his talents, or his political
power is illusory and that his “happiness has no firm foundation” (solida felicitas non est). 84
The transience of human life is also emphatically demonstrated through Pliny’s repeated
references during the course of his account of the geography of the world in his second through
fifth books to towns that have disappeared and to entire peoples who have perished, oftentimes
“without a trace” (sine vestigiis). Just so, writes Pliny, fifty-three peoples have vanished in Old
Latium alone, and he records similar facts about other regions both within Italy and beyond its
borders. 85 Pliny at times seems to relish the task of using his encyclopedia to provide epitaphs
for those of whom mankind would otherwise have no memory, and his evident concern for
listing the names of cities and tribes that have passed out of existence, or for at least noting their
large numbers when names are unavailable, cannot ultimately be explained solely by his desire
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to emphasize the transience of human life; instead, passing reference must also be made to his
larger apologetic purpose. The disappearance of cities “without a trace” prove that city walls do
not guarantee human memory, with plagues, natural disasters, and wars wiping out entire
populations and sometimes even erasing all evidence of their existence. 86 The transience of
cities, however, is relative to the seeming permanence of the earth, and it is therefore only by
means of a mode of political order in which the space of the “city” is the same as that of the
world that human memory can gain some measure of protection against the vicissitudes of
fortune. Indeed, denying man the security that would otherwise be afforded by the very faculty
through which he is able to add a modicum of ductility to his brittle existence, Pliny writes that
“no other faculty in man is as fragile” (nec aliud est aeque fragile in homine) as his memory. 87
Thus, not even man’s possession of “life’s most indispensable advantage” is secure, and Pliny’s
recurring allusions to the ease and the frequency with which entire cities have been destroyed has
the effect of subtly raising his readers’ awareness of the political preconditions of human
development.
86

According to Hannah Arendt’s exposition of the “self-interpretation” of the Greeks, the polis was thus failing to
fulfill its very reason for being. Arendt writes, “[W]hat the Greeks themselves thought of [the polis] and its raison
d’être, they have made unmistakably clear. The polis – if we trust the famous words of Pericles in the Funeral
Oration – gives a guaranty that those who forced every sea and land to become the scene of their daring will not
remain without witness and will need neither Homer nor anyone else who knows how to turn words to praise them;
without assistance from others, those who acted will be able to establish together the everlasting remembrance of
their good and bad deeds, to inspire admiration in the present and in future ages. In other words, men’s life together
in the form of the polis seemed to assure that the most futile of human activities, action and speech, and the least
tangible and most ephemeral of man-made ‘products,’ the deeds and stories which are their outcome, would become
imperishable. The organization of the polis, physically secured by the wall around the city and physiognomically
guaranteed by its laws – lest the succeeding generations change its identity beyond recognition – is a kind of
organized remembrance. It assures the mortal actor that his passing existence and fleeting greatness will never lack
the reality that comes from being seen, being heard, and, generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men …
It is as though the wall of the polis and the boundaries of the law were drawn around an already existing public
space which, however, could not survive the moment of action and speech itself. Not historically, of course, but
speaking metaphorically and theoretically, it is as though the men who returned from the Trojan War had wished to
make permanent the space of action which had arisen from the their deeds and sufferings, to prevent its perishing
with their dispersal and return to their isolated homesteads.” Hannah Arendt, The Human Condition (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1958), 197-98.
87

Pliny Naturalis Historia 7.90.

91

Whether a man is born into a tiny city-state or into a global empire, however, his passage
from sub-animality to animality requires the acquisition of various faculties, including the ability
to walk and the ability to eat, and if Pliny emphasizes the fragility or the “brittleness” of man’s
existence – that is, the contingency, the insecurity, and the transience of human life – in the text
of his encyclopedia, it is because such fragility is both the obverse of his unique capacity for
development and the very condition of his existence. In the penultimate section of his sixth
book, in which he examines human longevity and death, Pliny records cases of men who had
been presumed dead but who regained consciousness on their funeral pyres, either to return
safely from the brink of their destruction or to be burned alive amidst flames intended for a
lifeless corpse. These cases provoke Pliny to enunciate the first premise of his philosophy of
man, to move, that is, from example to principle. Pliny writes, “This is the condition of mortal
beings (conditio mortalium): we are born for these and similar accidents of fortune, so that no
confidence should be placed in that which pertains to a human being (homo), not even in his
death.” 88 Fragility is the condition of man’s existence, the backdrop against which the
significance of his capacity for acquiring faculties that enhance his chances for short-term
survival can be discerned and the rhetorically effective, if not logically necessary, presupposition
of the Plinian account of man. Pliny’s assertion in his proem that man knows nothing at birth
except how to weep is indeed a statement of man’s vulnerability to the accidents of fortune, but it
is also a statement of the almost limitless possibilities of his existence. Unlike the other animals,
the nature of the human animal does not consist of the set of capacities it receives at birth but
rather in its ability to acquire new capacities through time. In contrast to wild animals, which are
incapable of learning the distinctive capacities specific to other wild animals, man is able to
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observe the behavioral traits of other species of animals, to imitate them for the sake of the
satisfaction of human needs, and to share them with other men. 89 It is worth noting that in the
previously quoted passage about the discovery of an antidote for aconite, Pliny is careful to
specify that wild animals are incapable of passing on their discoveries “among themselves”
(inter se), leaving open the possibility that they are nevertheless capable of inadvertently passing
on their discoveries to man. 90 Indeed, on numerous occasions in the Natural History, Pliny
himself “hands down” information regarding the human applications of both the behaviors and
the discoveries of various wild animals, with his encyclopedic text thus serving as a lasting and
objectified expression of his own humanity. 91 Pliny writes, for example, that man learned the art
of using a rudder by observing the kite’s manipulation of its tail when flying and that the
beneficial effect of eating fennel on human eyesight was first discovered by snakes. 92 Whereas
wild animals, incapable of communicating among themselves, are aware of life’s aliments only
by natural instinct or through a process of continuous rediscovery, men can acquire and
accumulate knowledge and abilities across time, either by receiving instruction and guidance
from other men or by observing the behaviors and characteristics of other living beings. 93 The
human animal can thus progress beyond its deficient state on its natal day and even beyond the
highest level of existence attained by its progenitors.
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In his proem, Pliny asserts that all of the abilities and faculties possessed by a man
beyond the capacity for weeping were acquired through learning, and insofar as such learning
frequently occurs through spoken or written instruction and depends upon a man’s ability to
remember that which he has been taught, the complementary roles played by speech and memory
in the development of the human person are easily discerned. The content of Pliny’s proem thus
seems to confirm the conclusions reached in the preceding section concerning the importance of
speech and memory in defining the boundary between the human and the non-human. Two
considerations, however, intervene, necessitating a more precise statement of the nature of
Plinian man beyond a description of the two faculties upon which his individual development
during the course of his life appears to depend. First, as the foregoing examples of the kite and
the snake demonstrate, the acquisition of a new capacity does not always require speech. A man
can acquire knowledge or develop a new ability merely by imitating a wild animal without being
instructed by another man. If individual human development can proceed without the use of
speech, it is unclear why Pliny seems to suggest in other contexts that a capacity for articulating
thoughts is integral to a distinctively human life. Second, as was mentioned above, Pliny
attributes a capacity for memory to elephants, and he elsewhere attributes a capacity for speech
to various species of birds. 94 In fact, according to Pliny, magpies not only “love” the words they
are taught, but also “ponder” them, and Pliny even provides a description of a method through
which a bird can be taught to speak, suggesting that a capacity for acquiring new faculties is not
peculiar to man after all. 95
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These difficulties can be partly resolved simply by redescribing Plinian man as an animal
distinguished by its ability to hand things down, that is, by its ability to form a tradition, rather
than by the specific faculties such an ability necessarily presupposes and which may or may not
be held in common with other animals. 96 Hence, even though a magpie can learn certain words,
Pliny never suggests that a mother magpie is able to pass down the words contained in her
limited lexicon to her young. Pliny’s description of a method for teaching birds human speech,
however, is more problematic, and the challenge it poses to the foregoing account of Pliny’s
philosophical anthropology cannot be overcome by means of a simple redescription of Plinian
man; rather, the apparent acquisition by a non-human animal of a faculty not possessed at birth
(or perhaps possessed only in potentia) can be reconciled with the Plinian account of man only
by returning to the distinction between the two faces of Natura presented in the Natural History.
In a striking chiasmus contained in his proem, Pliny alludes to Nature’s twofold appearance
while once again giving aphoristic expression to his understanding of the relationship between
man and Nature. As translated above, according to Pliny, among all the animals, Nature casts
“man alone naked on the naked ground” (hominem tantum nudum et in nuda humo) on his natal
day. Pliny’s image of human pitifulness and vulnerability at birth is enhanced by the chiastic
structure of the sentence through which it is conveyed: hominem – nudum – nuda – humo.
Previous commentators have erred in emphasizing only the first half of the chiasmus, focusing
all of their attention on the nudity of man without examining the significance of the
corresponding nudity of the earth. 97 A more balanced reading of the text suggests not only that
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man needs the natural world but also that the natural world needs man. The cultivation of man
through the gradual integration of the products of Nature into human life proceeds by means of
the cultivation of the earth, and the introduction of nature into history thus entails the
concomitant temporalization of the natural world. Indeed, inverting classical teleological
conceptions of nature, Pliny even goes so far as to suggest in his sixteenth book that man was
engendered for the sake of the natural world rather than the contents of the natural world for the
sake of man. Pliny writes, “For brambles, curving downward, firmly plant their slender and at
the same time extremely long ends back into the ground and sprout again out of themselves, such
that they would fill up everything unless resisted by cultivation (cultura), so that it would be
entirely possible to think that men have been engendered for the sake of the earth.” 98 As
Beagon, ever-committed to Pliny’s supposed stoical worldview, exclaims with evident surprise,
“Rather than the normal Stoic idea of the earth being created for the sake of man, man is here
provided for the sake of a cultivated earth!” 99
The integration of the world of nature into human life is thus a twofold process consisting
of both the cultivation of human life and the cultivation of the natural world. Nature’s products
are introduced into human life through their cultivation, and human life is cultivated through the
temporalization of the world of nature. These two processes are the obverse and the reverse of
the single coin Pliny designates “natural history.” Importantly, as an aggregation of entities, the
natural world is in a sense timeless, with every rock, plant, and animal having its own
unchanging “nature.” The bee qua bee, that is, the bee as it is described in the first half of the
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Natural History, has the same peculiar nature as every other bee that ever existed. When viewed
independently of the needs and the possibilities of human life, the interlocking cycles of birth,
maturation, and death linking the succession of generations within a hive mark the passage of
time, but the nature of the bee itself, as manifested in each member of every successive
generation, has no history. Pliny is explicit, however, that the introduction of the products of
Nature into human life through their cultivation affects their individual natures, such that a bee
qua a producer of human aliments and medicaments is something new and different, something
other than a bee as it exists beyond the expanding sphere of human activity. 100 The bee’s
existence, like man’s, now also has a history, and human temporality, the dimension of the being
of man engendered by the gradual introduction of the products of Nature into human life,
temporalizes the natural world.
For Pliny, the temporalization of Nature’s products is most evident in man’s cultivation
of fruit- and nut-bearing trees. The application of the various methods of grafting discovered by
man, to which Pliny devotes considerable attention in his encyclopedia, increases the variety of
Nature’s products and provides indisputable evidence of the synergism of man and Nature. 101
The fact that Pliny mentions a “Plinian” cherry, moreover, suggests that his understanding of the
role played by man in the diversification of the products contained within the natural world was
not merely academic. 102 In addition to methods of hybridization, which increase the variety of
the products derived from trees, Pliny also describes methods of cultivation that increase the
amount of the products derived from trees. Pliny writes, for example, that the fecundity of an
100
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Egyptian fig tree is greatly enhanced when incisions are made in the unripened fruit with an iron
hook, allowing for fully ripened figs to be harvested no less than seven times during the course
of a single summer. 103 On multiple occasions, Pliny provides similar anecdotes concerning
dramatic increases in the yields of various crops achieved through human cultivation, and it is
clear that for Pliny, as Beagon rightly observes, the relationship between man and Natura “is not
simply the most harmonious of partnerships; her productivity is actually increased through man’s
activity.” 104
A tree, however, is frequently more than just a tree in Pliny’s encyclopedia, with
references to trees oftentimes marking important moments in Pliny’s narrative account of the
historical merger of the world of nature into the sphere of human activity and with human life
occasionally being described metaphorically in terms of the normal life cycle or the
characteristic features of trees. 105 It follows that Pliny’s remark in the proem to his thirteenth
book that “a very large part of the nature of a tree is due to its cultivation” is doubly significant,
offered as a statement equally applicable to both trees and the human animal. 106 At any given
moment in the history of the natural world, the distinctive characteristics of a particular species
of tree and the distinctive characteristics of a particular race of men are a function of their
cultivation. 107 The question of what makes man unique thus once again interrupts the flow of
exegetical analysis, as the boundary between the human and the non-human, and not just
between man and beast, appears to dissolve in the current of history. As has already been
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discussed, with the aid of the faculties of memory and speech, a man ascends from sub-animality
to animality, acquiring capacities and forms of knowledge through the integration of the world of
nature into his own individual life in a manner that recapitulates the larger history of human
discoveries regarding the life sustaining properties of the items contained in Nature’s manifold.
Temporality is thus a dimension of man’s existence absent from all other beings contained within
the world of nature when it is viewed from the perspective from which it appears as an
aggregation of entities, but by means of their integration into human life, that is, by means of the
merger of the world of nature into the sphere of human activity, these beings are also
temporalized and the natural world itself begins to acquire a history. That which distinguishes
man and beast, therefore, cannot simply be the possibility of development, as bees, cherry trees,
and blocks of marble can also acquire a developmental history through the appropriating activity
of man. What, then, is so special about Plinian man?
Ultimately, for Pliny man is distinguished by the burden of being responsible for his own
development. Man alone is responsible for the realization of the possibilities of his existence,
and thus for the realization of the possibilities inherent in all other beings, as the development of
every other product of Nature is achieved concurrently in the development of man. The
temporalization of the products of Nature occurs through the process of human development,
both across human history and in the life of the individual, and in consequence man is
accountable not only for his own “nature” conceived as the particular set of capacities he
possesses at any particular stage in his development, but also for the appearance of Nature itself.
The history of the world is a function of the history of man, who stands, Janus-faced, at the
nexus of time and eternity, bearing responsibility for the temporalization of the timeless.
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These reflections suggest one final paradox appertaining to Plinian man, as the
temporalization of Nature as an aggregation of individual entities entails the eternalization of
Nature as a teleologically-ordered whole. If history consists of the introduction of the world of
nature into the sphere of human life, the complete integration of the former into the latter through
the establishment of a global empire and the publication of an encyclopedia cataloging its
contents marks the end of history and indeed the final triumph of being over seeming. Nature’s
two faces converge in the single face of the encyclopedist, the fully actualized human being,
who, by gaining knowledge of the salutary properties of each and every natural entity, realizes
all of the possibilities of his own existence. All things now exist for the sake of man, their
separate and peculiar “natures” revealed as the byproducts of human ignorance and as a veil
shrouding Nature’s true face. The temporalization of the eternal natures of Nature’s disparate
products leads to the eternalization of Nature itself, with the world of nature as an aggregation of
entities passing beyond time at the end of history as a fully integrated, teleologically-ordered
whole. The realization of man temporalizes the timeless and brings the passage of time to
eschatological fulfillment.
At the end of history, Plinian man, no less than the other entities existing in the natural
world, passes beyond time, and the nature of the one essentially temporal being is eternalized.
This is less a contradiction than a confirmation of the collapse of the temporal and the eternal in
an imperial age, an article of faith contained in every imperialist’s creed. As Pliny suggests in
his proem to his sixth book, the transcendence of all divisions between human beings through the
identification of all men as members of a single species is a precondition for the fullest
realization of the nature of the human animal, and the creation of a single human community
through the establishment of a global political order is thus the ultimate political development,
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preparing the way for the fullest realization of the nature of man through the publication of
Pliny’s own encyclopedic text. 108 Indeed, according to Pliny, the establishment of a global
empire was the fundamental prerequisite for his encyclopedic undertaking, the completion of
which marks the realization of all of the possibilities of human existence and secures the Roman
achievement against a retrograde movement in the historical relationship between man and
Nature through which being and appearance would once again be dissevered. Thus, in a great
conflation of the spatial with the temporal, a conflation characteristic of ancient thought in
general but to his credit expressly described by Pliny in terms of the integration of the natural
world into the sphere of human activity, the destruction of all spatial boundaries simultaneously
brings about the eternalization of the temporal, and the Virgilian prophecy that Rome would
become an empire without limit in both space and time is fulfilled. 109
In a catalogue of wonders contained in his thirty-fifth book, Pliny provides his readers
with an image of Rome as a city that has escaped the ravages of time through a mythopoeic
account of the construction of ancient Rome’s greatest sewer, the Cloaca Maxima, which drained
the Forum and washed the refuse of Rome into the river Tiber. 110 Pliny begins his account with
a description of the Roman sewer system itself:
But at that time [i.e., in the middle of the first century BC] the old men used to marvel at
the vast dimensions of the Rampart and at the substructures of the Capitol, and in
addition to these, at the sewers, the most remarkable work of all, since hills were tunneled
through and Rome, as we mentioned a short time ago, was made into a hanging city
beneath which Marcus Agrippa traveled by boat during his aedileship after his term as
consul. Seven confluent rivers flow through the sewers, and rushing downward like
108
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mountain torrents, they are forced to seize and to carry off all things (omnia); and when
they are impelled forward by an additional volume of rainwater, they shake the bottom
and the sides of the sewers. From time to time, backwash from the Tiber pours into the
sewers, and the opposed, onrushing currents of water clash within them, and yet their
unyielding strength abides. Massive blocks of stone are dragged above them, but the
hollowed channels do not give way; falling buildings, whether collapsing of their own
accord or through fires, batter them; the ground is shaken by earthquakes; and despite
everything, they remain unconquerable after nearly 700 years since the time of
Tarquinius Priscus. 111
The city of Rome, elevated above the raging waters of seven confluent rivers, their force and
their volume regularly augmented by torrential rains and their awesome power revealed in
subterranean cataclysmic contests with onrushing offshoots from an overflowing Tiber, rests
unmoved and secure, a great, pendulant, ordered reality constructed above a watery, primeval
chaos. At least since the time of Plato’s gloss on Heraclitus’s river fragments, flowing water had
been identified with the flux of time, and although many insightful observations have been made
about the meaning and the purpose of Pliny’s poetic depiction of Rome as a city suspended
above the intersection of seven rivers, it would seem that the primary message Pliny wishes to
convey to his readers in the excerpted passage concerns the supra-temporality of Rome. 112
Despite the supposed antiquity of the city’s sewers, Pliny writes that in the middle of the first
century BC, Rome’s oldest citizens marveled at the “hanging city” in which they found
themselves, suggesting that the city of Rome had somehow recently changed its appearance in a
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manner noticeable only to those who had reached maturity before the city’s implied
transformation. In other words, it was only during the final transition from the Republic to the
Empire that the image of a city floating tranquilly above seven raging rivers, the combined force
of which was sufficiently powerful to sweep away “all things” (omnia), became a source of
amazement, an indication that the true object of wonder was not a city that had been built above
a river but rather a city in the process of being established beyond the flux of time.
As the next two chapters shall demonstrate, for Pliny, the establishment of such an eternal
city, by means of the extension of the boundaries of Rome to the edges of the natural world, not
only allowed for the fullest realization of man, but also enabled the final triumph of science over
myth and thus a resolution to the search for true knowledge inaugurated by the philosophers of
ancient Greece. Indeed, according to Pliny, the road to absolute and eternal truths, naively and
unsuccessfully sought by the Hellenic philosophers within the encircling walls of the Greek
polis, was in fact a system of paved imperial highways emanating from Rome and uniting the
world.
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CHAPTER 3
PLINY’S DEFENSE OF EMPIRE
Had he not won
A world by arms, and thrice in triumph scaled
The sacred Capitol, and vanquished kings,
And championed the Roman Senate’s cause;
He, kinsman of the victor? ’Twas enough
To cause forbearance in a Pharian king,
That he was Roman.
~ Lucan Pharsalia 8.553-556 1
A. A World by Arms
When Pompey the Great, having completed successful military campaigns on three
continents, returned to Rome triply triumphant with a trophy representing the world in his train
in 61 BC, the imagery of global empire, though always more an expression of a political
aspiration than a reflection of a geographical reality, was put on display before the citizens of
Rome for the first time with all of the pomp and pageantry associated with a military parade. 2
Cassius Dio records that Pompey’s triumphal procession was unusual in that it included trophies
for all of his achievements, not merely the most recent or even the most significant, and that
“after them all came a giant one, adorned in an extravagant manner and bearing an inscription

1

Non domitor mundi nec ter Capitolia curru / Invectus regumque potens vindexque senatus / Victorisque gener,
Phario satis esse tyranno / Quod poterat, Romanus erat? Lucan, Pharsalia, trans. Edward Ridley (London:
Longmans, Green, and Company, 1896), 247-48.

2

It should be noted, however, that at the time of Pompey’s third triumph images of a globe, a symbol of “cosmic”
sovereignty of Hellenistic origin, had already been in circulation on Roman coins for nearly twenty years.
Nevertheless, the symbolism and the circumstances of Pompey’s third triumph suggest that Pompey’s victories in
the East gave the preexistent, though perhaps only implicit, Roman claim to universal rule a concrete, geographical
basis within the Roman imagination. For the increasing presence of symbols of global imperium on Roman coins
beginning in the mid-70s BC, see Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics, 35-36. The second chapter of Nicolet’s
seminal work provides the standard account of the development of the symbolism of global conquest in Rome in the
first century BC, and my arguments in this chapter are heavily dependent upon his insightful analysis of the
reciprocal effects of politics on geography and geography on politics during the late republican and early imperial
periods.
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stating that it was a trophy of the inhabited world (oikoumenē).” 3 It had been customary for
victorious generals to present conquered territories to the people of Rome by means of a
procession of entitled placards, maps, or iconographic or scale-model representations when
reentering the city in a triumphal parade, but the symbolism of Pompey’s final trophy was
different from the symbolism contained in all previous triumphs of which there is record.
Pompey had not simply extended the frontiers of the Roman Empire by some quantifiable
distance, but had also brought, albeit synecdochically, the entire world within the ambit of
Roman control, transforming Rome from a bounded into an unbounded power. As Monroe
Deutsch demonstrates through a concise but conclusive examination of the writings of various
ancient Roman authors, “it was not the mere fact that [Pompey] had received the honor of three
triumphs, but that he had celebrated one over each of the three continents and so in a sense over
the entire world, that the Romans felt to be the most notable.” 4
Trevor Murphy argues convincingly that the Roman triumph was a mode of “imperial
geography” that fulfilled the pedagogical function of “acquaint[ing] the city with new fields that
it had come to possess for exploitation and administration,” and if this was indeed even one of
the intended purposes of a victorious general’s triumphal procession, it is easy to discern the
political and historical significance of the iconography of Pompey’s third triumph. 5 With
Pompey’s Asiatic victories it could be asserted that the entire world had been subjugated to the
people and the Senate of Rome. The world was now open for Roman settlement, for the
construction of roads and trade routes leading to Rome, and for the imposition of Rome’s
beneficent, but undeniably self-interested, rule. The succession of trophies included in Pompey’s
3

Cassius Dio Roman History 37.21.2.

4
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5
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third triumph, culminating in an especially large trophy representing the inhabited world as a
whole, reenacted his twenty-year conquest of the world and ratified within the popular mind that
which he and his legions had already achieved on the field of battle, namely, the extension of the
authority of Rome over all of the world’s peoples and territories. 6 In Murphy’s words, the
triumph was “a species of theatre” through which “the triumphing general (triumphator)
perform[ed] the process of his conquest.” 7 For Pompey, this meant reenacting his subjugation of
the entire oikoumenē, translated into Latin as the orbis terrarum or the “circle of the lands,” an
accomplishment achieved not merely through a series of battles in one region or on one
continent, but rather through a series of military campaigns in Africa, Europe, and Asia.
Although the citizens of Rome could not help but be aware of the existence of a residual,
crescentic stretch of land separating the boundary of direct Roman administrative control from
the northern, eastern, and southern boundaries of the inhabited world, they appear to have
underestimated the distance between the administrative frontiers of the Roman Empire and the
edges of the orbis terrarum, making the prospect of an attained congruity seem at least plausible
if not immanently realizable. 8 Perhaps more importantly, regardless of the actual size of the
three continents of which the Romans had reliable, firsthand knowledge and the reality of
administrative frontiers, if the poets of Rome provide any insight into the popular imagination of
the age, a belief that Roman authority rightfully extended in all directions as far as the encircling

6

Pompey’s first two triumphs in 79 and 71 BC were for his victories in Africa and Europe, respectively. Pompey
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Ocean had become an integral element of the Roman imperial Weltanschauung by the end of the
reign of Caesar Augustus in AD 14. 9
According to the Elder Pliny, Pompey’s theatre, underwritten by the world-conquering
general following his third triumph and completed in 55 BC, contained marbled personifications
of fourteen of the nations he had subdued during his military campaigns, an indication that
Pompey was not content simply to reenact the introduction of the nations of the world into the
sphere of Roman control in triumphal procession, but that he also wanted to integrate his
conquests into the material fabric and physical existence of the city itself and to place them on
permanent public display. 10 Nicolet adds that in “the same theatre complex there was a statue of
Pompey himself (preserved today, considerably restored, in the Palazzo Spada) in the heroic
nudity of an imperator, with sword and cloak, and holding a globe in his left hand.” In
conjunction with the fourteen national statues, writes Nicolet, Pompey’s statue, and in particular
the image of the globe it contained, “discreetly recalled that he had in principle ‘conquered the
world,’ in the name of the Roman people.” 11 Pompey’s theatre was thus meant to serve as a
permanent monument in the city of Rome commemorating his victories and the incorporation of
the world as a whole into the sphere of Roman control. 12

9

Whittaker makes a compelling case for the existence of a distinction within Roman geographical and cosmological
thought between a “[bounded] empire of administration and an [unbounded] empire of control” resulting in a
“dualist view of space” within the Roman political imagination. As Whittaker makes clear, however, despite the
fact that the Romans thus “clearly differentiated between administered and unadministered land,” both types of land
“were incorporated within the orbit of power and collective ownership of the city-state.” Whittaker, Frontiers of the
Empire, 10-59, esp. 17, 20, 21. See also C. R. Whittaker, “Where Are the Frontiers Now?” in The Roman Army in
the East, ed. David L. Kennedy (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 25-41. For poetic formulations of
the unbounded imperium of Rome, see the epigraphs taken from Ovid’s Fasti (2.683-84) and Virgil’s Aeneid (1.278279) which open the two preceding chapters.
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Despite the seemingly unsurpassable grandeur of their Pompeian beginnings, during the
Augustan Principate publicly displayed global imperial iconography underwent an important,
transformative development, with the installation of a map of the world on the wall of the
Porticus Vipsania in Rome sometime between 7 and 2 BC providing concrete confirmation of
the success of the Roman imperial project of opening the regions of the world for exploration,
demarcation, and subordination to a centralized authority. 13 According to a legend dating from
at least the late Roman period, the immense task of measuring the dimensions of the inhabited
world had first been proposed by Julius Caesar, who commissioned four scholars especially for
this purpose. 14 Regardless of the project’s true origin, however, responsibility for its completion
was ultimately assumed by Marcus Vipsanius Agrippa, a general and statesman who played a
decisive role in Octavian’s ascent to power; who subsequently oversaw the construction of roads
uniting the world and establishing Rome as its center; and who eventually married Julia,
Servius Commentary on the Aeneid 8.721. Pliny mentions the Porticus ad Nationes at 36.39. Nicolet speculates
that there were also sculptured representations of the provinces in the Forum Augustum. Nicolet, Space, Geography,
and Politics, 42-43.
13

For general discussions of the Porticus Vipsania and Agrippa’s map, see O. A. W. Dilke, Greek and Roman Maps
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(1963): 151-66. It has been argued that the “map” in the Porticus Vipsania was in reality some form of a tabular
inscription listing the dimensions of territories and the distances between various locations within the orbis terrarum
rather than a pictorial representation of the world. For the dispute, as well as for the arguments on both sides, see
Kai Brodersen, “Terra Cognita: Studien zur römischen Raumerfassung,” Spudasmata 59 (1995): 268-87; Kai
Brodersen, “The Presentation of Geographical Knowledge for Travel and Transport in the Roman World,” in Travel
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Encyclopedia, 157n57.
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Augustus’s only child, becoming the intended father of the emperor’s hoped-for heirs and
serving with him as a virtual co-regent of the empire until his death in 12 BC. Agrippa not only
oversaw the accumulation of the data necessary for the creation of the map of the world that
would bear his name, but also provided instructions in his will for the construction of the
porticus in which it would be housed. According to Pliny, the portico was completed under the
direction of Augustus himself, and as Nicolet contends, the map it displayed, which may have
been finished before Agrippa’s death without being installed until the portico was complete,
served as the graphic complement and the evidentiary basis of the fundamental Augustan
geopolitical claim of unbounded Roman imperium. 15 Indeed, unlike Pompey, who had
conquered the world only in principle, Augustus claimed to have conquered it in fact. The
introduction to the Latin version of Augustus’s posthumously published Res Gestae, detailing the
accomplishments of the first emperor of Rome, begins with a bold statement of this supposed
imperial achievement: “Below is a copy of the achievements of the deified Augustus, by which
he made the circle of the lands (orbis terrarum) subject to the imperium of the Roman people.” 16
In Murphy’s words, Agrippa’s map provided “visible certification” of Augustus’s selfproclaimed accomplishment of having subdued the world. 17
Carey observes that Agrippa’s map, though belonging to the tradition of publicly
displayed Roman global imperial iconography inaugurated by Pompey, differed in important
ways from Pompey’s trophy of the world, from the allegorical representations of conquered
nations decorating both Pompey’s theatre and Augustus’s Porticus ad Nationes, and even from
15

Pliny Naturalis Historia 3.17; Nicolet, Space, Geography, and Politics, 113-14. Rodriguez contends that the map
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Hellenistic depictions of terrestrial and celestial globes such as the one included in the
aforementioned statue of Pompey. Carey writes,
While the Romans may have been accustomed to symbolic representations of the world
either in Pompey’s allegorical display of conquered nations, or in the globe, which from
the Hellenistic period, had been part of the standard iconographic repertoire of power,
Agrippa’s map (whatever its exact appearance) displayed the world in a completely
different light. It revealed everything that hid behind the smooth circular surface of the
globe. Even greater than the sense of conquest evident in being able to hold the world in
your hand, here the whole world was unfurled, measured, and deconstructed, its anatomy
placed on view in the centre of Rome. In representing the world as it has not been seen
before, in detailing it where before it had simply been spherical, the map makes a strong
claim to autopsy, which in turn implies conquest, particularly when linked to a man [i.e.,
Agrippa] who had been a military commander in almost every part of the empire.
Already by 174 BC Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus’ map of Sardinia recognized that one
way of demonstrating complete conquest, was by demonstrating complete knowledge.
Agrippa’s map, one could argue, pushed this to its limits … Agrippa’s map gathered
together the boundaries of the world and installed them at the heart of empire. 18
Pliny, who explicitly notes the effect of the convexity of the earth in prohibiting man from
gaining a vision of the whole, repeatedly plays with the idea that Roman power had overcome
the limitations intrinsic to man’s terrestrial existence. 19 Although these passages will be
examined more carefully in the following chapter, for the time being it is sufficient simply to
recall Pliny’s claim, cited in Chapter 1, that “the greatness of the Roman Empire” allows “all
those things that previously had been hidden” to be made “available for general use.” 20 As
evidenced by Agrippa’s map, Roman imperial power had defeated the limiting conditions of
human life itself, enabling man to gain a vision of the whole and thereby to acquire absolute,
universal knowledge despite the relative and narrowly circumscribed vantage from which he
initially gains a perspective on reality. O. A. W. Dilke observes that for those passing through
18
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Agrippa’s portico, “the full extent of the Roman Empire [and thus of the whole inhabited world]
could be seen at a glance.” 21 If the wellspring of the impassioned determination with which
Pliny constructed his thirty-six book defense of empire is to be found anywhere, it is in the sense
of wonder he experienced when pondering the profound anthropological and epistemological
implications of the establishment of a world order in which such a vision of the whole was so
readily available to each and every man. 22
In his description of Agrippa’s purpose in preparing a cartographic representation of the
world, Pliny uses alliteration to accentuate the map’s cosmocratic message and to hint at the role
played by Rome in man’s transcendence of his original condition. After praising Agrippa’s
assiduity, Pliny queries rhetorically, cum orbem terrarum [u]rbi spectandum propositurus esset,
errasse quis credat et cum eo Divum Augustum? (“Who could believe that Agrippa, when
intending to put the circle of the lands [orbis terrarum] on view to be examined by the city
[urbs], erred, and with him the Divine Augustus?”) 23 The immediate apposition of orbis
terrarum and urbs in Pliny’s original Latin text not only creates an equation between the world
and the city in the reader’s mind as his eyes traverse the sequence of words, but also draws the
reader’s attention to the role played by the latter in the attainment of a vision of the former.
Nicolet describes the frequency with which the poets of the Augustan period punned on the
similar sounding words for “world” and “city” in the Latin tongue, and he even proposes that
Pliny’s phrasing may have been taken from the memoranda (commentarii) Agrippa wrote as an
ancillary for the interpretation of his map. “Agrippa’s project is so well integrated into the theme
of the universal empire that was finally incorporated by Augustus in the City,” writes Nicolet,
21
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“that we can legitimately wonder if Pliny’s formula does not go back for its source to Agrippa’s
Commentarii, and if the words spectandum urbi [to be examined by the city] were not on the
monument itself, not unlike the formula at the beginning of the inscription of the Res Gestae.” 24
Regardless of whether or not Pliny’s phrasing was taken directly from Agrippa’s memoranda or
even from an inscription on the Porticus Vipsania itself, it clearly echoes the writings of the
poets of the age and gives expression to the widespread belief that Roman power had opened the
world and that the world had in turn been introduced into the city of Rome. Like the statues in
Pompey’s theatre, Agrippa’s map incorporated the world into the city, making it part of the
physical existence of the city of Rome itself, but in a far more concrete form than an allegorical
display of conquered nations.
For Pliny, the extension of Roman authority to the edges of the earth, proclaimed by the
poets and attested by Agrippa’s map, established the identity of the urbs and the orbis in at least
two ways. First, it is clear that Pliny considered the limits of the Roman imperial order
coterminous with the limits of the natural world itself. In short, the city and the world had
assumed a common identity through Rome’s conquest of the orbis terrarum as a whole and
through their resulting spatial unity. Pliny’s encyclopedia is punctuated with passages
celebrating Rome’s subjugation of the world, and indeed the very premise of his encyclopedic
project is that whereas political divisions had previously prevented men from describing
anything lying beyond the particular locality in which they lived, the establishment of a global
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empire had for the first time made the entire world available for knowing. 25 Thus, distinguishing
himself from his predecessors, Pliny asserts in his seventeenth book that he is not offering an
interpretation of “one land” (una terra), but rather of “the whole of Nature” (tota Natura), and
three books later he reiterates that his subject “is Nature, not Italy” (de natura sermo, non de
Italia est). 26 According to Pliny, the very scope of his encyclopedic project, the completion of
which marked the final convergence of the realms of nature and life and the concomitant
transformation of all of Nature’s products from separate and distinct entities into elements of an
eternal, teleologically-ordered whole, necessarily presupposed the antecedent alignment of the
boundaries of the city with the boundaries of the natural world.
Second, through the importation of the myriad products of Nature into the city of Rome,
the extension of the boundaries of the Roman Empire to the edges of the orbis terrarum entailed
an important countermovement culminating in the establishment of the city of Rome as a
microcosmos, or a miniature replica of the world of nature. 27 As Roger French, Trevor Murphy,
and others have observed, the chronology of each section of the Natural History is structured
around the dates when each of the products of Nature described therein first made its appearance
in Rome, taking the passage of years since the founding of the city as a baseline. 28 Pliny’s
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inventory of the world is thus also an historical account of the introduction of the orbis into the
urbs, a process ending logically in their eventual identification. In one passage, Pliny writes that
taken by themselves even Rome’s buildings, having been constructed from materials imported
from throughout the orbis terrarum, form “another world”:
But it is now time to move on to the wonders of our city (urbs), to examine the strengths
acquired through the experiences of 800 years, and to show that in this way, too, the
circle of the lands (terrarum orbis) has been conquered. It will become apparent that this
has happened nearly as many times as the wonders to be described; indeed, if all of the
structures of Rome were piled together and thrown into one great heap, it would rise up
with a grandeur no different than if another world (mundus alius), so to speak, were being
described in one place. 29
Sorcha Carey observes that although Pliny’s inventory of the world rests on the claim that
Roman imperial authority had reached the edges of the earth, “there is also the suggestion that
the entirety of the world was already represented in miniature by Italy herself.” 30 In
consequence, Pliny’s encyclopedia is just as much a catalogue of the items available for purchase
in the city of Rome as it is an inventory of the products of Nature. 31 It should be noted, however,
that Pliny is aware that various types of plant and animal life are unable to survive outside of
their native environments and that this knowledge qualifies his presentation of the city of Rome
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as a microcosmos – an important qualification overlooked by Carey. On at least two occasions,
Pliny explicitly draws his readers’ attention to the fact that certain species of plants and animals
are forever bound to the particular localities in which they naturally occur, and as shall become
evident in the following chapter, he thereby lays the groundwork for his arguments concerning
the epistemological problems arising from the convexity of the earth and from the tiny
circumference of the encircling walls of the Greek polis. 32 The microcosmos that is the city of
Rome must always remain a deficient and artificial replica of the Roman Empire as a whole, a
macropolis coterminous with the boundaries of the cosmos itself.
In one of the many sententious turns of phrase scattered throughout the Natural History
providing the work with an often-overlooked depth proportionate to its much-discussed scope,
Pliny introduces his encyclopedic entry on Italy through a laconic redescription of this dual bond
identifying the city of Rome with the world as a whole. Italy, writes Pliny, is “at once the
nursling and the mother of all lands” (omnium terrarum alumna eadem et parens). 33 Pliny’s
aphoristic description of Italy has the character of a riddle, with Italy paradoxically assuming the
role of both a child and a parent in its relationship to the world. Within the context of Pliny’s
account of the historical integration of the world of nature into human life, and the concomitant
transformation of Nature’s disparate products into elements of a teleologically-ordered totality,
however, Pliny’s phrase is less a riddle than a shorthand description of Rome’s pivotal role
within the political history of Nature. According to Pliny’s account of the historical relationship
between man and Nature, the fullest realization of the human animal requires the complete
32
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integration of the world of nature into the sphere of human life. The convergence of the realms
of nature and life is brought about through increases in man’s knowledge of the salutary
properties of Nature’s products, and with the publication of the Natural History, a complete
register of the myriad ways in which the disparate products of Nature can be made subservient to
the end of sustaining human life, Pliny can confidently declare that “all those things that
previously had been hidden are now available for general use” – the triumphant proclamation of
the fully actualized man standing at the end of history. 34 Pliny leaves no room for doubt,
however, that Roman arms are the ultimate source of such increases in knowledge. 35 In short,
the unification of the realms of nature and life, though consolidated by the advance of
knowledge, occurs in practice through the expansion of the sphere of Roman political and
military control. Knowledge presupposes possession, and universal knowledge requires the
establishment of an unbounded authority. There is much to be said for Carey’s thesis that an
equation of knowledge and conquest is the fundamental premise of Pliny’s “catalogue of
culture,” such that “there is a simultaneous progress of knowledge and military advancement” as
the reader advances through the text of the Natural History. 36 Conversely, knowledge begins to
fail at the limits of the Roman military’s penetration into the world. Hence, in his fourth book,
Pliny explains that the origin of the Nile remains a mystery because it has been sought only by
“unarmed investigators, without the wars through which all other lands have been discovered”
(inermi quaesitus sine bellis, quae ceteras omnis terras invenere). 37
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On the final analysis, however, Pliny’s Natural History is not a glorification of war, but
rather a celebration of the blessings of Roman peace, for it is only after the establishment of
global peace that the products of Nature can be fully integrated into human life through universal
intercommunication and the uninhibited circulation of goods. In one of the key passages
contained in the Natural History, in which several important ideas peppered throughout the
preceding pages of his enormous encyclopedic text suddenly converge in a cogent statement of
his thesis, Pliny describes the global trade in life-promoting plants and attributes its emergence to
“the immeasurable majesty of Roman peace” (inmensa Romanae pacis maiestas):
The Scythian plant is transported from the marshes of Maeotis [where the Don flows into
the Sea of Azov]; the euphorbea from Mount Atlas [in northwestern Africa] and from
beyond the Pillars of Hercules [flanking the Straits of Gibraltar] where the nature of
things begins to fail; britannica from another direction, from oceanic islands situated
beyond the continent (terras); and also aethiopis from a region scorched by the stars; and
besides these other plants from other directions are transported this way and that
throughout the whole world (totus orbis) for the sake of human well-being (humanas
salus) – all this owing to the immeasurable majesty of Roman peace, which displays in
turn not only men of diverse lands and nations, but also mountains and their peaks rising
above the clouds, their offspring, and their vegetation, too. I pray that this gift of the
Gods will be eternal! So much does it seem that they have given the Romans to the
human race as a second source of light (altera lux)! 38
The Roman people are a “second source of light” or a “second sun” enlightening the world. The
world illumined by the Roman sun, however, is a different world than the world illumined by the
actual sun, since it is a world in which all appearances have been shed and in which the reality of
the natural world as a teleologically-ordered whole has emerged from the evaporating mists of
human ignorance. 39 It is within this same light that the meaning of Pliny’s dual description of
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Italy as both the nursling and the mother of all other lands becomes clear. Italy, like a suckling
infant, has imbibed all things through the importation of the world’s products, and she is thus in
a sense the offspring of all other lands, but she has also returned all things to the conquered
nations of the world, like a loving mother to her children, in the form of a unified reality
rendered subservient to the needs and the desires of man. 40
The core idea behind Pliny’s apology for empire is that the absorption of the orbis into
the urbs, culminating in their identification, could be brought about only through the destruction
of inherited forms. In the proem to his thirteenth book, shortly after his statement that the
greatness of the Roman Empire had enabled all things previously hidden to be made available for
general use, Pliny laments the fact that “the expansiveness of the world and the extent of
[Rome’s] possessions” (laxitas mundi et rerum amplitudo) had made it possible for the quest for
knowledge to be displaced by the pursuit of luxury. 41 Whereas national boundaries had
separated man from the fundaments of human life during mankind’s political age, and the
resulting state of scarcity had made it necessary “to exercise the gifts of the mind” (animi bona
exercere) simply in order to survive, the very abundance of things in an expanding empire
relieved man of the constraining force of necessity, signaling an increase in the ductility of
human life while simultaneously retarding the process of human development by creating an
opportunity for the interposition of a desire for private pleasures and for the erection of a wall of
accumulated luxuries, where the walls of the polis once stood, between the partly merged realms
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of nature and life. 42 As Healy observes, the desire for luxury had in effect “neutralized the
benefits derived from the spread of empire.” 43 Thus, after expressing regret that “the only arts
being cultivated” by his contemporaries “are the arts of avarice” (avaritiae tantum artes
coluntur), Pliny writes,
In former times, a nation’s political powers (imperia) were self-contained, and in
consequence so were its mental abilities (ingenia). Due to a certain barrenness of fortune
it was necessary to exercise the gifts of the mind, and countless kings were honored
(colebantur) through the beauty of the arts; and they, thinking that these works would
prolong their immortality, placed them at the forefront in the display of their possessions
– wherefore both the rewards and the labors of life (et praemia et opera vitae) were
growing in abundance. Subsequent generations have been disadvantaged by the
expansiveness of the world and by the greatness of our possessions. 44
According to Pliny, in former times, political boundaries divided humanity into isolated
communities and limited the imperia of each nation. Due to these geographical limitations, the
ingenia of each nation were also constrained. The expansion of man’s knowledge of the salutary
properties of Nature’s products, a process advancing by means of the absorption of the orbis into
42
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the urbs and culminating at the end of history in both the sublimation of the world of change and
appearance into a realm of eternal being and the realization of all of the possibilities of human
existence, thus necessitates the supersession of the bounded forms of order that had previously
dissevered the human race. The true powers of the human genius, argues Pliny, will only be
unleashed once the walls circumscribing isolated communities of under-developed men are torn
down, the political boundary separating the sphere of the natural world from the sphere of human
activity is completely dissolved, and the space of the world is depoliticized through its
identification with the space of the city of Rome. 45
Importantly, at the conclusion of his proem, Pliny somewhat unexpectedly suggests that
the bounded form of order characteristic of man’s pre-imperial age is not the only form that must
be shed in order for the orbis to be fully absorbed into the urbs and for the realm of nature to be
fully integrated into the realm of life:
In consequence [of the opportunities for pursuing wealth and luxury arising from the
expansiveness of the world and the greatness of our possessions], by Hercules, pleasure
has begun to live (vivere) and life itself (vita ipsa) has ceased. But we will also
investigate those things that have been erased from memory, and we will not be deterred
45
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by the lowliness of certain subjects, just as it did not deter us in our discussion of
animals, although we see that Virgil, the most distinguished of the poets
(praecellentissimus vates), for this reason avoided the resources of gardens, and among
those which he did register, he, a blessed and successful man of high repute (beatum
felicemque gratiae), plucked only the flowers of his subject, with in all only fifteen kinds
of grapes being called by name, along with only three kinds of olives and as many kinds
of pears, and indeed only the Assyrian apple, with all of the rest being neglected. 46
In his careful analysis of Pliny’s depiction of Virgil in the Natural History, Richard Bruère notes
that in the quoted passage, the encyclopedist’s “praise of Virgil (praecellentissimum vatem,
beatum felicemque gratiae) is almost Pecksniffian; it is included principally to enable Pliny to
upbraid the poet more effectively.” 47 Bruère in fact discerns a “persistent malignancy” toward
Virgil in the text of the encyclopedia despite Pliny’s “professed admiration” for the poet, and he
provides numerous examples of passages in the Natural History in which Pliny alludes to the
horticultural precepts contained in Virgil’s Georgics solely to refute them, exposes the
limitations of Virgil’s poetic mode of exposition and his knowledge of Italian agriculture, or
attempts to undercut the authority and the prestige of both the didactic poem and its author,
occasionally by misrepresenting – Bruère believes unconsciously – the meaning of the Virgilian
text. 48 Bruère ultimately attributes Pliny’s “polemical” and “captious” attitude toward Virgil to
the existence of a “jealous rivalry” between the encyclopedist and the poet, both of whom sought
to proclaim “the incomparable superiority of Italy and its inhabitants,” but who differed in their
emotional and artistic temperaments. 49
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Bruère’s conclusion, however, is less compelling than his description of the evidence
upon which it is based, and the context of Pliny’s “Pecksniffian” praise of Virgil suggests a
deeper, philosophical reason for the encyclopedist’s efforts “to censure and amend the poet’s
statements whenever he can find a pretext for so doing” than subconscious poet envy. 50 Indeed,
the juxtaposition of Pliny’s description of the constraints imposed upon the genius of a people by
the small circumference of their political boundaries and his implicit criticism of Virgil, “the
most distinguished of the poets,” for having described only lofty or beautiful subjects in his
poems, is not accidental. In both instances, Pliny is calling his readers’ attention to the
limitations of inherited forms: the bounded or “political” form of human order and metrical form
of the poem. Just as the circumvallating walls of the Greek polis or the encircling boundaries of
the Hellenistic kingdom had been incapable of encompassing the orbis terrarum as a whole,
leaving man ignorant of that which lay beyond the curve of the earth, so a versified sequence of
alternating dactyls and spondees was an inappropriate container for an exhaustive inventory of
the contents of the world. The limitations of the poetic form are manifest in the selectivity of the
poet: Virgil, writes Pliny, “plucked only the flowers of his subject” – in Greek, he
anthologized. 51 As has been shown, Pliny’s concern for the relationship between the form and
the content of a text is evident in the arrangement of his materials in the Natural History, and he
suggests here that the poetic form is fitting only for those authors who choose selectively from
Nature’s manifold when looking for a topic about which to write. Pliny uses the example of
Virgil to demonstrate that the material content suitable for the metrical form of a poem is limited
to lofty or beautiful things. If the most distinguished of the poets could not even find space in his
50
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poetry for the fruits and vegetables contained in a household garden, there was simply no way
the contents of the world as a whole could be squeezed into the limiting metrical form employed
by the poets. A more expansive subject required a different compositional form. 52 There is,
moreover, more than a hint of irony in Pliny’s critique: in limiting his poems to the beautiful
items contained in the natural world, Virgil failed to gain a vision of the infinitely greater beauty
of the whole of Nature itself. 53 As shall be shown in greater detail in the following two sections,
according to Pliny, the unification of the realms of nature and life by means of the absorption of
the orbis into the urbs would have been impossible if these two fetters on the development of the
human animal – the political and the poetic – had not first been shed. Interestingly, Pliny’s
apology for empire, that is, his defense of the conquest of the world by arms, is thus also at the
same time a defense of the encyclopedic form of the apology itself.
B. The Depoliticization of Space
As previously discussed, Pompey used his third triumph in 61 BC to celebrate not only
his recent conquests in Asia, but also his subjugation of the entire world on behalf of the Senate
and the people of Rome. Among Pompey’s Asiatic victories, his defeat of King Mithridates VI
Eupator Dionysius of Pontus, the last great king of the Hellenistic Age, had been especially
significant. 54 For Pliny, no less than for Pompey himself, Mithridates’ defeat had removed the
last obstacle to unchallenged Roman rule on a global scale, and within the theoretical framework
of Pliny’s political history of Nature, Pompey’s victory had thus prepared the way for the
extension of the authority of Rome to the edges of the earth, for the complete integration of the
52
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world of nature into the realm of history by means of Pliny’s own encyclopedic project, and for
the actualization of all of the unrealized possibilities latent in Plinian man. It follows that the
140-year period stretching between Pompey’s defeat of Mithridates in 63 BC and the completion
of the Natural History in AD 77, a period of time encompassing the establishment of the
principate under Octavian in 27 BC, constituted a liminal phase in the life history of the human
race as the world transitioned from a political to an imperial age and as man himself passed
beyond the flux of time. 55 Significantly, Pliny writes that on Pompey’s return trip to Rome
following his victory over Mithridates, the world-conquering general traveled to Rhodes in order
to visit the home of the aging Stoic philosopher Posidonius (c. 135-51 BC), and that in a
conspicuous act of deference, Pompey lowered his fasces, the emblem of the imperium of Rome
and thus of his own authority, before passing beneath the lintel of the philosopher’s door. 56 In
Pliny’s words, “At the conclusion of the Mithridatic war, when Gnaeus Pompey was about to
enter the house of the renowned professor of philosophy Posidonius, he forbade his lictor to
pound on the door in accordance with the usual practice, and he before whom East and West
bowed down, bowed his fasces before the door of learning.” 57 Pompey, having won the orbis
terrarum by arms, lays a subjugated world at the feet of the philosopher, making knowledge of
the art of war a mere propaedeutic in the pursuit of universal knowledge. S. C. Humphreys,
emphasizing the “sublime” character of the encounter between Pompey and Posidonius as it is
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depicted in the Natural History, rightly asserts that Pliny’s account “is surely more than a crude
plug for philosophy or for the superiority of Greek culture over Roman arms. It is a
juxtaposition, with only a wooden slab between, of the world-conqueror, the ruler of land and sea
– Pompey had just crushed Mithridates, the last threat to Roman supremacy – and the cosmic
understanding of the philosopher.” 58 Humphreys fails to add, however, that Pliny’s account
implies that Pompey actually passed through the frame of the door to Posidonius’s house,
eliminating even this slim divide between military power and the pursuit of knowledge, between
the imperator and the philosopher.
Within the shimmering realm of those typologies which constitute the connective tissue
of history for all men living within a parousiastic age in which the world of appearances and
change has been sublimated into a realm of eternal being, the partnership between Pompey and
Posidonius, announcing the beginning of a period of liminality in the history of man, exists in
prototypical form in man’s pre-imperial or political age. Just as a Christian theologian discerns
the imago Christi in the gait of Isaac as he carries the wood for his own sacrifice in the land of
Moriah or in the beaten back and bespittled face of Deutero-Isaiah’s Suffering Servant, so too
Pliny perceives a foreshadowing of the encounter between Posidonius and Pompey in the
supposed collaboration of Aristotle and Alexander in the composition of Aristotle’s Historia
Animalium. 59 Although Werner Jaeger’s acceptance of the veracity of the legend of Aristotle
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and Alexander’s collaboration on the basis of Aristotle’s knowledge of elephants presumed to
have been brought from India once lent credibility to this clearly apocryphal tale, Jaeger’s
contentions have since been refuted, and a passing reference by Athenaeus 150 years after the
publication of Pliny’s encyclopedia and a pseudepigraphal epistle from Aristotle to Alexander of
contested antiquity are the only other ancient sources attesting to Alexander’s purported
patronage of Aristotelian science. 60 Pliny, however, reports as fact the existence of a vast
network of investigative agents gathering data from across Alexander’s empire for Aristotle’s
use in the composition of his great treatise on animals, with the philosopher actually working at
his former pupil’s behest:
King Alexander the Great, fired with a desire to gain knowledge of the natures of animals
(animalium naturas), upon delegating this research to Aristotle, the most distinguished
Posidonius and Aristotle. This is a compelling example of the hermeneutical difficulties confronting the reader of
the Natural History. The form of an encyclopedia necessitates a particular interpretive approach, as the structure of
the text precludes the standard form of an argument in which an opening statement of the author’s thesis gains
support through a progression of arguments, with each argument containing a subsumed set of auxiliary lemmata.
Instead, the reader of an encyclopedia must consider the nature of the work as a whole, including its outward form
and internal structure, and then consider the definitions, descriptions, and anecdotes contained within each
encyclopedic entry, allowing the text as a whole to inform the interpretation of each entry and allowing each entry in
turn to shed additional light on the author’s overarching purpose and the content of his beliefs. One of the primary
reasons why Pliny’s apology has remained hidden for nearly two millennia is that the Natural History has been read
almost exclusively as a reference work, causing entries to be read in isolation from the text as a whole. Doody has
noted, however, that the method of reading the Natural History as a reference work and the distinctly different
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passages in the encyclopedia in which the author clearly presupposes “that the reader has read the previous book.”
Doody, “Finding Facts,” 1, 15. In contrast, consider the interpretive premises of the following scholars: Duff,
Literary History of Rome, 368 (“He was not, of course, to be continuously perused”); French, Ancient Natural
History, 231 (Pliny “intended the whole treatise to be used as a reference work”); Isager, Pliny on Art, 18 (“To be
sure, Pliny thought of his Natural History as a reference work, an encyclopedia, and he arranged his work
accordingly so that it might be read section by section”); and Pinkster, “Language of Pliny,” 253 (The Natural
History “was clearly conceived as a reference work”).
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man in every field of learning, issued orders to several thousand men throughout the
inhabited space of the whole of Asia and Greece – to all those who were supporting
themselves through hunting, fowling, and fishing and who were managing warrens,
herds, apiaries, fishponds, and aviaries – to follow Aristotle’s instructions, so that he
might not be ignorant of any animal born anywhere. On the basis of his inquiries to these
men, he composed those famous volumes, nearly fifty in number, on animals. 61
According to the Plinian account, Aristotle undertook his zoological investigations in order to
satisfy his former pupil’s cupiditas noscendi rather than his own curiosity or love of knowledge
for knowledge’s sake. Moreover, it is Alexander’s prior conquest of the whole of Asia and
Greece that had made the composition of the Historia Animalium possible. The propagatio
imperii is thereby made subservient to the propagatio ingenii humani, and in the Plinian
Alexander the union of power with the desire for knowledge – a union first sought by Plato,
Alexander’s teacher’s teacher – is achieved. 62 The original marriage of philosophy and power,
however, was brought about at the expense of the Greek polis, the form of human order to which
both Aristotle and Plato before him had been committed as the only form capable of supplying
man with the conditions necessary for the fullest realization of his potential as a human being.
As Aristotle writes, “Man is by nature a political animal (politikon zōon),” that is, an animal who
lives in a polis, “and anyone not belonging to a polis (apolis) by nature and not merely by chance
is either base or superhuman.” 63
Pliny’s great insight, the insight upon which he bases his defense of empire, is that man is
not a political animal, a zōon politikon, but rather an imperial one, an animal imperiale, for
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whom the realization of the highest possibilities of his existence requires the establishment of a
form of order capable of absorbing the world as a whole. Whereas the Hellenic philosophers’
commitment to the polis as the only possible mode of human order had set an unsurpassable limit
to the trans-generational progress of the human race, the supersession of the polis by the empire
through the successive efforts of Alexander, Pompey, and Augustus had opened a new and in a
sense boundless horizon for the transformative cultivation of the human animal. 64 Indeed, for
Pliny, the bounded form of the polis was not merely an outmoded form of human order, but also
the form of man’s relationship to Nature during the childhood of the human race. 65 In order for
man to pass from his childhood into an eternal maturity within this “biological” historical
scheme, the separate histories of the world’s various cities had to be incorporated within a single
history and the separate lands of the orbis terrarum, each with its own indigenous animals,
plants, and minerals, had to be reconstituted as a single, integrated, teleologically-ordered
whole. 66 Man’s adolescence thus consisted of the process of the depoliticization of Nature, that
is, of the supersession of the polis through the integration of the separate histories of the world’s
disparate cities into the biography of the city of Rome and the destruction of the political
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boundaries that had previously structured man’s relationship to Nature and indeed the very
dimensions of time and space. 67
In the eternal light cast by an ascendant Roman sun, it is perhaps unsurprising that the
image of Mithridates Eupator that emerges from the various encyclopedic entries in which he is
mentioned in many ways “epitomizes the Plinian ideal” despite the fact that the King of Pontus
had been a formidable and persistent enemy of Rome. 68 In the calculated mass killing known as
the Asiatic Vespers which opened the First Mithridatic War in 88 BC, Mithridates’ forces
allegedly slaughtered no less than 80,000 Roman men, women, and children, and until his
eventual defeat by Pompey three wars and twenty-five years later, the last great king of the
Hellenistic Age repeatedly “proved himself one of the most aggressive and determined
opponents that the Senate and the People of Rome ever faced.” 69 Yet, for the author of a sacred
history written at the end of time, the typologies linking the childhood, adolescence, and
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adulthood of the world add a mystical dimension to the profane happenings and personages of
ordinary time, and within this mystical dimension the superimposed characteristics of a type
blend with the otherwise distinctive features of the Mithridatic visage. In fact, within Pliny’s
Natural History, Mithridates plays the role of a proto-Vespasian, the emperor of Rome at the
time of the encyclopedia’s writing, whom Pliny describes in his opening book as the maximus
omnis aevi rector, “the greatest ruler of all time.” 70 Significantly, in his twenty-fourth book, at
the beginning of his longest and most substantive discussion of Mithridates, Pliny provides
Rome’s former enemy with a nearly identical epithet: Mithridates, writes Pliny, was the
maximus sua aetate regum, “the greatest king of his own age.” 71 The similarities between these
two titles, linking the men they designate across time and space and uniting them as instances of
a single type within Pliny’s sacred history, are surely not a coincidence, although the slight
differences they contain are no less significant than that which they have in common: whereas
Mithridates, a maquette of the future emperor of Rome who governed only a small portion of the
Asian continent, was the greatest king of a particular age (aetas), Vespasian, who governs a
global empire, is the greatest ruler of all time (omnis aevus). Vespasian, moreover, is a ruler
(rector) rather than a king (rex), the latter title being specific to a bygone age in the political
history of Nature. 72 It should be noted that Vespasian’s superlative and seemingly insuperable
title can be given with confidence only when time itself has come to end, making the rise of
another, greater ruler within the flux of human history an impossibility. Just as Mithridates’
defeat before the assembled legions of Rome marked the conclusion of a particular age within
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the history of man, allowing the Pontic king to be recognized as history’s greatest rex,
Vespasian’s principate marks the end of history itself, allowing the Flavian dynast to be
proclaimed the greatest rector of all time.
Pliny’s description of Mithridates as an instantiation of Plinian man is therefore less
paradoxical than it might seem at first blush, as Pliny’s words of praise redound to the man under
whom he himself had flourished as both an imperial official and a scientist. 73 Once Pliny’s
political history of Nature is recognized as a sacred history in which the significant actors
involved in previous epochal breaks in the history of man are the precursors of the agents of the
sublimation of the world at the end of time, it is unsurprising that Pliny’s encyclopedic “entry”
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on Mithridates provides the reader of the Natural History with a foreglimpse of Plinian man as
he will appear perfected at the end of time. 74 Pliny writes,
For it was Mithridates, the greatest king of his age, whom Pompey vanquished, who is
known from the evidence and not solely from report to have been the most careful
investigator of life (vita) among all those born before him: it having been devised by him
alone to drink a poison every day after first taking remedies so that by frequency of use it
would be made harmless; with a variety of antidotes having been invented by him first,
one of which even retains his name; it having been his invention to combine antidotes
with the blood of Pontic ducks, because they live on poisonous substances; volumes
addressed to him are still in existence that were composed by the famous physician
Asclepiades, who, since he had been pestered by requests to come from the city of Rome,
sent instructions in his stead; it being established with certainty that he alone among men
spoke in twenty-two tongues, and indeed that not one man from his subject nations was
addressed by him through an interpreter during the fifty-six years in which he reigned.
He was, therefore, along with the greatness of his intellectual ability (ingenium) in other
fields, an especially diligent student of medicine, and searching through each nation one
at a time (singula), he gathered treatises from all of his subjects, who comprised a great
part of the world, and left behind among his private possessions a case of these treatises,
together with specimens and information about their effects. Nevertheless, Pompey,
having obtained all the royal booty, ordered his freedman Lenaeus, a philologist, to
translate these things into our language (sermo noster), and that victory thus benefited life
(vita) no less than the state (respublica). 75
Here stands Plinian man incarnate, realized to the highest degree possible in a divided world.
His knowledge of twenty-two languages enables him to learn the discoveries that have been
passed down across the succession of generations within each of the nations over which he rules.
As Pliny emphasizes elsewhere in the text of the Natural History, Mithridates’ multilingualism is
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no less a testament to his memory than to his powers of communication, with the encyclopedist
including Mithridates’ ability to remember twenty-two different vocabularies among the great
feats of human memory listed in his book on the nature of the human animal. 76 Mithridates thus
exemplifies man’s capacities for memory and speech, the two distinctive capacities of the human
animal according to Pliny’s philosophical anthropology. Moreover, Pliny writes that Mithridates
applied his linguistic and mnemonic skills to the task of investigating “life” (vita) – a term over
which W. H. S. Jones expresses confusion in his translation of the Natural History’s twentyfourth book, suggesting that the Latin term be translated into English as “life’s problems” or
“biology.” 77 Within the context of his philosophies of man, Nature, and history, however,
Pliny’s meaning is clear: like Pliny himself, Mithridates sought the fundaments of human life in
the natural world, and in particular, in the medicinal properties of Nature’s products, and it is in
this sense that he was indeed an “investigator of life.” 78 In his books on the life-sustaining
properties of plants and animals, Pliny credits Mithridates with the discovery of two plants with
alexipharmic powers as well as with the invention of two antidotes, although he rejects the more
complex of the two as a “deceitful display of art and an extravagant boast of knowledge”
(ostentatio artis et portentosa scientiae venditatio) rather than a legitimate pharmaceutical and
refuses to include a list of its fifty-four separate ingredients in his pharmacopoeia. 79
Nevertheless, despite this one vain display of phony erudition, Mithridates appears to be one of

76

Ibid., 7.88-89; see also Beagon, On the Human Animal, 272-74.

77

Pliny, Natural History: Books 24-27, trans. W. H. S. Jones (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980), 138-39.

78

It should be noted, however, that Pliny once again makes the greatness of Mithridates’ achievements relative to
his own age. According to Pliny, the King of Pontus was a more careful investigator of life than “all those born
before him,” words of praise that nevertheless leave open the possibility that the most careful investigator into the
fundaments of human life would belong to a future age.
79

Pliny Naturalis Historia 23.149, 25.62-63, 25.127, 29.24-25. Cf. Beagon, Roman Nature, 67-68.

133

the great benefactors of the human race portrayed in Pliny’s encyclopedia, and his investigations
seem consistent with the “whole humanitarian ideal” espoused by Pliny himself. 80
Although it is indisputable that Mithridates exhibits the key characteristics of Plinian man
described in Chapter 2, approximating the Plinian ideals of universal communication and perfect
memory, in the end Mithridates’ resemblance to Plinian man is only superficial. Indeed, in the
excerpted passage Pliny not only emphasizes Mithridates’ virtues, but also calls attention to the
constraints on the development of the human animal resulting from a divided world and to
Mithridates’ own shortcomings as an instantiation of the fully actualized human being. 81
Mithridates’ knowledge of twenty-two languages, for instance, accentuates the obstacles to
universal communication in a divided world no less than the king’s nearly superhuman ability to
overcome them, and the reader of the Natural History cannot help but wonder if the conquest of
additional nations would have exposed the limits of his linguistic and mnemonic powers or if
these limits had perhaps already exercised a restraining force on his libido dominandi. In a
similar passage highlighting the impediments to the circulation of goods that exist in a
linguistically fractured world, Pliny describes the deserted city of Dioscurias on the Black Sea in
modern-day Abkhazia as an abandoned trading center where at one time there resided tribes
speaking 300 different languages for which Roman traders required 130 interpreters in order to
transact business. 82 In both instances, the multiplicity of languages characteristic of man’s
political age hampers human flourishing and hinders the introduction of the products of Nature
into human life. Moreover, doubly emphasizing the divisions that remain within the Mithridatic
kingdom, Pliny adds the small and surely invented detail that Mithridates searched for
80

Beagon, Roman Nature, 18; Beagon, On the Human Animal, 6, 8, 116.

81

Cf. Beagon, Roman Nature, 228-29.

82

Pliny Naturalis Historia 6.15.

134

alexipharmics in each of the twenty-two nations over which he ruled “one at a time” (singula).
The asynchronism of Mithridates’ inquiries is presented as the ineluctable consequence of the
separate temporalities of the separate nations over which he ruled and their parallel but
uncorrelated chronologies. Finally, Pliny is careful to note that Mithridates’ subjects formed a
magna pars terrarum, a “great part of the world,” an expression indicating how closely the
Mithridatic kingdom approximated a global empire while simultaneously reminding readers of
the qualitative distinction between a part and a whole and of the infinite difference between a
bounded and an unbounded power. Thus, in his efforts to exploit the resources of the natural
world, Mithridates’ researches were circumscribed by both the boundaries of his kingdom and
the limits of his linguistic and mnemonic powers. The success of Mithridates’ inquiries into the
fundaments of human life was in effect delimited beforehand by the geographical boundaries and
the internal fissures of the kingdom over which he ruled.
Pliny’s description of the aims and the limitations of Mithridates’ investigations into the
fundaments of human life is framed by references to Pompey, a structural feature of the text
which suggests that the moral of the story has less to do with the epistemological problems
foredooming the Mithridatic enterprise than with the political solution to these problems
achieved through the absorption of the orbis into the Roman urbs. Although Pliny’s presentation
of the Roman political solution to the epistemological crisis coeval with the Western
philosophical tradition will be the subject of the following chapter, wherein it will be treated in
full, Pliny’s political history of Nature is at the same time a theory of the progress of human
knowledge, and a complete description of the historical supersession of the bounded forms of
order characteristic of man’s political age is impossible without attending, at least in passing, to
the concomitant transformation Pliny alleges occurred in man’s understanding of the natural

135

world. In fact, upon turning to the Natural History’s index, the reader of Pliny’s encyclopedia is
surprised to discover that the capitulum referring to the excerpted passage indicates that Pliny’s
topic is not in fact the Pontic king, as it initially seems, but rather the Romanization of Greek
knowledge. The cue to Pliny’s description of the conquest of the last great king of the
Hellenistic Age reads with a mundanity that would deter all but the most avid collector of
esoterica who happened to be thumbing though the Natural History’s index from even bothering
to locate the passage: “When the knowledge [of the uses of plants] reached the Romans.” 83 The
encyclopedist’s point, however, is far from mundane. Pliny’s capitulum indicates that his
account of Pompey’s defeat of Mithridates is in actuality a description of the substitution of one
type of knowledge for another: the knowledge of Rome for the knowledge of Greece, the
knowledge of the whole for the knowledge of a part, the absolute knowledge of a world viewed
in its entirety from beyond history for the partial and relative knowledge of a world viewed from
a particular location at a particular moment in time. Pliny’s capitulum thus confirms that which
the structure of the passage suggests – namely, that his description of Pompey’s conquest of
Mithridates is not concerned solely or evenly primarily with the limitations inherent in
Mithridates’ quest for knowledge into the fundaments of human life but rather with their
transcendence. 84 Moreover, once Pliny’s objective in his description of Mithridates’ defeat
becomes apparent, the reader is shocked by the sudden realization that the true agent of the
transformation Pliny records is not the world-conquering imperator but rather the lowly
grammaticus, not Pompey the Great but rather his lowly freedman, Lenaeus. 85
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As described in the excerpted passage, the royal booty delivered to Pompey following the
conquest of Pontus included a case retrieved from among Mithridates’ private belongings filled
with pharmaceutical treatises and related plant specimens. Pompey assigned the task of
translating these treatises into Latin to Lenaeus, making the philologist the ultimate agent of the
Romanization of the conquered kingdom of Pontus and of the introduction of a “great part of the
world” into the city of Rome. Within Pliny’s sacred history, however, Lenaeus’s achievement
did not consist solely in making the accumulated wisdom of twenty-two nations available for the
citizens of Rome, but also in formally opening a period of liminality in the history of the human
race, and he thereby provides a model for Pliny in the encyclopedist’s own efforts to create an
inventory of the world at the end of history. In an ecstatic vision, Pliny sees himself prefigured
in the philologist at Pontus as he fulfills the awesome responsibility of advancing the cause of
history through the introduction the orbis into the urbs. Just as Mithridates is the prototype for
Vespasian, Lenaeus is the prototype for the encyclopedist himself, and in the philologist’s efforts
to help the human race transcend the fractured world of man’s political age and the limitations it
imposes on the pursuit of knowledge, the reader of Pliny’s sacred history sees a foreshadowing
of the sublimation of the world at the end of time.

Wallace-Hadrill concerning the Roman cultural revolution that occurred in tandem with the Roman political and
social revolutions of the first century BC. Relying on the extant writings of ancient Roman authorities, WallaceHadrill argues that the expansion of the Roman Empire to the edges of the earth and the corresponding
universalization of Roman culture could proceed only in conjunction with a rationalization of knowledge, a process
which in time led to a transfer of authority in matters of ancestral custom, law, time, and language from Rome’s
patrician elite to academic “experts” or “specialists.” According to Wallace-Hadrill, the resulting transfer of
authority from the nobilis to the antiquarian as the custodian of Roman traditions, to the jurisconsult as the
interpreter of Roman law, to the mathematician as the regulator of the Roman calendar, and to the grammarian as the
protector of the purity of the Latin tongue severed political and intellectual authority in the late Republic, creating
the conditions for their reunification under Augustus through the inclusion of antiquarians, jurisconsults,
mathematicians, and grammarians as personal advisors within the imperial administration. Wallace-Hadrill
concludes that the Roman “political and social revolutions of the first century BCE … involved a parallel revolution
in ways of knowing.” The same transfer of authority described by Wallace-Hadrill can be seen in the Natural
History in Pompey’s reliance on the philologist Lenaeus to complete the Romanization of the vanquished kingdom
of Pontus. Wallace-Hadrill, “Mutatio Morum,” 6.
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Importantly, Pliny intimates that Mithridates had kept his discoveries hidden, as the Latin
phrase in arcanis suis, translated into English above as “among his private possessions,” could
also be translated “among his secret possessions,” and perhaps with greater fidelity to Pliny’s
intended meaning. Pliny animadverts against those who keep their knowledge of the lifesustaining properties of Nature’s products secret both before and after his account of Pompey’s
victory over Mithridates, thematizing the contrast between the deleterious consequences of the
privatization of knowledge and the benefits of its publication. First, in the opening lines of the
proem in which Pliny records his account of Mithridates’ defeat, the encyclopedist criticizes
contemporary Romans for failing to live up to the standards of their ancestors, whose “care and
attentiveness” (cura diligentiaque) left “nothing untried or unattempted” (nihil intemptatum
inexpertumque) and who kept “nothing secret” (nihil occultatum) from their descendants. 86 In
contrast, writes Pliny,
we desire to conceal and to suppress the things that have been worked out by these men
and to cheat life (vita) even of the good things that do not belong to us. Thus, without
fail, those who have made any few new discoveries, envious of others, keep them hidden,
and to teach them to no one increases the authority of their knowledge. So far removed
are our customs from the contrivance of new things and from the assistance of life (vita)
that now for a long time it has been the supreme task of our intellectually gifted men for
each to keep the achievements of the ancients to himself, so that they are lost. 87
Pliny thus opens his twenty-fourth book with a condemnation of all who “cheat life” by keeping
their knowledge of the discoveries of their forbears private, consigning their knowledge of the
fundaments of human life to oblivion by ensuring that such knowledge will cease to exist when
they themselves perish. Second, only a few short paragraphs after his account of Pompey’s
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conquest of Pontus, Pliny writes that the refusal of certain men to share the information they
possess about the salutary properties of plants, “as though they themselves would lose that which
they had passed on (tradiderint) to others” (tamquam ipsis periturum sit quod tradiderint aliis),
is “the most shameful cause of the scantiness [of knowledge]” (turpissima causa raritatis)
among his contemporaries. 88 In refusing to share their knowledge, these men unwittingly
conspire to deprive the human race of the aliments and the medicaments upon which life itself
depends and to dissever and destroy the burgeoning tradition through which man acquires his
humanity, with each man confining a portion of the collective patrimony of the human race to his
private memory for the sake of his own prestige.
These passages indicate that Pliny’s primary concern in the opening pages of his twentyfourth book is the distinction between public and private memory and the deleterious
consequences of the privatization of knowledge. Within this context, Pliny’s use of the word
arcanus suggests not only that Mithridates kept the treatises he had obtained among his personal
belongings, but also that he refused to share his knowledge with others, thereby destroying the
continuity of knowledge across the succession of generations, cutting himself off from the
human race, and even indirectly undermining his own humanity. As Beagon remarks, “[I]t is the
invidia [the envy or the jealousy] of man towards man with regard to the benefits of life which
earns particular condemnation from Pliny. Refusal to communicate herbal remedies in effect
also puts those responsible on the same level as animals generally, who find their own cures by
88
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haphazard chance discovery.” 89 Thus, despite his exemplification of the distinctively human
capacities for memory and speech, in keeping his collection of medical texts hidden, Mithridates
interrupted the development of the traditio through which man distinguishes himself from the
beasts and proclaimed himself an enemy of the human race. 90 This seeming paragon of the
Plinian ideals of universal communication and perfect memory must therefore ultimately be
recognized as a negative example employed by Pliny to remind his readers of their ability to
destroy their own humanity, that is, to “become little better than the flies of summer” by
separating themselves from the process of trans-generational development characteristic of the
human race, and to admonish his readers against certain recidivistic tendencies present in Rome
threatening to destroy the Roman imperial achievement. 91 The Pontic kingdom described in the
Natural History represents an outmoded form of human existence and serves as a reminder of the
possibility of a retrograde movement in the life history of the human race, with Mithridates’
infamously inhuman cruelty being ever so subtly associated with the prospect of a return to the
dystopian world of the polis through the disintegration of the unified realms of nature and life by
means of the privatization of the collective memory of the human race.
As has already been suggested, the full extent of Mithridates’ mnemonic power, with
regard to both its wide scope and its intrinsic limitations, is made apparent through its implicit
juxtaposition with the fractured state of the collective memory of the human race during
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mankind’s political age. The aggregation of the contents of the separate national memories of
the twenty-two peoples over which Mithridates ruled in his private library, a process occurring
within the life history of an individual king, is recapitulated in the Plinian account at the level of
the life history of the human race in the translation of the separate treatises contained in
Mithridates’ library into Latin by Lenaeus and their subsequent transfer to Rome. Indeed,
Pliny’s description of the supersession of the political form of human order and the substitution
of the knowledge of Rome for the knowledge of Greece turns on the contrast between the
“twenty-two tongues” (XXII linguis) dividing the Mithridatic kingdom, mentioned at the
midpoint of the passage, and Pliny’s reference to “our language” (sermo noster), the single
language of a universalizing empire, at its conclusion. 92 This contrast accentuates Lenaeus’s
crucial role in advancing the political history of Nature. Although Pompey had made the
introduction of the orbis into the urbs possible by destroying the exterior walls of the Pontic
kingdom, it was the philologist rather than the triumphant general who ultimately overcame its
internal linguistic fissures by translating the contents of Mithridates’ library into Latin and who
thereby succeeded in introducing “a great part of the world” into the city of Rome. Once the
walls of Pontus had been overthrown, Lenaeus was able to rescue the patrimony of the human
race from the fleeting and fragile memory of a mortal king, replacing Mithridates’ secret library
for a universally accessible text preserved in an eternal city.
At the conclusion of his account of “When the knowledge of the uses of plants reached
the Romans,” Pliny asserts that due to Lenaeus’s translation of Mithridates’ medical library,
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Pompey’s victory over the Pontic king “benefited life (vita) no less than the state (respublica),”
linking the advancement of human life with the success of the Roman imperial project. The
association of human flourishing with the extension of the boundaries of the Roman Empire
through the scholarly activities of the proto-encyclopedist provides the foundation for Pliny’s
defense of empire, as it justifies the destruction of the separate identities of the world’s disparate
nations for the sake of the realization of man. Importantly, the philologist Lenaeus is the axel
uniting the wheel of political progress with the wheel of human development and ensuring that
they turn in tandem. The Roman imperial project is in effect justified only through the
intervention of the scholar, through whose efforts the pursuit of global imperium is subordinated
to the end of promoting human life. Nevertheless, the example of Lenaeus demonstrates that
human development had required the destruction of the political form of man’s relationship to
the natural world, as it was only through the destruction of the exterior boundaries of
Mithridates’ kingdom by the world-conquering general that the secret knowledge of a mortal
king could be made available for general use in an immortal empire, that the epistemological
limitations foredooming the Mithridatic enterprise could be overcome through the intervention of
a Roman philologist, that the world of nature could be fully integrated into the sphere of human
life, and that Plinian man could be fully incarnated in the world.
Mithridates must remain an ambiguous figure within the Natural History. He is depicted
as both an incarnation of Plinian man, embodying the ideals of universal communication and
perfect memory to the highest degree possible in a divided world, and an enemy of the human
race, resisting a greater realization of the human animal by opposing the encroaching power of
an expanding empire. The ambiguity surrounding Mithridates has an important implication, for
it has been shown that within Pliny’s sacred history Mithridates is a prefigurement of the
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emperor Vespasian, who must in turn occupy a similarly ambiguous position vis-à-vis the human
race. It is not insignificant that Pliny’s description of Vespasian as “the greatest ruler of all time”
suggests that his principate is occurring within time rather than beyond it. Just as the world of
man’s political age had been transcended through the publication of Lenaeus’s translation of the
Pontic king’s library, so the sublimation of the world of appearances and change would be
brought about through the supersession of the Vespasianic Age by means of the publication of
Pliny’s own encyclopedia. That Pliny’s Natural History, heralding the final union of the realms
of nature and life and bringing the passage of time to eschatological fulfillment, is not dedicated
to Vespasian, the emperor under whom it was written, but rather to his son, is thus not merely a
slight breach of protocol in violation of the standard literary conventions of the day. 93 Indeed, in
the very first line of his epistolary preface, Pliny subversively notes that whereas the title “Most
Delightful Emperor” (iucundissime Imperator), with which Pliny addresses Titus, is “supremely
true” (verissima), the epithet maximus “is growing old with your father” (consenescit in patre). 94
Pliny is not glorifying the Vespasianic Age but rather announcing its impending supersession
through the publication of his own encyclopedia, and the same ambivalence the reader feels
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toward Mithridates must be transferred to the aging emperor of Rome, the representative of a
passing age in the life history of the human race.
Whereas Pompey’s freedman was responsible for introducing the knowledge of plants
specific to the Mithridatic kingdom into the collective memory of the Roman people, the task
Pliny sets for himself in his encyclopedia is immeasurably greater: to introduce the knowledge
of all of Nature’s products into the collective memory of the entire human race and in so doing to
bring about the final transformation of the natural world into a teleologically-ordered whole in
the form of an eternal empire beyond the flux of time. 95 Thus, in contrast to Lenaeus, whose
efforts marked the end of a particular age within the history of the human race and the first light
of the predawn glow preceding the rise of an eternal Roman sun, Pliny’s encyclopedic
undertaking is meant to effect the sublimation of the world and the fulfillment of history itself.
However, just as the inherited political form of man’s relationship to Nature could not contain
the contents of the world, so too inherited literary forms were inadequate to the task of
containing a complete description of the role of the natural world in sustaining human life. In
other words, just as the circumvallating walls of the polis had to be torn down in order for the
disparate products of Nature to be transferred from the separate nations of the world to Rome in
the guise of a nursing child, so the poetic form of composition characteristic of the world of the
polis had to be shed in order for the world of nature as a teleologically-ordered whole to be given
back to mankind by the city of Rome in the guise of a loving mother.
C. Pliny’s Encyclopedia: A New Literary Form for a New Age
In his sixteenth book, Pliny writes that he is including a description of a new method of
grafting in his encyclopedia, “in order that I shall not wittingly pass over anything that I have
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found anywhere.” 96 With the condescending and mocking tone characteristic of so many of
Pliny’s commentators, who assume that the ancient encyclopedist was little more than a neurotic
compiler of facts and prodigies, Conte adds the following gloss: “Pliny disseminates along his
path a number of not always consistent statements of principle, but this is one of the most sincere
and heartfelt ones.” 97 His derision notwithstanding, Conte is right to emphasize the centrality of
the encyclopedist’s desire to omit nothing from the pages of his inventory of the natural world.
Pliny’s principle of total inclusion, frequently interpreted by his critics as a symptom of his
“anxious disposition” or as a cover for his credulity, is in fact a direct consequence of his
philosophies of man, Nature, and history, and it constitutes the guiding principle of his entire
encyclopedic project. 98 As has already been argued, Pliny’s aim in the Natural History is to
bring about the final merger of the realms of nature and history – and thus to effect the
sublimation of the world of appearances in a realm of eternal being – through the introduction of
all things into human life, and according to the encyclopedist’s own interpretations of the course
of human events and the hidden depths of human longing, the throbbing, inarticulate, collective
aspiration of an embryonic race finds expression and ultimate release in his own quest for
totality. Pliny reformulates his principle of total inclusion at least twice, writing in his twentyninth book that even though the efficacy of certain proposed remedies for maladies affecting
infants is difficult to believe, “nevertheless they must not be omitted since they have been passed
forward” (non omittenda tamen, quia sunt prodita), and in the proem to his thirty-fourth book
that although he will describe the various kinds of earth and rock contained in the natural world
96
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with a brevity consistent with his plan, he will omit “nothing necessary or natural” (nihil
necessarium aut naturale) from his encyclopedia. 99 A reference to necessity implies an end or a
purpose, and within the context of Pliny’s teleological scheme, the implicit end in this third and
final formulation of his principle of total inclusion can be nothing else than human life: Pliny
will exclude nothing necessary for human flourishing from his catalogue of the products of
Nature. In conjunction, these three formulations provide Pliny’s readers with the guarantee that
his encyclopedia will include everything that he has personally discovered or that has been
transmitted to him by others about either the natural world or the fundaments of human life. 100
In the valediction to Nature with which he concludes the Natural History, Pliny assures his
readers that this guarantee has been satisfied: “Hail, Nature, mother of all things; be gracious
unto me, since I am the only one among the citizens of Rome to have praised you in all your
aspects (numeri omni).” 101 Pliny’s valediction is an affirmation of the success of his
encyclopedic project, an assurance to his readers that nothing has escaped his exhaustive
inventory of the world. The realm of nature has been fully integrated into the sphere of human
life. The end of history is at hand.
Several scholars have noted the resemblance between Pliny’s concluding valediction to
Nature and Virgil’s salutation to Italy, the “land of Saturn,” in the second book of his Georgics.
Virgil addresses Italy with the following words: “Hail, land of Saturn, great mother of fruits /
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and heroes.” 102 Bruère contends that Pliny’s evocation of the Virgilian greeting is an expression
of his confidence that he has paid superior homage to his native land and has thereby “vindicated
his challenge to the poet.” 103 Bruère, however, gives insufficient weight to the alteration Pliny
makes to the lines from Virgil’s poem. Whereas Virgil’s poetry lauded the “fruits and heroes” of
a single land, Pliny’s encyclopedia embraces the whole of Nature itself. In drawing attention to
the different subject matters of the two texts, Pliny’s evocation celebrates the completion of his
encyclopedia as the archetype of a new, uniquely Roman, literary genre capable of embracing the
entire contents of a global empire and not just the “flowers” (flores) of a single land. 104 In effect,
Pliny is presenting his encyclopedia as the first truly Roman text, one freed from the deficiencies
inherent in the constraining poetic form adopted by Virgil from the Greeks. As Nicholas Howe,
commenting on Bruère’s careful examination of Pliny’s repeated efforts in the text of the Natural
History “to censure and amend the poet’s statements,” writes,
This animosity on Pliny’s part may be traced to jealously of some unspecified sort,
according to Bruère, which suggests a meanness of motive hardly to his credit. I suspect,
however, that this rivalry should be traced to Pliny’s belief that the choice of a literary
genre implicitly expressed other non-literary and perhaps political views. The national
work should not be poetic, for by this very choice of genre, the national character has
been violated. The Roman spirit should be celebrated in its proper form – in utilitarian
prose. 105
Plinian man, emerging from the chrysalis of the polis metamorphosed as animal imperiale,
required a new literary genre for a new age, and Virgil’s atavistic commitment to the metrical
form of the poem threatened to strangle off the incipient life of imperial man. Indeed, Pliny’s
claim that he is the first to praise Nature in “all [its] aspects” (numeri omni) furthers the contrast
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between his encyclopedia and Virgil’s poems, since the word numerus can also be used to denote
the “meter” of a poem. In referring to the “meters” of Nature in the plural, Pliny is suggesting
that the simple, metrical form of a poem is inconsistent with the multipartite structure of the
natural world and perhaps even with the historical duality of Nature itself as both an aggregation
of separate and distinct entities and a teleologically-ordered totality. Although the employment
of a single meter unifies the contents of a poem, just as the encyclopedic form of Pliny’s Natural
History unifies his account of the political history of Nature, the simple structure of a poem does
not reflect and cannot reproduce the complex structure of Nature. Hence, in a poem about
Nature, there can be no perfect correlation of form and content, and the poem’s content must for
that very reason always be deficient.
As was shown at the conclusion of Chapter 1, Pliny emphasizes both the Romanness and
the novelty of his undertaking in the very first words of his epistolary preface, telling Titus that
the books of his Natural History “are a novel task for the native muses of your Roman citizens”
(novicium Camenis Quiritium tuorum opus). 106 In combination with his belief that he has
outdone Virgil in the latter’s efforts to create “a representative national work expressing the
Roman ethos,” his intimation of the constraining form of the poem in the proem to his thirteenth
book, and his principle of total inclusion, these words now gain added meaning: in order to
provide an exhaustive account of the contents of the natural world, Pliny, with the aid of the
muses of Rome, must invent a new literary form, for just as the boundaries of a single kingdom
in a divided world cannot encompass all of the products of Nature, so the poetic form cannot
replicate the structure of Nature or contain a complete description of Nature as a multipartite,
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multilayered, multifaceted reality. 107 At a later point in his epistolary preface, Pliny offers the
following description of his subject, elements of which have already been discussed, wherein he
once again highlights the novelty of his theme and calls attention to the unprecedented scope of
his undertaking:
The subject of my discourse is the nature of things, or in other words, life; and this in its
meanest part, and with either the vernacular of the countryside or foreign, nay barbarian,
terms being employed for many things – words which must be introduced with an
apology. Beyond this, the way forward is not a beaten path trod by previous authors, nor
one on which the mind desires to travel. There is not one person among us who has
attempted the same undertaking, nor one among the Greeks who has treated all of these
things (omnia ea) single-handedly. A great part of us seek pleasant fields of study, while
matters of immense subtlety treated by others are concealed by dark obscurities. Now the
subjects which the Greeks call enkyklios paideia must be touched upon before all things,
and yet they are unknown or have been made uncertain through sophistry, while other
subjects have been transmitted (prodita) by so many people that they have fallen into
contempt. It is a difficult thing to give novelty to the old, authority to the new, luster to
the ordinary, clarity to the obscure, charm to the contemptible, credibility to the dubious,
and indeed to all things nature and to nature of her own all things. And so, even if these
things have not been attained, it is exceedingly admirable and splendid to have resolved
to attempt it. 108
Although Aude Doody is surely right to call into question the tacit assumption underlying much
of the scholarly literature that Pliny’s assertion of the preeminence of that which “the Greeks call
enkyklios paideia” was a “reference … to the content of his own work,” undercutting the notion
that Pliny self-consciously created the world’s first “encyclopedia,” she is equally right to defend
the claim that the Natural History, as the first incarnation of a new literary genre, “marks a
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significant innovation on the part of Pliny.” 109 In other words, even if Pliny never actually
referred to his mastodonic text as an “encyclopedia,” he did in fact create a new literary genre,
and he says as much in his praefatio. Pliny is explicit: a work embracing the entirety of Nature,
both as an aggregation of entities and as a teleologically-ordered whole, and reproducing its
complex structure, is a “novel task” for the muses of Rome, one which no one, neither Roman
nor Greek, has ever before attempted.
Modern retrospective reconstructions of an ancient encyclopedic genre often lump
Pliny’s Natural History together with several supposed antecedents, including Cato the Elder’s
Ad Filium, Varro’s Disciplinae, and Celsus’s Artes. 110 As Doody persuasively argues, however,
the Natural History’s “first audience could not have recognized it as part of an encyclopedic
genre of texts that included the Ad Filium, the Disciplinae, and the Artes,” because such “a
shared category of ancient writing” simply did not exist. “If any of these texts are
encyclopedias,” Doody continues, it is only “because of their reception history,” and in fact, “the
basis on which [modern scholars] call the texts of Cato, Varro, and Celsus ‘encyclopedias’ is
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quite different from the reasons [they] call the Natural History one.” 111 Whereas the works of
Cato, Varro, and Celsus grew out of the Greek handbook tradition, were almost certainly
arranged according to the artes or disciplinae they covered, and provided a bridge between the
handbooks of the Hellenistic period and the quadrivium and trivium of the Middle Ages,
ensuring a continuity of form despite the injection of novel content, Pliny “consciously rejected
the liberal arts as an adequate framework of human knowledge.” 112 Mary Beagon writes, “For
Pliny, useful knowledge is not to be artificially divided and confined within the bounds of certain
artes. In this respect it is misleading to see the HN in the context of encyclopaedic literature and
its development from the subject divisions of Varro’s and Celsus’s works into the fixed medieval
system of the seven liberal arts, the trivium and quadrivium.” 113 For Pliny, the world of nature as
a teleologically-ordered whole simply could not be divided into isolated spheres of specialized
knowledge without destroying the whole itself.
Pliny, it can be inferred, found the division of knowledge into separate disciplines or
technical fields no less constraining and artificial than the walls of the polis or the metrical form
of the poem: all such inherited forms were inadequate containers for the contents of the world,
and their atavistic recurrence in Rome had the effect of constricting human life, threatening to
suffocate man like a snake attempting to slither back into its sloughed skin. Significantly, Pliny
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repeatedly informs his readers that the exhaustive lists contained in his Natural History exceed
the much shorter lists he attributes to Cato. 114 Cato, for instance, described only a “few” (pauca)
varieties of vines, while Pliny notes in his index that he is including “ninety-one kinds of vines
and grapes” (vitium et uvarum genera XCI) in his encyclopedia. 115 Similarly, at various points in
his fourteenth book, Pliny writes that Cato did not describe any plumbs or artificial oils, that he
failed to include the peach among his lists of wild fruits, and that he mentioned only six types of
figs, three types of myrtles, and two types of laurels, thus neglecting all twelve varieties of
plumbs, all forty-eight kinds of artificial oils, the peach, the remaining twenty-three varieties of
figs, the remaining eight types of myrtles, and the remaining eleven types of laurels, all of which
had been introduced into Italy since Cato first published his precepts on agriculture. 116
Pliny’s criticism of Cato initially seems indistinguishable from his criticism of Virgil, but
the reader of the Natural History cannot help but notice an important difference in tone in Pliny’s
comments about each author. While Pliny’s references to Virgil evince a captious, polemical
attitude, it has been observed that “Pliny seems at pains to praise Cato” even when “the context
does not demand it.” 117 The reason for this difference in tone must be traced to the different
literary forms employed by Cato and Virgil and to the different ages in which they wrote.
According to Pliny, Cato’s medical writings – consisting of a series of medical precepts in
prosaic form – provided his contemporaries in the second century BC with a record of “what
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medicines the Roman people used for 600 years,” and within the theoretical framework of
Pliny’s Natural History, he therefore deserves praise not only for promoting the integration of
the world of nature into the sphere of human life to the fullest extent possible within a divided
world, but also for rejecting a poetic mode of composition, anticipating the needs of an
impending age. 118 In fact, in homage to his predecessor, Pliny uses Cato’s writings as a baseline
when measuring the extent to which imperial expansion had furthered the integration of Nature’s
products into the realm of life, implicitly lauding Cato’s writings as the high-water mark of
republican scholarship. Hence, in his account of figs, Pliny comments that “[s]ince [Cato’s time]
so many names and kinds have arisen that even a consideration of this alone is enough to show
how life (vita) has changed” in the intervening quarter-millennium. 119 Virgil, in contrast, wrote
during a subsequent age in the history of man, and he not only failed to record complete lists of
the plant and animal species introduced into the Roman Empire as a result of the conquests of
Pompey, Julius Caesar, and Augustus, but also adopted an outmoded literary form, fettering the
development of Plinian man.
Nicholas Howe’s careful reading of Pliny’s praefatio provides additional support for the
foregoing interpretation of the difference in attitude distinguishing Pliny’s treatments of Virgil
and Cato. Howe insightfully suggests that the dedicatory epistle preceding the text of the
Natural History has the character of an apology in which the encyclopedist defends “the primacy
of the prose writer over the poet.” 120 Howe offers two pieces of evidence for such a
characterization of the praefatio. First, in his epistolary preface, Pliny “reveres Cato and Varro,”
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tacitly lending authority to their writings, but virtually “ignores Virgil.” 121 According to Howe,
by neglecting Virgil, Pliny indirectly challenged “the prestige enjoyed by poetry as a genre in the
Rome of his day.” 122 Such a conclusion is perhaps unwarranted when the preface is read
independently of the text as a whole, but it coheres nicely with Bruère’s observations regarding
Pliny’s negative treatment of Virgil in the thirty-six books of the encyclopedia itself. Second,
Pliny quotes the poet Catullus in his opening dedication to Titus, and although it might seem that
Pliny thereby legitimizes poetic composition by allotting such a privileged place in his text to the
words of a poet, the effect of the placement of the Catullian excerpt is precisely the opposite.
Howe demonstrates that Pliny “deliberately altered” the poem in such a way as to emphasize the
frivolity of poetry, destroying the irony of Catullus’s self-deprecatory claim that a poem is less
valuable than a work of prose, “so that only the literal sense remains.” 123 Pliny “thus establishes
his own hierarchy of literary values” in his prefatory epistle, inverting the conventional
hierarchical relationship between the prosaist and the poet. 124
Howe’s conclusion that the “true genre” of the praefatio to the Natural History is that of
“an explanation and defense of [Pliny’s own] encyclopedic mode” of composition, though
lacking a wide basis of support in the text, provides additional evidence that Pliny considered
poetry the genre of a superseded age, with the limitative form of the poem, evidenced by the
selectivity of the poet with regard to his choice of subjects, being the mirror image in the realm
of literature of the encircling walls of the polis in the realm of man’s earthly existence. 125 For

121

Ibid.

122

Ibid., 569.

123

Ibid.

124

Ibid.

125

Ibid., 562.

154

Pliny, the form of the poem, with its constraining requirements of rhythm and meter, could not
contain the contents of an unbounded empire. Importantly, however, in the application of his
principle of total inclusion, Pliny is compelled to acknowledge a necessary limit on his own
ability to catalogue the entire contents of the orbis terrarum: the impossibility of pronouncing
certain foreign terms in the Latin tongue. Sorcha Carey has observed that in his second book
Pliny twice equates that which is unpronounceable in Latin with that which is unworthy of being
recorded, and although he transliterates dozens of foreign terms into Latin in his quest for
totality, he expresses a willingness to exclude anything that cannot be Latinized. 126 Pliny thus
nowhere feigns the “objectivity” affected by the modern scientist, and in these passages he in
effect unabashedly admits that the totality he is describing is a uniquely Roman totality. Indeed,
according to Pliny, the complete integration of nature into life and the fullest realization of the
human species demand that this be so even if the resulting totality is only one of many possible,
linguistically-defined totalities. Without a common vocabulary, the global interchange of goods
and ideas is rendered inefficient, as the examples of Mithridates’ fractured kingdom and the
chaotic trading city of Dioscurias illustrate. More importantly, Pliny remarks that such
inefficiency sometimes has fatal consequences. Pliny frequently notes that a particular species of
plant or animal life or a particular type of stone is called by different names in different places or
that the same name has been assigned to different things in different lands. 127 As a consequence
of such nomenclatorial confusion, the life-sustaining properties of many of Nature’s products
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remain unknown to entire communities of men and doctors inadvertently prescribe poisons rather
than medicaments to their patients. 128 Linguistic fissures, the residual imprint and enduring
effect of the walls that had divided the human race during man’s political age, continue to resist
and to retard the introduction of nature into life, endangering human life and preventing the
fullest realization of Plinian man.
Residual linguistic barriers thus stand in the way of the complete actualization of the
human race, and in consequence, men, existing in varied stages of development depending upon
the particular linguistic community to which they belong, are even prevented from recognizing
one another as men. The human voice, Pliny argues, has thereby given rise not only to the
distinction between human beings and wild animals, “but also to another distinction among
human beings themselves as great as that which separates them from the beasts.” 129 Indeed,
writes Pliny, there are “so many national dialects, so many languages, such a great variety of
ways of speaking, that a foreigner from a strange land scarcely counts as a human being.” 130
Insofar as linguistic fissures continue to preclude communication between the world’s disparate
populations, they prevent the formation of a single tradition encompassing all lands and peoples,
and the human race persists in a fractured, underdeveloped state despite the destruction of
political boundaries. Pliny offers no philosophical justification for the establishment of Latin,
instead of some other language, as a universal tongue, neither advancing Latin as a language
uniquely qualified to serve as the house of Being nor asserting that it was the language through
which a Creator-God first sundered day from night and the waters of the heavens from the waters
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of the earth, but rather simply acknowledges as a fait accompli the global spread of Latin as a
result of Rome’s engagements throughout the world. Pliny does, however, consider the
establishment of a universal language a prerequisite for the fullest realization of the human
animal, and in this he finds a justification for empire. In his second book, Pliny is explicit:
“Italy,” he writes,
has been chosen by the command of the gods to increase the renown of heaven itself, to
gather (congregaret) scattered powers into a single empire, and to make manners gentle;
both to draw together for conversation the discordant and uncivilized tongues of so many
peoples through an exchange of language and to give man his humanity (humanitas); and
in brief, to become throughout the whole world the one fatherland of all the races. 131
As discussed in Chapter 2, in his proem to his book on the nature of man, Pliny had lamented
that while other animals “assemble (congregari) and stand against animals different from their
own kind … most of man’s ills are on account of man.” 132 The existence of divisions among
men during mankind’s political age was the surest sign of the underdeveloped state of the human
race. Rome, however, has now “assembled” (congregaret) the scattered kingdoms of the world,
removing the walls that had previously divided mankind and allowing for the identification of
the human race as a single and distinct species of animal life. In short, writes Pliny, men have
shed their separate national identities and have assumed a common identity as members of a
single imperial race giving their allegiance to a single fatherland. Perhaps most importantly, by
means of “an exchange of language,” through which foreign terms for natural substances
formerly unknown to the Romans have been added to the Latin lexicon and the partial and
incomplete indigenous languages of the world’s disparate nations have in turn been traded for the
universal vocabulary of Rome, an exchange replicating Rome’s status as both the nursling and
131
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the mother of all other lands at the linguistic level, Rome has drawn all men together into a
single conversation, allowing for communication between the different races of men and for
trade and commerce to develop on a global scale. 133 The urbs Roma, Pliny writes a few
paragraphs later, has defeated the nations of the world by means of both “its language and its
might” (lingua manuque), an indication of his belief that Rome had conquered the world
linguistically no less than militarily and that the Roman Empire was a linguistic no less than a
political phenomenon. 134 Elsewhere in the Natural History Pliny emphasizes the role of Rome
as the final arbiter of the conflicting vocabularies of the disparate nations of the world, noting at
one point that although several varieties of pears have been named differently in different
locations, he will list them “according to the accepted designations of the city [of Rome]”
(confessis urbis vocabulis), and at another point that although previous authorities have
disagreed over the names of certain types of pine trees, “we shall distinguish them according to
the judgment of Rome” (nos ista Romano discernimus iudicio). 135 Pliny’s encyclopedia,
providing all men with a complete account of the life-sustaining properties of all of the items
contained in Nature’s manifold, is only possible because of the role played by Rome in providing
a standard for the creation of a single, universal vocabulary containing words denoting each and
every substance present in the natural world. 136 As Carey remarks, “The signature of empire, it
is though the Latin language that disparate elements of the world are bonded to become a
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cohesive entity.” 137 The unification of the world as a teleologically-ordered totality, though
made possible by the arms of Rome, is ultimately a linguistic process. Together, the destruction
of the walls characteristic of man’s political age and the erasure of their residual linguistic
imprint permit all of man’s discoveries to be passed between nations, creating the conditions for
the formation of a single tradition encompassing all of the diverse races of men throughout the
world. It is, moreover, in Pliny’s own Natural History, a complete record of the patrimony of
the human race written in a universal tongue, that this single human tradition becomes a
reality. 138 Pliny, it should be noted, makes it clear in his epistolary preface that his encyclopedia
is meant not only for Titus, himself a “representative of totality on a spatial level” as the future
ruler of “a world empire,” but also for the “common crowd” (humile vulgus). 139 By including
both the highest and the lowest strata of a world society in his intended readership, Pliny in effect
addresses his work to all men everywhere. 140 Italy, in virtue of having “become throughout the
whole world the one fatherland of all the races,” transformed man from a political into an
imperial animal and thereby gave him his humanity, a gift in thirty-six volumes.
In relying on the judgment of Rome in order to forge a universal vocabulary adequate to
the task of describing the entirety of the natural world, Pliny mimics on a global scale Lenaeus’s
efforts to make the contents of Mithridates’ medical library available to the people of Rome, and
indeed, within Pliny’s sacred history, Lenaeus’s efforts are but a foreshadowing of Pliny’s own
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encyclopedic project. Moreover, just as Lenaeus’s Latin compilation of Mithridates’ medical
library united the separate national memories of the twenty-two nations comprising the
Mithridatic kingdom within a single written text, so Pliny’s encyclopedia incarnates the
collective memory of the human race as a whole. Importantly, in the ancient world written
records were considered “an expression or an extension of memory,” and a recognition of Pliny’s
belief that the books of his Natural History, containing an account of the contents of the universe
in a newly established universal language, would serve as humankind’s collective memory in an
age of global empire is fundamental to a complete understanding of the true nature of his
encyclopedic project. 141 In a revealing comment in his epistolary preface, Pliny puts the
rationale for his undertaking into the mouth of Domitius Piso, according to whom the vast
amount of information circulating throughout the Roman world in disparate written texts
constituted a state of literary chaos: “It is storehouses (thesauros) that we need,” Piso is reported
to have quipped, “not books (libros).” 142 At first, Pliny’s decision to quote Piso may seem
surprising in light of the prominence of the words “The books of my Natural History” (Libros
Naturalis Historiae) with which he opens his epistle and thus his entire work. 143 Pliny appears
to be responding to the problems arising from a surfeit of books through the publication of thirtysix more, compounding rather than solving the problem observed by Piso. As several
commentators have noted, however, in ancient Roman thought a “storehouse” was a commonly
employed metaphor for the human memory, and the meaning of the statement Pliny attributes to
Piso is that what the Romans needed was not merely a set of books, but a set of books capable of
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organizing the accumulated information of the ages into a single, integrated whole analogous to
the memory of an individual human being. 144 Both Varro and Vitruvius had already taught that a
written record is a more enduring form of human memory than the fleeting and transient memory
of an individual man, and as an incarnation of the collective memory of the human race, the
thirty-six books of Pliny’s encyclopedia replace the literary chaos of a liminal phase in the
history of man with a single, organized text. 145 The mind of the encyclopedist thus serves as the
template for the collective mind of the human race, and its reification in the novel form of an
encyclopedic text establishes the synonymity of “nature” and “life.”
Thus, in the encyclopedist and his encyclopedia, the distinctive faculties of the human
animal – the faculties of memory and speech – are simultaneously brought to perfection at both
the level of the individual and the level of the species as a whole, marking the completion of
another rotation in the upward spiral of history and preparing the way for the sublimation of the
world and the ascension of Titus to the throne of an eternal empire. 146
D. Conclusion: Pliny’s Defense of Empire
“[I]t is … as a work of literature,” writes Carey, that the Natural History itself best
reveals “Pliny’s commitment to empire.” 147 Indeed, for Pliny, the publication of the world’s first
encyclopedic text, making the life-sustaining properties of all of the diverse products of Nature
accessible to all men in a newly-established universal language, is in itself the ultimate
justification for the destruction of the world of the polis. In short, just as Lenaeus’s translation of
144
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Mithridates’ medical library had justified Pompey’s conquest of Pontus, Pliny’s Natural History
justifies Rome’s conquest of the world. As Trevor Murphy has written,
[T]he Natural History could only have been written at the intersection of the accumulated
learning of the past with the vast and hierarchical power of Roman imperium. Only
where these intersected could one collect the world in its particularity, past and present,
and classify it, giving its immensity a centre. Pliny’s encyclopedia could only be written
because Roman power had already organized the world for it. In his lifetime, to an extent
previously inconceivable, centuries of thought, the knowledge of three continents, and of
their mountains, herbs, seas, animals, and histories, became available to be apprehended
by a single mind. And this hypothetical mind, if it ever existed, belonged to Pliny, who
occupied a particularly favourable vantage-point. For besides Pliny the scholar, the
voracious reader taking notes far into the night, we must keep in view Pliny the civil
servant, the traveler, soldier on the German frontiers, procurator of Hispania, Gaul,
perhaps of Africa, the intimate of emperors … If the Natural History has a unity, it is the
unity of Roman power; for the limits of the world, of Roman imperium, and of
knowledge are all the same. 148
The final merger of the realms of nature and life was brought about through the publication of
Pliny’s own encyclopedia, but such a work could be written only after the sphere of Roman
imperial control had extended to the edges of the earth and the political and linguistic divisions
that had previously prevented the fullest realization of the human animal had been destroyed.
The absorption of the orbis into the urbs could proceed only through the destruction of inherited
forms, and it is in this necessity that Pliny finds a defense of empire. 149
As was shown in Chapter 2, for Pliny, the human animal distinguishes himself from the
beasts by passing on to others the knowledge he acquires of the salutary properties of Nature’s
products, an activity that gives rise to a tradition uniting men as men and not merely as animals
across the succession of generations. Through the accumulation of discoveries across time
concerning the various ways in which the disparate products of Nature sustain human life, man
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gradually transforms a world of false appearances into an eternal, teleologically-ordered realm of
pure being. Insofar as the circumvallating walls of the Greek polis and the political boundaries
of the Hellenistic kingdom could not embrace the whole of Nature, and thus prevented such a
transformation, they had to be abandoned. In publishing the books of his Natural History in a
post-political age, Pliny hands down the collective patrimony of the human race to all men for all
time, giving expression to his own humanity on an unprecedented scale and heralding the onset
of a new era in the history of man. 150 In accordance with his principle of total inclusion, Pliny’s
encyclopedia gathers together all that has been handed down across the succession of generations
within each and every defunct kingdom throughout the world and transmits the collective
knowledge of the human race to posterity in the form of a single, universally accessible text.
Since the constraints of meter and rhythm were too restrictive for the contents of such a text, they
too had to be cast aside. Pliny’s apology for the Roman Empire is thus at the same time a
defense of the encyclopedic form of the apology itself, for just as the absorption of the orbis into
the urbs required the dismantling of the encircling walls of the polis, so too it required the
shedding of the metrical form employed by its poets.
Despite the Hellenic philosophers’ professed antipathy toward the poets, in Pliny’s eyes
the philosophers and the poets of Greece were equally committed to Hellenic forms and thus to a
mode of existence that placed unnecessary fetters on the process of human development. 151
Although the encyclopedist shares the philosophers’ scorn for the poets, he chides the
philosophers for having failed to understand that myth and meter were the necessary
complements of the political form of human order to which they themselves had been
committed. As shall be shown in the following chapter, for Pliny, global empire had not only
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rendered the myths of the poets obsolete, but had also resolved the epistemological crisis at the
origin of the Western philosophical tradition. In consequence, neither the poet nor the
philosopher would have a place in an eternal empire.
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CHAPTER 4
ROMAN SCIENCE
Here the commander felt a loss of way
as his ship’s head swung off, lacking a helmsman,
and he himself took over, holding course
in the night waves. Hard hit by his friend’s fate
and sighing bitterly, he said: “For counting
overmuch on a calm world, Palinurus,
you must lie naked on some unknown shore.”
~ Virgil Aeneid 5.867-871 1
A. The Xenophanean Quandary
i. The Poet and the Polis
At the conclusion of Plato’s Republic, the poets, having been convicted of the crime of
propagating “false stories” (mythous pseudeis) about the highest things, stand outside the portals
to Plato’s polis, banished for their offense against philosophy. 2 Within the theoretical
framework of Pliny’s political history of Nature, however, by expelling the poets from the
narrow confines of the polis’s encircling walls, the philosophers had in fact freed them from one
of the two fetters frustrating man’s search for knowledge. Indeed, for Pliny, the Hellenic
philosophers condemned the myths of the poets while contradictorily seeking to preserve the
form of human order that had engendered the very needs fed by the poetic art. Polybius had
been the first to diagnose the underlying political disease, of which the myths of the poets were
but a symptom, writing in his Histories that prior to the empires of Alexander and Rome, it had
been “nearly impossible” (adunatou schedon) to find a “true account” (tēs alēthous historias) of

1

cum pater amisso fluitantem errare magistro / sensit, et ipse ratem nocturnis rexit in undis / multa gemens casuque
animum concussus amici: / “o nimium caelo et pelago confise sereno, / nudus in ignota, Palinure, iacebis harena.”
Virgil, The Aeneid, trans. Robert Fitzgerald (New York: Random House, 1981), 156.
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far-away lands. 3 Polybius contended that prior to the advent of empire, travel by both land and
sea had been perilous, preventing expeditions to remote regions of the world. Even if someone
managed to survive the dangers of a journey through an anarchic world and to reach the edges of
the earth, Polybius continued, inhospitable lands and linguistic barriers would have made it
difficult to gather reliable information. Finally, on those rare occasions when someone actually
succeeded not only in exploring desolate and barbarous lands, but also in communicating with
foreign tribes in their native tongues, he nevertheless would have been tempted to add fabricated
tales of monsters and marvels to his account of his travels in order to entertain his readers and to
enhance his fame, rendering his description of the world beyond his native borders dubious. 4
Sure knowledge of that which lay beyond the boundaries of one’s own land was consequently
virtually unobtainable during man’s political age. Yet, “all men by nature desire to know,” and
the empty fables of the poets, offering explanations of that about which there was no certain
information, provided a placebo to palliate the unsatisfied yearnings of political man. 5 The
vacuous myths of the poets, however, succeeded only in stimulating an appetite for which their
insubstantial tales could provide no real satisfaction, ensuring a continuous demand for their
mythographic inventions through the constant exacerbation of the persistent longing that attends
an unconsummated love.
According to Polybius, the rise of empire as a mode of human order allowed for a true
cure for the anguish of political man’s unsatisfied desire. In Polybius’s words, “For this is a
peculiarity of the present age, in which, the whole world being open for travel by sea and by
land, it is no longer appropriate to use poets (poiētais) and mythmakers (mythographois) as

3
4

5

Polybius Histories 3.59.1.
Ibid., 3.58.5-9.
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witnesses for that about which we are ignorant – ‘giving groundless assurances,’ as Heraclitus
writes, ‘for disputed facts’ – but we must attempt to compose an account for our listeners that
stands on its own credibility.” 6 Empire had opened the horizon of human experience, providing
the pursuit of knowledge with an empirical foundation it had formerly lacked and obviating the
need for the fabulations of the poets. Conte rightly notes that Polybius’s “awareness, practical
and cultural, of the universality of political horizons can be understood as a real achievement,”
with Polybius being the first to discern within the pursuit of global empire an opportunity for
progress in man’s knowledge of the world in which he lives. 7 Paradoxically, this meant that the
achievement of global empire had opened a new field for the contests of ambitious men by
closing off another, creating opportunities for the pursuit of honor and fame in the realm of
science while foreclosing the possibility of an illustrious military or political career. Conte
writes,
New political possibilities and, with them, new cultural ones: a new field, [Polybius] will
go so far as to say, open to those who feel themselves to be men of action. Once the
possibility of performing political and military exploits by individual initiative had been
precluded (by now this was absolutely precluded by the enlargement of the state
organism to universal dimensions) scientific and above all geographic research remained
available as a surrogate and sometimes complementary exercise. 8
The extension of imperial boundaries to the edges of the earth had left no room for the display of
political or military genius, but it had also opened the entire oikoumenē for empirical
investigation. 9

6

Polybius Histories 4.40.2-3.

7
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As shall be shown in the pages which follow, Polybius’s argument, adopted and
elaborated by the Elder Pliny, responds to an epistemological crisis as old as philosophy itself,
and the writings of Polybius and Pliny thus exist in continuity with the Hellenic philosophical
tradition. Distinctions between the “theoretical” sciences of the Greeks and the “applied”
sciences of the Romans, though real enough, are overwrought, obscuring the common set of
epistemological problems for which both the Greeks and the Romans sought a solution. 10 Conte
is therefore simply wrong when he asserts that by Pliny’s time “the divorce between philosophy
and science was already complete” and that within Pliny’s encyclopedia a crude “summation of
positive facts prevails over an image of knowledge structured organically and motivated by a
unified epistemological principle.” 11 On the contrary, in his Natural History, Pliny, like
Polybius before him and Plato before them both, participates in a conversation initiated by the
pre-Socratic philosophers concerning the foundations and the limits of human knowledge, and
his encyclopedia not only contains an image of knowledge structured organically, with higher
forms of knowledge growing out of man’s concrete observations of the world around him, but
also enunciates a political epistemology according to which the types of knowledge available to
man depend upon the form of order to which he belongs, with the establishment of an unbounded
empire allowing human beliefs about the highest things to gain an empirical foundation and
thereby to assume the status of genuine knowledge for the first time. 12 Pliny thus rejects the
Greek solution to the epistemological crisis at the origin of the Western philosophical tradition,
10

See, for example, Arnold Reymond, History of the Sciences in Greco-Roman Antiquity, trans. Ruth Gheury de
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for whereas the Hellenic philosophers ultimately attempted to increase their knowledge of the
highest things by substituting rational inquiry for empirical observation as their primary method
of investigation, Pliny asserts instead that the narrow boundaries of the polis had been the true
barrier to universal knowledge.
According to Pliny’s political epistemology, the failure of the Hellenic philosophical
project of substituting true knowledge for opinion or myth, a failure evidenced by the existence
of competing sects and schools in Rome propagating inconsistent and irreconcilable teachings
about the highest things, was a direct consequence of the small circumference of the encircling
walls of the polis. The philosophers of Hellas had effectively foredoomed their momentous
undertaking through their unquestioning commitment to the very form of order generating the
world of shifting and illusory appearances they were attempting to transcend. In his Laws, Plato
had prescribed that the polis be limited to a mere 5,040 households. 13 Plato appears to have
chosen the number for its mathematical properties: 5,040 is divisible by the number twelve as
well as by all integers from one to ten, and once divided by twelve, the quotient (420) is again
divisible by twelve without a remainder. Plato, having come to believe that the insensible forms
comprising the realm of true being beyond the illusory realm of the sensible world were
numbers, “constructed the polis as a mathematical crystal which in its proportions reflected the
numerical relations of the cosmos.” 14 Pliny’s critique of the philosophers, to be examined in the
following section, begins with the recognition that it was the political form of man’s relationship
to Nature that had made the sensible world a realm of mere appearances in the first place by
preventing the complete transformation of Nature’s disparate products into an eternal,
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Eric Voegelin, Order and History, vol. 3, Plato and Aristotle (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press,
1957), 251.

169

teleologically-ordered whole. Plato, having rightly discerned within himself a longing for a
realm of true being, ensured that his longing would never find satisfaction by eternalizing the
very form generating the world of illusions he sought to escape. As a result, Plato engaged in an
abortive quest for an insensible realm beyond the sensible world and did not seek the sublimation
of the world itself through the destruction of the circumvallating walls characteristic of man’s
political age.
For present purposes, Plato’s Idealism is significant only insofar as it posits the existence
of an ideal Form for human order, a Form toward which men can aspire in their constitutional
arrangements but can never transcend and which thereby sets a strict limit on the size of the wellordered polis. As Eric Voegelin writes,
From the point of view of practical politics, in the face of the Persian danger and of the
rising power of Macedonia, [Plato’s] insistence on the small size of the polis was fatal,
and … [he] was aware of the problem. If he insists nevertheless, the reason has to be
sought in the conception of the political entity as an embodied Form. The Form, or Idea,
cannot organize any amount of matter into an order; the body which the Form creates for
itself has to be suitable as a vessel for the Form. The Form is a limitative principle, a
Measure, a metron, in the cosmos; and the body has to fit the clear, finite Measure. 15
The very nature of a Platonic Form is such that it sets limits, and the polis, as an incarnate Form,
was therefore necessarily a finite, delimited entity. A universal empire, as an “unlimited Form,”
was a solecism within the language of Plato’s philosophical system, unintelligible to the Platonic
Idealist; and yet, according to Pliny, it was only through the establishment of such an empire that
the thirst Plato had discerned within himself could be quenched at the fountain of absolute
knowledge. Through his Republic and his Laws, Plato had offered a prescriptive re-theorization
of the polis as an integrated set of institutions capable of sustaining and perhaps even furthering
man’s trans-generational pursuit of knowledge, the former through an ironical illumination of the
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limits, and the latter through an account of the real possibilities, of political order. 16 The Greek
polis, however, could not absorb the world as a whole – an unbounded reality could not be
brought within its encircling walls. For the apologists for Roman imperial expansion, Plato’s
inability “to realize his theories about laws and constitutions” (ta dianoēthenta peri nomōn te kai
politeias apotelein) in practice confirmed the futility of the Hellenic philosophers’ political
project. 17 Indeed, Plato’s failure was interpreted by men such as Polybius, Julius Caesar, and the
Elder Pliny, among others, as the inevitable consequence of the walls of the polis – walls which
set artificial boundaries to the scope of human inquiry and thereby ensured the continued
authority of the poets as the originators and propagators of mythical explanations. 18 Plato had
erred in his attempt to integrate the institutions of the polis into the philosophers’ search for
knowledge, as the division of the world into separate kingdoms precluded knowledge of the
whole and guaranteed that man’s perspective would always be relative and particular rather than
universal and absolute. 19 In other words, the substitution of knowledge for myth required the
historical supersession, rather than the mere re-theorization, of the polis. An examination of the
Roman political solution to the Hellenic epistemological crisis, however, must begin with a brief
description of the crisis itself.
ii. The Hellenic Epistemological Crisis
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If, as Alfred North Whitehead famously quipped, the entire Western philosophical
tradition is but a footnote to Plato, the eighteenth extant fragment of the lost writings of the
wandering pre-Socratic philosopher and poet Xenophanes (c. 570-475 BC) provides an epigraph
for the Platonic text:
DK18

Indeed, not from the beginning have the gods disclosed the whole to mortals,
but in time those who seek (zētountes) find out better. 20

Described as “one of the turning points in the history of western thought” and as the world’s first
“genuine affirmation of [human] progress,” Xenophanes’ couplet is considered by many to be
the earliest recorded assertion of the efficacy of human inquiry into the unknown. 21 In order to
make an unprecedented claim, however, Xenophanes had to endow an old word with new
meaning. Whereas the Greek word zētein had previously simply meant “to search about” for
something, it would thenceforth possess a second, technical meaning, designating the activity of
philosophical inquiry. 22 Since only fragments of their works survive, it is significant that both
20
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Heraclitus (c. 540-470 BC) and Parmenides (c. 515-445 BC), the two most prominent
philosophers of the following generation, use forms of the word zētein to refer to their own
activity in what remains of their written texts, providing proof that the term immediately attained
the status of a technical concept among the earliest philosophers. 23 Moreover, within one
hundred years of Parmenides’ death, Plato would likewise adopt Xenophanes’ terminology,
describing Socrates and his interlocutors as self-conscious participants in the “search” (zētēma)
for knowledge and thus establishing Xenophanes’ couplet as the motto for a way of life. 24
Despite Xenophanes’ assertion of the efficacy of human inquiry, the philosophers’ search
did not originate in a faith in the unlimited power of the human mind, but rather as a response to
that which Xenophanes himself considered an insurmountable epistemological crisis. When read
in conjunction with his other remaining fragments, it is evident that Xenophanes in fact
advocated a limited form of skepticism, with the pre-Socratic philosopher-poet flatly rejecting
the possibility of ever gaining clear and certain knowledge about the highest things. To “find out
has been partially spared.” Yet, Havelock errs in describing the task of linguistic invention as an effort to create “a
set of commonplace but abstract terms which by their interrelations could describe the physical world conceptually,”
implicitly limiting the concepts invented by the pre-Socratic philosophers to terms referring to the external world
and thereby abstracting man’s knowledge of the world out of man’s participatory existence within it. In DK18,
Xenophanes coins a term to designate the very activity in which he himself was engaged, with the implication that
the invention of concepts referring to man’s participation in reality was part and parcel of the pre-Socratic
philosophers’ efforts to create a technical vocabulary for the purpose of describing reality itself. Havelock
inadvertently creates a false division between subject and object within the pre-Socratic mind, abstracting man out
of the world and man’s knowledge of the world out of man’s existence within it. The knowledge sought by the
philosophers must not be severed from the erotic search by means of which such knowledge was sought and which
was itself an object of knowledge, for otherwise inquiry loses its orientation to reality, the activity of philosophy is
separated from its foundation in the experience of human longing, and the quest for knowledge is retarded through
the introduction of pseudo-problems originating in the false dichotomization of the knower and the known. Eric A.
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for the pursuit of knowledge, especially with regard to political reality, see Eric Voegelin, Anamnesis, trans. Gerhart
Niemeyer (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1990), 143-82.
23

Cf. Heraclitus DK101; Parmenides DK2. Havelock notes that according to conventional accounts of the teachings
of the earliest philosophers, “Xenophanes is assigned the role of precursor to Parmenides, both of them being
viewed as offering doctrines in contradiction to the doctrine of Heraclitus. Yet so much of the language used by
Heraclitus, far from correcting or contradicting the pioneer efforts of Xenophanes, seems designed to expand and
carry forward a common enterprise.” Havelock, “Linguistic Task,” 22-23.

24

E.g., Plato Republic 368c. Cf. Voegelin, Plato and Aristotle, 82-88.

173

better” about something, it should be noted, does not necessarily imply the ultimate attainment of
certain knowledge about that into which one is inquiring, and indeed Xenophanes’ whole point
in DK18 is that even though certain knowledge about the whole of Nature is impossible, “those
who seek find out better” in time. 25
Two of the forty-five extant fragments of Xenophanes’ lost works illustrate the crisis in
response to which he articulated his understanding of both the power and the insuperable limits
of human inquiry:
DK16

The Ethiopians say that their gods are snub-nosed and black,
and the Thracians say that theirs are grey-eyed and red-haired. 26

DK38

If god had not made yellow honey, men would think
that figs are much sweeter. 27

DK16 is not a Feuerbachian critique of religion, but rather evidence of an epistemological crisis.
Human beings think that they have knowledge, but all too often a man’s beliefs are unduly
influenced by his particular experiences, with the result that different men, having made
unwarranted inferences on the basis of their respective parochial observations, come to possess
inconsistent and even irreconcilable beliefs. Insofar as no man has communed with the gods
face-to-face, human beliefs about the appearance of the gods arise from each man’s largely
adventitious experience of the world around him, and such beliefs consequently lack a secure
epistemic foundation. The Ethiopians, who have black skin and distinctive noses, project the
image of their neighbor, whom they see, onto the gods, whom they do not see. Similarly, the
Thracians, who have grey eyes and red hair, assume that the gods must also have grey eyes and
25
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red hair. Inferences beyond the narrow realm of each man’s direct experience result in confusion
and contradiction, not knowledge. As Jonathan Barnes, referring to DK16, has observed, “There
is, I think, an epistemological moral here: our beliefs – or many of them – are explicable in
terms of our circumstances; they do not, therefore, amount to knowledge.” 28
DK38 confirms Barnes’ reading of DK16. Judgments concerning the sweetness of a fig
depend entirely upon a man’s diet, with the implication that people might someday determine
that even honey is really not as sweet as they think, if only they happen to taste something even
sweeter. Each man’s set of empirical observations has a narrow scope, and yet a man’s beliefs
are dependent upon his experience of the world around him. Insofar as no man has experienced
the whole of Nature, absolute or universal claims are nothing more than mere conjectures,
lacking a secure foundation and failing to qualify as true knowledge. In regards to the highest
things – the gods and the whole of Nature – and even in regards to the absolute value of entities
occurring within the whole, men may opine, but they cannot know. Hence, in DK35, in which
Xenophanes appears to be referring to his own teachings, the philosopher-poet states,
DK35

Let these things be conjectured as being consistent with what is true, 29

suggesting that even though his own account of the physical world and of the highest things fits
man’s (or at least his own) experience of reality, and therefore merits provisional acceptance, it
must ultimately be admitted that even his own doctrines are mere conjectures falling short of
certain knowledge. As J. H. Lesher observes, for Xenophanes, “mortal beliefs and judgments”
about the highest things, including his own, are necessarily a function “of adventitious personal
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experience,” and in consequence they lack both a secure epistemic foundation and the certainty
that accompanies true knowledge. 30
Xenophanes’ recognition “of the narrow limits of human experience” and of their
implications for human knowledge caused him to adopt an early form of skepticism. 31 In words
which echo across the Western philosophical tradition, forming a refrain repeated again and
again by the torchbearers of the legacy of Hellas from Arcesilaus to Camus, in DK34
Xenophanes provides an assessment of the limits intrinsic to the human condition:
DK34

And of course the clear truth no man has seen,
nor will there ever be anyone who knows about the gods and about what I say
concerning the whole.
For even if one happened to say what was actually the case,
still he himself would not know. But opinion is allotted to all. 32

Xenophanes here formulates that which can be termed the Xenophanean Quandary: the “clear
truth” (to saphes) about things divine and about “the whole” (pantōn) is inaccessible to man, as
both the gods and the whole of Nature lie beyond his ken. A man’s beliefs about the highest
things, arising from his adventitious and parochial experience of the world, can therefore never
amount to anything more than mere opinion, for even if his beliefs happen to be true, they lack
the experiential foundation required for certain knowledge. 33 It might just happen that a man’s
opinions about the gods and about the whole, despite their narrow foundation in his limited
experience of the world, are true – honey, for example, might just be the sweetest substance in
30
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the universe – but he will never know whether or not this is in fact the case, so it cannot be said
that he has knowledge. As Empedocles, self-consciously paraphrasing Xenophanes’ description
of the human condition, would later lament, “Men behold in their span but a little part of life,
then swift to die are carried off and fly away like smoke, persuaded of one thing only, that which
each has chanced on as they are driven every way; who, then, boasts that he has found the
whole?” 34
Xenophanes’ “pioneering reflections on the nature, limits, and varieties of human
understanding,” writes Lesher, summing up Xenophanes’ significance for the future
development of the Western philosophical tradition, “articulate a distinction between genuine
knowledge (apprehension of the truth based upon clear and reliable indications) and opinion
(acceptance of what is potentially correct but unconfirmable) which became a commonplace in
succeeding philosophical reflections on human knowledge.” 35 Indeed, insofar as the practice of
philosophy, conceived as a “search” for understanding, consists in the activity of substituting
certain knowledge for uncertain opinion, Xenophanes’ original “articulation of the contrast
between belief and knowledge” announced the beginning of the practice of philosophy as a selfconscious enterprise. 36 Nevertheless, Xenophanes’ announcement also contained an important
judgment concerning the human condition and the epistemological quandary resulting from the
narrow scope of each man’s experience of the world. In Lesher’s words,
The crux of the problem identified in fragment 34 (and the related fragments 35 and 38)
lay in the disparity between the resources for knowledge available to men and the
requirements for the sort of knowledge they most want to have: what they were in a
position to know (that is, accept with confidence on the basis of clear evidence) was the
world of persons, things, and events with which they were in direct contact; but what they
34
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now sought to know (the nature of the gods and the truth about all nature) were matters
lying far beyond the limits of that personal world. 37
All men by nature desire to know, and yet according to Xenophanes men are unable to obtain
“the sort of knowledge they most want to have.” Unless man had been fated for an absurd and
alien existence, sentenced to a life of perpetual frustration and pointless toil as he searched with
conscious futility for knowledge concerning the highest things, the Xenophanean Quandary
would have to be resolved.
iii. The Parmenidean Response
Fittingly, the first attempt at its resolution was made by Parmenides, who according to the
doxographic tradition had been one of Xenophanes’ pupils. 38 For present purposes, Parmenides’
proposed solution to the Xenophanean Quandary is important only insofar as it is generally
representative of the Hellenic response to the epistemological crisis out of which the Western
philosophical tradition was born (and thus, according to Pliny, of the failed Greek alternative to
Roman science). In brief, Parmenides, having accepted Xenophanes’ conclusions regarding the
impossibility of experiencing the whole of Nature, rejected experience as the foundation and the
criterion of true knowledge, substituting rational inquiry for empirical observation as the proper
method of philosophical investigation and making reason rather than experience the foundation
of man’s beliefs about the highest things. In other words, Parmenides refused to accept the
Xenophanean Quandary’s hidden premise, namely, that empirical observation, despite its
limitations and its inadequacies, is the only possible means for acquiring knowledge. In his
didactic poem on the goddess Truth (Alētheia), in which he displays no compunction whatsoever
about making claims concerning the whole of Nature, Parmenides explicitly rejects empirical
37
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observation as a basis for knowledge, instead proclaiming “reason” (logos) the sole “way”
(hodos) of gaining access to reality. 39 Parmenides writes,
DK7

For this belief shall never predominate, that things-which-are-not exist;
but you must exclude your thought from this way of searching (hodou dizēsios)
and you must not let the habit of much experience force you down this way,
allowing yourself to be directed by the unwatchful eye and by the ear, filled
with noise,
and by the tongue; but you must judge by reason the much-contested refutation
proclaimed by me. 40

True knowledge is here transformed from something gained through sensory experience – that is,
through the eye, the ear, and the tongue – into something acquired through rational inquiry. A
new “way of searching” (hodou dizēsios) replaces the method of empirical observation employed
by “those who seek” (zētountes) in Xenophanes’ eighteenth fragment, and reason, rather than the
fallible senses of the body, itself but an encumbrance on the human mind, is made the ultimate
measure of truth. In sum, as Plutarch is purported to have remarked, Parmenides attempted to
resolve the Xenophanean Quandary by “hurling the senses from the realm of truth.” 41
In substituting reason for empirical observation, Parmenides attempted to provide
knowledge with a new foundation. Xenophanes had considered empirical observation the only
possible source of human knowledge, and in consequence he allowed its deficiencies to limit the
horizon of human understanding. Although Parmenides’ outright rejection of sensory experience
as a basis for knowledge would be amended and qualified by subsequent Greek philosophers,
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especially Aristotle, reason would continue to be considered man’s peculiar mode of access to
the highest things and the ultimate criterion of truth within the Hellenic world. 42
B. The Roman Solution
In conjunction with his own belief in the impotence of human reason when confronted
with an irrational world, the legacy of the Greek philosophical tradition – the fragmentation of
the philosophers’ search for knowledge, conceived as a collective undertaking, into a multiplicity
of competing sects and schools; the gradual displacement of the love of wisdom (philosophia) by
the spirit of the party (philoneikia); and the slow descent into dogmatomachy, or the warfare of
contending dogmas – convinced Pliny that the failure of the Parmenidean response to the
Xenophanean Quandary had been foreordained. 43 Indeed, for Pliny, it had been nothing less
than “madness” (furor) to attempt to escape the world of sensory experience in the pursuit of
supersensual truths. As Pliny writes in his opening book, “It is madness, absolute madness, to go
outside of the world, as if everything within it were already thoroughly known, in order to
investigate those things which lie beyond it; as if, indeed, he who does not know the measure of
himself could take the measure of anything else or the mind of man could see those things which
the world itself does not possess.” 44
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Although he never explicitly describes the philosophers’ reliance on reason as a
perversion of man’s search for knowledge or as a pathology arising from the artificial
circumscription of the human genius during man’s political age, Pliny repeatedly reviles the
Greeks for their empty and groundless conjectures, refusing to draw a distinction between the
myths of the poets and the rational deductions of the philosophers, and he clearly relishes
displaying the contradictory and competing hypotheses promulgated by his predecessors in the
Hellenic and Hellenistic worlds. Following Xenophanes, Pliny observes a fundamental disparity
between the resources available to political man in his pursuit of knowledge and the knowledge
for which he pines, and in both the myths of the poets and the faulty inferences of the
philosophers he discerns – occasionally with pity, but more often with contempt – the futile
efforts of a condemned race to bridge the insurmountable chasm separating their parochial and
adventitious observations from their beliefs about the highest things. 45 For Pliny, the myths of
the poets and the speculations of the philosophers are equally the product of that which he calls
the vanitas Graecorum – the inanity or untruthfulness of the Greeks. 46 Although Pliny
occasionally uses the word vanitas in a seemingly prosaic manner to refer to the “vanity” of
those who make ostentatious display of their wealth, such as the vanitas exhibited by the
Egyptian pharaohs in the construction of the pyramids or the vanitas of a musician famous for
his refulgent gemstones, the term frequently has a more technical meaning within the text of the
Natural History, referring specifically to the “emptiness” or “untruthfulness” of an assertion
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lacking an adequate foundation in man’s actual experience of the world. 47 Moreover, as
Xenophanes first observed, knowledge of something’s absolute value presupposes knowledge of
the whole, and it can therefore be surmised that erroneous judgments concerning the real value of
pyramids, gemstones, or any other form of material wealth are in fact a special instance of the
larger class of empirically unjustified human beliefs. Indeed, Pliny can accuse the Greeks of
vanitas for assigning inordinate value to radishes, to the relative degradation of beets and turnips,
just as easily as he can accuse the pharaohs of attaching inordinate value to their pyramids. 48
Pliny is thus consistent in his use of the term vanitas throughout the text of his
encyclopedia, employing the word to describe any belief lacking a secure basis in man’s
empirical observations of the world around him. Hence, an estimate of the circumference of the
earth based on a note purportedly written by the shade of a man whose post-mortem travels had
taken him to the center of the earth and the Greek belief that amber can be found on an island
that has never been positively identified both earn Pliny’s scorn, singled out in his encyclopedia
as examples of vanitas Graeca, or Greek untruthfulness. 49 Both beliefs, Pliny insists, must be
rejected, as they lack a secure basis in human experience. According to the scale employed in
the Natural History, a belief’s epistemic value is a function of its origin, and beliefs without firm
empirical foundations, failing to meet the requirement for true knowledge, must be rejected as
empty and worthless conjectures. 50
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Importantly, such vanitas is not limited to the Greeks, as Pliny declares that any man who
posits the existence of life after death, who makes idle judgments concerning which human
beings have achieved the greatest happiness in life while necessarily lacking knowledge of the
secret fears residing in the inner recesses of the hearts of men, or who offers conjectures of any
sort regarding objects beyond the realm of possible human experience is likewise guilty of
untruthfulness. 51 Yet, with the exception of these occasional allusions to the vanitas hominum,
or the untruthfulness of man, the term vanitas in the Natural History is almost exclusively
associated with the teachings of the Greeks. 52 The fantastical remedies and superstitious beliefs
of the Greek magicians in particular provide Pliny with a constant source of fodder for his
attacks on Greek untruthfulness. 53 In his twenty-sixth book, for instance, Pliny exposes the
emptiness of assertions about the magical power of the catanance, a plant which according to the
magicians can be used as a love philter. The catanance, Pliny derisively notes, was “selected for
this use by inference (coniectura), since it contracts into the shape of the claw of an expired kite
as it withers.” 54 The purported power of the catanance is inferred on the basis of its resemblance
to a bird’s claw: if a bird of prey hooks its victims with its talons, so the argument goes, then the
between the epistemic value and the instrumental value of a belief. Similarly, although Pliny flatly denies that
Nature obeys the commands of priests, he adds that religious rituals are nevertheless beneficial as a form of public
experimentation regarding the forces of Nature and the interconnections that exist between observed natural
phenomena. Ibid., 2.20-21, 26-27, 141.
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catanance, which resembles a talon, must likewise have the power to hook the object of
someone’s hitherto unrequited love. Pliny is adamant that such empty conjectures, lacking an
adequate empirical foundation, cannot be considered true knowledge. Elsewhere he explicitly
describes firsthand experience as the surest source of human knowledge, articulating the criterion
by which he distinguishes true knowledge from empty conjecture throughout the text of his
encyclopedia. Pliny writes in his sixteenth book that “it is best to believe in proofs from
experience (experimentis),” and he reiterates in his twenty-fifth book that “practical experience
(usus) is the most effective teacher of all things.” 55 For Pliny, true knowledge of the human
applications of the catanance requires the careful observation of its effects in practice, a rocksolid empirical foundation in comparison with which the mystical associations and contradictory
inferences of the Greeks are but a fundament of sand.
Premised upon the belief that the extension of the boundaries of the Roman Empire to the
edges of the earth had for the first time enabled man to gain a vision of the whole, Pliny’s
encyclopedia exposes the vanitas Graecorum by contrasting the empty conjectures of the Greeks
with the scientia Romanorum, or the sure knowledge of the Romans, which he puts on display in
the text itself. Significantly, Pliny twice suggests that the human mind, at least in the central
regions of the inhabited world where the climate is the most conducive to human flourishing, is
capable of embracing the whole of Nature. 56 According to Pliny, however, man’s ability to gain
a vision of the whole is conditional, a function of his political no less than his climatic
circumstances. During the human race’s political age, political boundaries had prevented man
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from experiencing the whole, not only because linguistic and political divisions had inhibited
travel, but also because a universe “resembling the infinite” (infinito similis) could not have been
introduced into the finite form of the Hellenic polis or the Hellenistic kingdom. 57 In short, a
man’s ability to grasp the entirety of Nature with his mind, an ability existing only in posse in the
divided world of the polis, could not be actualized until the realm of nature had been integrated
into a single, unified, teleologically-ordered whole through the depoliticization of time and
space. The mind of man simply could not embrace that which did not yet exist. The
establishment of a global empire, however, had effectively resolved the Xenophanean Quandary,
not only by enabling man to experience the orbis terrarum in its entirety, an achievement
confirmed by the installation of Agrippa’s map in the Porticus Vipsania, but also by creating the
conditions necessary for the complete integration of the disparate products of Nature into a
unified totality, that is, by enabling the intellection of the world as a whole. Universal empire
thus obviated the need for the groundless myths of the poets, the vacuous speculations of the
philosophers and the magicians, and all such similar efforts to satisfy political man’s desire for
knowledge of the whole despite his possession of a part. For the Romans of Pliny’s day, the
“dominion of Nature” had become “coextensive with that of Rome,” and insofar as Rome had
thus “encompass[ed] within her power the entire world,” its citizens, living under ideal climatic
conditions – “midway,” Pliny declares, “between the eastern and western edges of the world”
(inter ortus occasusque mediam) – were able to activate their formerly dormant “ability to
encompass the totality of nature, intellectually … [no less than] militarily and politically” 58 As
Murphy observes, according to Pliny, “Under the happiness of peace, and an emperor zealous for
the advancement of knowledge, the world ha[d] become a safe and accessible place. Thanks to
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the rule of this emperor the whole of the orbis terrarum, past and present, [could] be enumerated
and presented to the eye. This survey [was] possible because of political circumstance.” 59
It is not until the final book of his encyclopedia that Pliny attends explicitly to the
significance of the establishment of a global empire within the theoretical framework of his
political epistemology. In his thirty-sixth book, Pliny opens his discussion of the human
applications of amber with the following remark:
Here is an opportunity for exposing the untruthfulness of the Greeks (vanitas
Graecorum): I only ask my readers to bear with me patiently, since it is of importance
for life (vita) to know that not everything the Greeks have passed forward (prodidere)
ought to be admired. It is said that when Phaethon had been struck by a thunderbolt, his
sisters in their mourning were changed into poplar trees, and that every year, near the
river Eridanus, which we call the Po, they pour out tears of amber, named electrum [by
the Greeks], since they call the sun Elector – a story related by numerous poets (plurimi
poëtae), the first of whom, I think, were Aeschylus, Philoxenus, Euripides, Nicander, and
Satyrus. It is clear from the testimony of Italy (Italiae testimonium) that this is false. The
more painstaking poets have mentioned the Electrides, islands in the Adriatic Sea, to
which the amber is carried by the Po. It is certain that no islands by this name have ever
existed there, nor indeed that there are any islands so situated that something carried
downstream on the current of the Po would be able to reach them. As for the fact that
Aeschylus said that the Eridanus is in Iberia – that is, in Spain – and that the same river is
called the Rhone, while Euripides and Apollonius asserted on the contrary that the Rhone
and the Po flow into one another upon reaching the coast of the Adriatic, it makes it
easier to pardon them for being ignorant of amber when their ignorance of the world
(orbis) is so great. 60
Although Pliny does not wish to excuse the Greeks completely for propagating empty fables, he
admits that the limited horizon of human experience during man’s political age partly exculpates
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the poets for their untruthfulness. As mentioned in Chapter 3, Pliny often “plays” with the
earth’s spherical shape – indeed, at one point (2.179) he even refers to the world as a “ball”
(pila), that is, as a child’s plaything – and he repeatedly reminds his readers of the delimiting
effect of the curvature of the earth on the range of human vision. 61 On three separate occasions,
Pliny observes that the “convexity of the world” (mundi convexitas) or the “curve of the
[terrestrial] ball” (anfractus pilae) prevents a man from seeing all of the stars contained in the
heavens at the same time, perhaps alluding to the futile efforts of the philosophers, often
derogatorily described or symbolically depicted as stargazers, to gain a vision of the whole by
means of rational inquiry despite the impotence of human reason. 62 A narrowly circumscribed
range of observation is the very condition of pre-imperial man’s terrestrial existence, a direct and
seemingly inescapable consequence of the fact that the ground upon which he stands has a
convex surface.
During the human race’s political age, Pliny contends, a man’s beliefs about the whole
were necessarily based upon his knowledge of a part. As Polybius, like Xenophanes before him,
had argued, however, although “it is possible to get some idea of a whole from a part … it is not
possible to have knowledge nor a sure means of knowing.” 63 The chasm between political man’s
limited empirical observations and the type of knowledge he desired simply could not be bridged
in the divided world of the polis. As a result of the political boundaries and linguistic fissures
dividing the human race and preventing the integration of the world of nature into a
teleologically-ordered totality, the philosophers’ rational quest for a vision of the whole had been
a fool’s errand – a futile search for a whole that did not yet even exist. The form of the polis to
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which the philosophers had been committed guaranteed and perpetuated the realm of illusions
they sought to escape and engendered the very unquenchable thirst the poets palliated with their
mythical explanations of those things which lay beyond the horizon of political man’s ken.
Thus, just as Xenophanes had observed that the Ethiopians and the Thracians each fashioned
their gods after their own appearance, adding sardonically that
DK15

… if horses or oxen or lions had hands
or were able to draw with their hands and to produce works like men,
horses would draw forms (ideas) of gods resembling horses,
and oxen resembling oxen, and they would make the bodies of the gods
in accordance with the frames they themselves each possessed, 64

so Pliny observes that there is a lack of agreement among the Greeks over the true “form” or
“shape” (facies) of the frankincense tree, since “the samples of the Greeks vary” (Graecorum
exempla variant). 65 Insofar as different communities of men living during man’s political age
had come to possess dissimilar samples of trees growing in distant lands, their inferences
regarding the actual appearance of such trees, based on their respective samples, necessarily
diverged. 66 A single, stable reality remained hidden behind the shadowy haze of multiple,
shifting appearances. In a striking inversion of Platonic Idealism, the intelligible realm of the
Forms is unmasked as the product of human fancy, with the “Forms” of material objects having
less permanence and stability than the objects whence they are derived. The Forms projected by
political man beyond space and time are nothing more than delusions arising from the
desperation of a fettered and confined animal. In a related criticism, Pliny notes that since the
Greeks are confined within narrow boundaries and do not have definite knowledge of the outside
world, their empty stories are not tethered to a particular location and thus “wander” (vagare)
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from place to place, their changing settings providing evidence of the absence of a true
connection to the real world of human experience. 67 The fancies of the magicians, the Forms of
the philosophers, and the myths of the poets are all empty conjectures, beliefs gained by means
of imagined ascents up illusory ladders – ladders occasionally grounded in the realm of sensory
experience, but always lacking a firm footing in the real world and invariably ending in the
ethereal realm of the human imagination.
The “testimony of Italy” (Italiae testimonium), writes Pliny, checks the excesses of the
Greeks and explodes their empty tales. Pliny’s assertion almost seems out of place, wedged
between his account of the original myth concerning the origin of amber and its more detailed
revised version, the fictive details of which, Pliny’s readers might infer, were perhaps added by
subsequent poets ill at ease about the myth’s tenuous connection to the real world but
nevertheless themselves unable to provide it with a secure foundation in their own firsthand
observations. In fact, the reader of a modern edition of the Natural History must read several
more pages before coming to Pliny’s explanation of the nature of Italy’s “testimony.” In the
intervening pages, Pliny recounts no less than nineteen additional mythical accounts of the origin
of amber, as summarized in table 2 below. Although such stories (stretching from 37.33 to
37.41) have the appearance of a rather extensive digression, they serve an important rhetorical
function within the context of Pliny’s apology for empire, providing an image of the fractured
and foundationless state of man’s beliefs about amber prior to the publication of Pliny’s
encyclopedia, a foil against which the unity and the reliability of his own subsequent systematic
account of the origins (37.42-46), kinds (37.47), properties (37.48), and human applications
(37.49-51) of amber stand out in sharp contrast. Pliny even offers a perfectly mundane
explanation of one of the recurring features of the myths of the poets, remarking that the
67
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Table 2. Divergent Accounts of the Origin of Amber, Natural History 37.33-41
Author
Purported Origin
Unnamed Poets

The Gum of Trees on Inaccessible Rocks in the Adriatic

Theophrastus

The Soil in Liguria

Chares

A Shrine for Phaethon on the Island of Ammon

Philemon

The Soil in Scythia

Demonstratus

The Urine of Lynxes in Italy

Zenothemis

The Urine of Lynxes on the Banks of the Po

Sudines and Metrodorus

“Lynx” Trees in Liguria

Sotacus

Rocks in Britain Called the Electrides

Pytheas

Solidified Brine Deposited on Abalus Island

Timaeus

Solidified Brine Deposited on Basilia Island

Nicias

Sap from the Rays of the Sun

Theochrestus and

Ocean Water Deposited on Pyrenean Promontories

Xenocrates of Aphrodisias
Asarubas

Mud Warmed by the Sun in Lake Cephisis

Mnaseas

The Tears of Birds in Africa

Theomenes

Trees in the Garden of the Hesperides

Ctesias

Trees on a Mountain Near the Hypobarus River

Mithridates

Trees on Serita Island off the Coast of Carmania

Xenocrates of Sicyon

The Mire of Numidia

Sophocles

The Tears of Birds Living in Lands Beyond India

mythographers often associate amber with the river Po in their tales of its origin because the
women of Transpadane Gaul, the southern boundary of which is formed by the Po, often wear
necklaces made of amber. 68 The shadowy, shifting forms contained in the early-morning mists
of the Greek imagination are burned away beneath an ascendant Roman sun, the clear and
penetrating light of which allows for the direct observation of the things themselves.
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As shown in table 2, Pliny attributes the final mythical account of the origin of amber
contained in his encyclopedia to the famous Greek tragedian Sophocles. Pliny emphasizes
Sophocles’ seriousness (gravitas), his noble birth, and his high reputation, but only in order to
castigate him all the more harshly for being either gullible or willing to propagate a story he
knew to be untrue. In using one of the greatest poets of the pre-imperial period as his
culminating example and in calling attention to his personal accomplishments, Pliny implicitly
suggests that even the greatest of Greek minds could not overcome the limitations of a divided
world and that the knowledge possessed by even the least educated citizen of Rome has a more
secure footing than the phantasms of the most cultured Greek. Pliny writes,
Exceeding all these authors is the tragic poet (poeta tragicus) Sophocles, which is truly
astonishing, since his tragedy is so serious (gravitas), and besides this, since his life’s
reputation is unmatched by the lives of others, due to the position into which he was born
among the Athenians, his personal achievements, and his military command. This man
said that amber is formed beyond India from the tears of birds called Meleager’s
Daughters shed for Meleager [a Greek hero whose painful death had been effected by his
own mother after he had killed his maternal uncles]. Who would not be astonished that
he accepted this as true or at least hoped to be able to convince others of its truth? Or
who is able to find anyone so puerile and ignorant that he believes in birds that weep
once each year, that shed such large tears, or that traveled from Greece, where Meleager
died, to the Indies in order to weep? So what? Are there not many poets (poetae) who
have handed forward things equally fabulous? But that anyone should seriously tell such
a story in regards to a substance such as this, which is imported every day and exists in
abundance, and so exposes (coarguat) the falsehood, is a great insult against man and an
insufferable exercise of his ability to lie with impunity. 69
Although it hardly seems fair to blame Sophocles for his mythical explanation of the origin of
amber given the fact that he did not have access to the emporia of Rome, the poet stands
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condemned for his lies, his very reputation making him a particularly attractive target for Pliny’s
recriminations. Within the context of a Roman legal proceeding, the word coarguere, translated
above as “to expose,” meant “to prove to be guilty” or “to convict of a crime,” giving Pliny’s
condemnation the character of a prosecutor’s closing argument or a jury’s verdict at the
conclusion of a criminal trial. Significantly, it is the marketplace of Rome, wherein the world’s
goods are bartered and sold and thereby integrated into human life, that allows for the firsthand
observations upon which the “testimony of Italy” is based. Any citizen of Rome, Pliny suggests,
can visit one of the city’s markets to inquire about the origin of the goods being sold, to test the
myths of the poets against the observations of the traders who procured them, and to gain
firsthand access to all of Nature’s myriad products. Pliny even describes simple experiments a
man can undertake to verify that amber is in fact the hardened resin of a particular species of
pine tree, as Pliny, relying on the reports of Roman soldiers and traders, asserts in his
encyclopedia. 70 As a result of the dual bond uniting the urbs and the orbis, the Roman
marketplace constitutes a microcosm of the world of nature, and simply by making a trip to their
local market, the citizens of Rome are able to make a tour of the entire world in miniature and to
observe all of the various products of Nature firsthand.
Pliny writes in his thirty-second book that “trade was invented for the sake of
nourishment” (commercia victus gratia inve[n]ta), reminding his readers that the exchange of
goods, necessary for the realization of man’s highest faculties, was itself an important political
development within the spiraliform history of human progress outlined in the concluding
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paragraphs of his book on man. 71 As previously discussed, the establishment of commerce on a
global scale through the construction of a worldwide network of roads and waterways, the spread
of a universal language, and the guarantee of Roman peace, had enabled the introduction of all of
the disparate products contained in the world of nature into human life and their concomitant
transformation into a teleologically-ordered totality – a totality rendered stable by Pliny’s
exhaustive description of the life-sustaining properties of each of Nature’s products in the final
eighteen books of his encyclopedia and freed from the effects of time through its representation
in a written text existing independently of the fleeting memory of any single human being. Pliny
now adds, however, that global commerce advances human knowledge in tandem with human
life, providing man’s beliefs about the world of nature and the human applications of Nature’s
products with a secure footing. In other words, it is not simply the case that the establishment of
a universal empire increases the number of man’s beliefs about the life-sustaining properties of
Nature’s products; it also transforms these beliefs into actual knowledge, bringing the world as a
whole within range of firsthand human experience and thereby providing man’s beliefs about the
highest things with the empirical foundation they had previously lacked.
Whereas Xenophanes had found it impossible to make judgments concerning the true
sweetness of figs due to the limited scope of human experience in the world of the polis, Pliny
contends that once the bounded form of the polis had been superseded by the unbounded form of
a universal empire, man gained the capacity to make absolute judgments. Just as Rome provides
a universal vocabulary for the description of all of Nature’s products, argues Pliny, so the
judgment of the citizens of Rome establishes once and for all the true value of each and every
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product contained in Nature’s manifold. 72 In his tenth book, for example, Pliny claims that the
best cheese is produced in two particular villages in the district of Nîmes: “With regard to
cheese, the most highly praised at Rome, where the good things of all nations are judged
firsthand (comminus), is from the villages of La Lozere and Gevaudan of the district of Nîmes;
but it is commended only for a short time and while fresh.” 73 In Rome, the “capital of the
world” (terrarum caput), where all of the world’s products are imported in abundance, “the good
things of all nations are judged firsthand,” allowing for the evaluation, in this instance, of the
world’s cheeses. 74 Pliny similarly records the judgment of Rome concerning the best or most
highly esteemed varieties of numerous other natural products, including the “highest ranked”
(principatus) grape, the “most excellent” (praestantissimus) fig, and the “most pleasing”
(gratissimus) pear, and the pages of the Natural History are laced with claims that presuppose
knowledge of the whole, with Pliny offering information about “all aquatic animals” (omnia
aquatilia), “all insects” (insecta omnia), and “every region in which salt is found” (omnis locus,
in quo reperitur sal), to cite just a few of the statements contained in the Natural History
implying possession of universal knowledge. 75 Whereas modern social scientists use sampling
techniques to make inferences about populations, employing inferential statistics to gain
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knowledge about phenomena necessarily exceeding any particular man’s immediate experience,
Pliny contends that global empire had brought entire populations within the cognitive dominion
of the Roman mind, an achievement permitting both universal and absolute judgments and
negating the need for inference. Once an unbounded power had been established, the
epistemological crisis resulting from the observed discrepancy between the narrow range of each
man’s experience of the world and the wide scope of his beliefs concerning the whole
disappeared.
If the evidence supplied by the goods available for purchase in the markets of Rome and
the firsthand accounts of their procurers confute the poets, Pliny’s own encyclopedic text and the
universal and absolute judgments it contains expose the futility of the Greek philosophers’ search
for true knowledge. Through the establishment of global peace, guaranteed by the arms of
Rome, and the depoliticization of time and space, the human mind now for the first time had the
opportunity to embrace the world in its entirety, a whole replicated in the final eighteen books of
the Natural History and thereby made available to every man. 76 The unbounded form of a
universal empire extended man’s ken to the edges of the earth, defeating the limits that had
previously seemed inseparable from man’s existence as a terrestrial being and obviating the
Parmenidean rationalization of man’s search for knowledge about the highest things. Global
empire brought the natural world as a whole into the realm of human experience, providing
man’s beliefs with an empirical foundation and substituting certain knowledge for mere opinion,
the scientia Romanorum for the vanitas Graecorum. The original sin of the poets, the
philosophers, and the magicians had been inherited through the encircling walls within which
they had been born, and although Pliny is conscious of his dependence upon the scientific and
military achievements of his predecessors, within the context of his sacred history, it is Pliny
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himself who becomes the ultimate agent of man’s redemption through the publication of his
encyclopedia. It must be emphasized, however, that Pliny’s sacred history is not providentially
guided and that the sublimation of the world at the end of time does not enjoy a divine guarantee.
Such conclusions stem directly from Pliny’s rejection of the philosopher’s deification of his own
rational mind and his assertion that the order of the universe is maintained through a precarious
balance of counterpoised forces rather than through the agency of a divine pneuma permeating
the cosmos. For Pliny, it must be remembered, rage (rabies) rather than reason (ratio) governs
and animates the whole. As Virgil was perhaps the first to argue, the success of the Roman
project hinged on the substitution of the stargazer by the imperator at the helm of the ship of
state. 77 According to Pliny, however, there was no divine promise ensuring a successful voyage,
no providential guarantee against the ultimate failure of the man and of the arms of which the
poet had sung and a return to the abandoned shores of Troy. 78
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C. A Threat to Empire
According to the conventional division of Pliny’s encyclopedia, Book 20 of the Natural
History begins with a boldly formulated statement of purpose: “From this point forward,”
declares Pliny, “we will begin our treatment of the greatest work of Nature and will tell man his
proper means of sustenance, and we will force him to admit that he is ignorant of the things
through which he lives.” 79 That Pliny’s statement of purpose in reality introduces the second
half of his encyclopedia, announcing his intent to adopt a new perspective from which to sketch
the visage of Janus-faced Nature, has been overlooked by Pliny’s readers for nearly two
millennia, concealed from view by his nephew’s mischaracterization of the structure of the text
and by the prejudices of modern commentators concerning his ineptitude as a scholar. Within
his original thirty-six book schema, Pliny’s declaration of purpose opened his nineteenth rather
than his twentieth book, marking the reader’s passage from a world conceived as an aggregation
of entities, each with its own discrete nature, to a world experienced as a unified totality, within
which the nature of each item contained in Nature’s manifold cannot be understood apart from
its subordination to the single end of sustaining human life. As Conte writes, once the world is
conceived as a teleologically-ordered whole, “the very beings of nature seem to exist solely with
a view toward man, who avails himself of them.” 80 The world of Pliny’s nineteenth through
thirty-sixth books, illumined by an ascendant Roman sun, is thus a different world than the world
of nature conceived independently of the needs of the human race. Following the removal of
2,000 years of accreted errors and prejudices and the discovery of the true architecture of Pliny’s
encyclopedia, the reader cannot help but be struck by both the self-consciousness with which
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Pliny organized the materials contained in his encyclopedia and the presumptuousness with
which he undertook his task as he himself formulates it at the start of the second half of his
encyclopedia. As examined in Chapter 1, Pliny’s aim in the second set of eighteen books
contained in his thirty-six book encyclopedia is nothing less than to teach man the “order of life”
(ordo vitae), that is, the phylogenetic history of the human race through which all of Nature’s
products were gradually made subservient to the needs of man, and in so doing, to transform the
world of nature from a mere aggregation of entities into an eternal, teleologically-ordered
whole. 81
Roger French is surely right that “the spread of Roman power” is the “essence” of Pliny’s
political history of Nature, and he insightfully observes that “Pliny’s account of human progress
is the story of how man has learned to use the natural world.” 82 Nevertheless, French
erroneously conflates Pliny’s teleological conception of the natural world, depicted in the second
half of his encyclopedia, with a providential conception of human history, incorrectly concluding
that since the historical integration of Nature’s products into a teleologically-ordered whole
occurred by means of imperial expansion, the “Romans clearly therefore seemed to be following
some kind of destiny.” 83 Pliny’s assertion of the possibility of integrating the products of Nature
into a teleologically-ordered totality through the accumulation of discoveries about the lifesustaining properties of natural substances and the spread of commerce and trade to the edges of
the earth, however, in no way compels the conclusion that he considered the introduction of the
world of nature into the sphere of human life through Rome’s conquest of the orbis terrarum an
historical necessity. It should be recalled from Chapter 2 that Pliny explicitly rejects both the
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plenipotency of fortune and the existence of a providential deity determining the course of
human affairs as forms of escapism through which man – the only being bearing responsibility
for the realization of its nature – disburdens himself of the weight of his humanity. There are no
laws of history governing the sequence of human events, no divine guarantees ensuring the
success of the Roman imperial project, and the specter of a retrograde movement in the history
of man, of the disintegration of the unified realms of nature and life, thus haunts the pages of
Pliny’s encyclopedia, endowing it with its often noted admonitory and moralizing tone.
Although the publication of Pliny’s encyclopedia, made possible by the success of the Roman
imperial project, effects the sublimation of the world and the eternalization of the world of nature
as an integrated whole, Pliny insists that there is no divine decree ensuring that Rome’s universal
empire will exist in perpetuity: man alone bears responsibility for the fate of the empire and
thus, as always, for his own nature.
If the publication of Pliny’s encyclopedia, providing all of mankind with an exhaustive
account of the fundaments of human life, effects the final transformation of the world of nature
into a teleologically-ordered whole and permits the fullest realization of Plinian man, it follows
that the subsequent privatization of knowledge would result in the disintegration of the unified
realms of nature and life and the consequent degradation of the human race. 84 It has already
been noted that Pliny believed that the increased availability of luxury goods in the wake of
Rome’s conquest of the world jeopardized the Roman imperial achievement, threatening to
interrupt the process of individual human development through the displacement of the desire for
knowledge by a desire for private possessions. In the proem to his twentieth-eighth book,
however, Pliny examines an even greater threat to empire, one associated with a particular class
of men, primarily of Greek origin, active in the city of Rome itself: the practitioners of the
84
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medendi ars or the art of medicine. 85 In their pursuit of fame and fortune, writes Pliny,
profiteering Greek physicians have gained control over man’s access to the medicaments
contained in the giant medicine cabinet that is the natural world, making knowledge of the lifesustaining properties of Nature’s products the private possession of a handful of medical
“experts,” separating men from the foundations of their own existence in the world of nature, and
giving doctors the power to extort money from their patients for natural remedies freely and
readily available to all men. 86 After observing that the process of trial and error through which
doctors learn their trade occurs at the expense of human life and that “only a doctor can kill a
man with perfect impunity” (medico … tantum hominem occidisse inpunitas summa est), Pliny
compares the man who depends upon a physician for instruction about the medicinal properties
of natural substances to a man who depends on slaves to carry him from place to place in a litter
and to remind him of the names of those whom he meets on the street. 87 In Pliny’s words, we
deserve to be the doctors’ guinea pigs,
so long as no one among us wishes to know what is necessary for his own well-being.
We walk with feet that are not our own (alienis pedibus), we recognize our acquaintances
with eyes that are not our own (alienis oculis), we offer greetings on the basis of a
memory that is not our own (aliena memoria), we even live by means of labors that are
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not our own (aliena opera), and the valuable properties of the nature of things (rerum
naturae pretia) and the contents of life (vitae argumenta) have been lost (perierunt). 88
Just as a man being carried in a litter does not have his feet planted firmly on the ground, so the
citizens of Rome, having become dependent upon Greek doctors, do not have a firm footing in
the natural world and are in effect alienated from the very foundations of their existence. The
privatization of knowledge entails the disintegration of the world of nature as a teleologicallyordered whole and the separation of man from the very contents of his life.
Previous commentators have offered various explanations of Pliny’s antipathy toward the
practitioners of the medendi ars. 89 Vivian Nutton, for instance, contends that the “reasons for
[Pliny’s] opposition are many; doctors are expensive, unnecessary, incompetent; they indulge in
over-subtle argumentation; they are blown along by the winds of fashion; they have brought
about the deaths of the defenceless as well as the degeneration of the Roman state; they have
turned Romans aside from the true, efficacious and inexpensive herbal remedies of the Roman
patriarchs and of Cato and introduced them to the seductions of a medicine that was not just unRoman. It was Greek.” 90 Nutton ultimately focuses on Pliny’s contention that Greek medicine
“was both unnecessary and un-Roman,” suggesting at least implicitly that these two
considerations carried the greatest weight in Pliny’s mind. 91 Nutton then argues that although
less than ten percent of doctors in practice in the first century AD “show[ed] no signs of
88
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Greekness,” justifying Pliny’s assertion that the practice of medicine was in some sense a Greek
rather than a Roman art, the remedies contained in the Natural History were probably less
efficacious than those being prescribed by the doctors of his day. 92 It can be inferred, concludes
Nutton, that Pliny’s patriotic fervor caused him to “maltreat” the members of the medical
profession by giving a biased estimate of the efficacy of Greek medicine. 93
Alternatively, Beagon, ever-committed to the premise that Pliny’s “view of life springs
from a mainly Stoic outlook,” analyzes Pliny’s criticism of the medendi ars within the
framework of the uses and abuses of human reason in man’s dealings with the gifts of Nature. 94
In Beagon’s words, “Pliny’s criticism of medicine is, in fact, criticism of the way man’s activity
can misuse Nature’s most basic gifts, a theme by now familiar from the preceding studies of
Pliny’s thought. Indeed, by examining how the ars can be said to have corrupted medicina, we
encounter many of the Plinian ideas on the use and abuse of ratio, such as the questions of false
ingenuity, caeca subtilitas [obscure theoretical distinctions], and the balance of theory and
practice.” 95 For Beagon, Pliny’s criticism of the medendi ars must ultimately be understood in
terms of the contrast between Roman herbology, which rests on the appropriate blend of reason
(ratio) and practical experience (usus), and Greek medical theory, which has been produced by
the workings of ratio alone, separated from practical experience and “badly misused by the
pernicious Greeks.” 96 In misusing their capacity for rational thought through overly-subtle
theorizing and specious reasoning severed from practical experience, the Greek physicians,
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called to be rational participants in a rationally-ordered universe, fail to live in accordance with
their own proper nature and indeed with Nature itself. 97
The foregoing interpretations of Pliny’s critique of the medendi ars in his proem to his
twenty-eighth book suffer from at least two weaknesses: first, they create the appearance of
blatant hypocrisy on the part of the encyclopedist given his inclusion of numerous remedies
devised by Greek physicians in his pharmacopoeia and his general dependence on Greek medical
terminology; and second, they fail to account for his concern, evident in the excerpted passage,
for the alienation of man from the contents of his existence through the interposition of Greek
doctors between the individual and “the things through which he lives.” 98 Several of Pliny’s
more prominent commentators have indeed accused him of hypocrisy in his treatment of the
Greek physicians. Beagon, for instance, claims that “the disingenuousness of Pliny’s professed
attitude to ‘Greek medicine’ becomes apparent as soon as the indexes which make up the first
book of the HN are opened. Of the vast number of medical sources quoted for books 20-37,
Greeks outnumber Romans by at least three to one.” 99 Wallace-Hadrill, adopting a Beagonian
framework, along with all of its faulty premises concerning the structure of Pliny’s encyclopedia
and his supposed stoical philosophical anthropology, condemns Pliny’s perceived
disingenuousness in even harsher terms:
The Romans, with their simple ancestral lore of herbalism, know how to live according to
nature; the Greeks, with their misplaced scientific ingenuity devoted to the manufacture
of noxious compounds, are the inventors of luxuria [prodigality] and the enemies of
nature. This is all very well. But let us reflect for a moment: Pliny is writing a work of
science, the first (he claims) in Latin, a Greek branch of learning, and based on an
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extensive reading of Greek sources, which he spells out proudly in the contents summary
in book 1. Moreover, his guiding ideas of the providential organizing of nature for man’s
benefit, is directly and with acknowledgement derived from Greek philosophy. Doesn’t
that make his attitude to the Greeks hypocrisy as well as chauvinism? Of course it
does. 100
Such accusations of hypocrisy ignore Pliny’s careful differentiation between the art of medicine
and medicinal remedies – between specialized or expert knowledge (ars), which ought to be
condemned precisely insofar as it is jealously guarded as the special province of a privileged
few, and the content (res) of such knowledge, the value of which can be determined only in the
crucible of human experience. “Previous generations,” Pliny writes with evident admiration,
“condemned not the subject matter (res), but the art (ars).” 101 Can it really be believed that
Pliny, who “proudly” lists his sources for each book of his encyclopedia in his index, discredits
the very medicines he prescribes for his readers’ ailments in a sweeping condemnation of
remedies inherited from the Greeks? 102 Moreover, such a sweeping condemnation would run
contrary to Pliny’s emphasis on the importance of the continuity of knowledge and his belief that
man’s participation in a trans-generational tradition is the very source of his humanity. In
general, it would seem that the proper disposition for the reader of a text written by even a
mediocre author is such that an obvious hypocrisy should not immediately provoke disdain for
the author but rather skepticism regarding the reader’s own presuppositions regarding the
author’s meaning and intent. 103 Pliny is precise: his protests are directed solely against the
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medendi ars and its practitioners – certainly not against medicaments in general, nor even against
Greek medicaments in particular.
The faulty interpretations of Pliny’s proem summarized above, however, do not simply
lead to unmerited accusations of disingenuousness and chauvinism on the part of the
encyclopedist; they also conceal the link between Pliny’s condemnation of the art of medicine
and his philosophy of history. Nutton erroneously substitutes the question of the relative
efficacy of Greek and Roman remedies for the question that concerns Pliny, namely, how the rise
of the art of medicine in Rome affects the relationship between man and Nature, while Beagon
distorts Pliny’s analysis by making rationality, rather than history, that through which man qua
man relates to the natural world. As a result, the solemn warning contained in Pliny’s proem
against an impending retrograde movement in the political history of Nature is overlooked by
both scholars. In the excerpted passage, Pliny accentuates his concern for the disintegration of
the realms of life and nature, an historical process assuming the character of a loss of knowledge
in the life of the individual, by means of a rhetorical crescendo of successive clauses concerning
human alienation. In Pliny’s original Latin text, a form of the word alienus is used anaphorically
(i.e., as the first word) in the sentence’s first four clauses, emphasizing man’s increasing
alienation from the world and creating a certain momentum in the text that culminates in the
sentence’s fifth and final clause in a statement of man’s outright dispossession of the contents of
his own existence: alienis … alienis … aliena … aliena … perierunt.
Importantly, as Beagon has observed, Pliny describes the medendi ars and its
practitioners in the Natural History in curiously political terms. 104 The history of Nature, Pliny
seems to be suggesting, proceeds through the substitution of political forms regardless of
whether the passage of time is marking the unification or the separation of the spheres of life and
104
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nature. Just as the introduction of the products of Nature into the sphere of human activity
required the substitution of the empire for the polis, so the alienation of man from the contents of
his existence is linked to the reemergence of political boundaries between men. Indeed, that
which is experienced as a loss of knowledge at the level of the life of the individual is
experienced as a political counterrevolution at the level of the collective life of the human race.
Pliny variously describes the different schools of medicine present in Rome as political
“factions” (factiones) or “parties” (sectae), and he writes derisively of their leaders, depicting
them as ambitious and demagogic men seeking “power” (potentia), “popularity” (fama),
“followers” (adsectatores), and “authority” (auctoritas) rather than genuine knowledge or the
well-being of their patients. 105 According to Pliny, physicians do not simply migrate to Rome,
but rather “invade the state” (civitam invadere), and those citizens of Rome who practice the art
of medicine, unique among the “Greek arts” (artium Graecarum) in that it is totally inconsistent
with “Roman seriousness” (Romana gravitas), are not simply foolish or vicious but instead
“deserters to the Greeks” (ad Graecos transfugae). 106 The multiplication of medical sects in
Rome and the behavior of their adherents signify the reemergence of Greek forms in the heart of
the Empire – a truly ominous development in the political history of Nature
Perhaps most importantly, for Pliny the re-politicization of time and space entails the loss
of the conditions necessary for true knowledge about the highest things. The rise of competing
sects and factions within the empire and the descent into dogmatomachy are in fact two aspects
of a single political and historical process, a unified movement similar to the changing positions
of two diametrically opposed points on a backward-spinning wheel. As the spirit of the party
displaces the love of wisdom, secure knowledge of the life-sustaining properties of Nature’s
105
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products is gradually exchanged for “the discordant opinions of the doctors” (discordes
medicorum sententiae). 107 In Pliny’s words,
There is no doubt that all of these doctors, in their hunt for popularity by means of some
innovation, did not hesitate to traffic with our life (anima). This accounts for those
miserable clashes of opinions (miserae sententiarum concertationes) around the ill, with
no doctor expressing an opinion already spoken, so as not to appear to have acceded to
another. This also accounts for that unhappy phrase inscribed on monuments, “It was a
mob of doctors (turba medicorum) that killed me.” The art changes every day, being
repeatedly revamped, and we are swept along by the hot air of the clever minds of
Greece; and it is not a secret that anyone among them who gains the power of speaking
becomes on the spot the imperator of our life and death. 108
The empty exhalations of the Greek mind fill the sails of the Roman ship of state, carrying the
citizens of Rome this way and that on a sea of ignorance. The substitution of the spirit of the
party for the love of wisdom and the inanity of the Greeks for the secure knowledge of the
Romans is depicted as the immediate and ineluctable consequence of the reemergence of the
political form of man’s relationship to Nature within the world of the empire. Greek doctors
would rather risk the lives of their patients than admit the strength of the arguments of their
rivals, and the silence that accompanies sure and certain knowledge is interrupted by a growing
cacophony of conflicting opinions. 109 The reappearance of the political form of man’s
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relationship to the natural world recreates the epistemological conditions of man’s political age,
destroying the empirical foundation of human knowledge and reducing man’s beliefs to the
status of mere opinions. In Beagon’s words, “[The] impermanence and lack of continuity in the
theory of the rival medical sects suggest that Greek medicine … did not meet the [the] standards
of true knowledge.” 110
The growth of the medendi ars in Rome thus betokens a reversal in the course of human
events and a return to the world of the polis, with the privatization of man’s knowledge of the
life-sustaining properties of Nature’s products and the fractious state of the medical profession
signaling the reemergence of the political form of man’s relationship to Nature and the
restoration of conditions under which “opinion is allotted to all” but certain knowledge of the
highest things is pushed beyond the grasp of the mind of man. The interposition of Greek
doctors between man and the natural world marks a retrograde movement in the life history of
the human race resulting in the alienation of man from the contents of his existence and
threatening to negate the Roman imperial achievement. The publication of Pliny’s encyclopedia
was meant to stanch the hemorrhaging of human knowledge – to dispel the vanitas Graecorum
and to make genuine knowledge of all of the life-sustaining properties of Nature’s myriad
products available to all men for all time. As Trevor Murphy has observed, however, several of
the most notable stylistic features of the text of the Natural History, including its spiraling, openended sentences and its heavy reliance on ablative absolutes, reveal an author in a frenzied state
hoping to outpace the decay of knowledge – a man, it can now be added, whose awareness of the
fragility, transience, and uncertainty characteristic of the human condition made the ultimate
success of the Roman imperial project and of his own efforts to bring about the sublimation of
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the world anything but a foregone conclusion. 111 Indeed, according to Pliny, due to the growth
of the medendi ars in Rome, Greek doctors, the representatives of a superseded age, now govern
man’s access to Nature’s medicaments and they have thus already regained control over an
important domain of human life: “We are obedient to foreigners,” laments Pliny, “and in one of
the arts, they have mastered (imperaverunt) even their masters (imperatoribus).” 112 The
incipient life of imperial man writhes within the womb of Venus Genetrix, struggling against an
abortifacient administered by a Greek doctor.
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CONCLUSION: PLINY’S REDEMPTION
I and this mystery, here we stand.
~ Walt Whitman, “Song of Myself,” 3.14 1
The preceding chapters have been an essay at – and indeed, in a certain sense, on – the
Elder Pliny’s redemption. Once recognized as “the most learned man of his time” and listed as
an authority on a par with Aristotle and Theophrastus, Pliny has now been derided for over half
of a millennium as a credulous collector of facts and prodigies lacking both acumen as a scholar
and ability as an author. 2 Despite a resurgent interest in the Natural History following the
formation of a Pliny translation group in Germany in 1976 and an international conference on
Pliny on the nineteenth centenary of his death three years later, praise for the world’s first
encyclopedist has remained muted due to faulty assumptions regarding the structure and the
purpose of his encyclopedic text and inherited prejudices concerning his intellectual mediocrity. 3
Attempting to reconcile Pliny’s standing in the ancient world with his current reputation as “a
neurotic collector of data, an obsessive compiler who seems to think only of not wasting a single
jotting in his mastodonic notebook,” contemporary commentators often claim that from the
perspective of the modern scholar Pliny’s inability to distinguish fact from fiction and to
articulate a theoretical argument supported through the selective marshalling of his materials is
in fact his greatest virtue. 4 As Gian Biagio Conte writes, “It is precisely Pliny’s intellectual
defects – his bland indifference to theoretical rigor, his refusal to engage in systematic analysis
and selection – that make him so precious for modern scholars interested in the ancient world.
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Unlike scholars who had greater intelligence, more self-confidence, or simply more time at their
disposal, he preserves everything and passes it on to us.” 5
Perhaps more than anyone else, it is the Younger Pliny who bears responsibility for his
uncle’s current reputation as a man for whom only the passage of time could transform his
defects into virtues. As noted in Chapter 1, it was the encyclopedist’s nephew and testamentary
heir who first described the Natural History as “a wide-ranging, learned work in thirty-seven
books no less diverse than nature itself” (triginta septem, opus diffusum eruditum, nec minus
varium quam ipsa natura). 6 The description of Pliny’s text as a work divided into thirty-seven
books concealed the careful arrangement of its parts, its symmetry, and its annular structure, and
the Younger Pliny’s emphasis on the “diversity” of its contents would be read by the scholars of
a later age as a euphemism for its lack of internal order, with its purported paratactical
organization not only mirroring the strange contiguities found in the natural world but also
proving that in the end the overwhelmed encyclopedist was never able to master the diffuse flow
of information streaming from the peripheral regions of a global empire into its central hub.
Understandably, an apparent absence of order was interpreted as an indication that the text as a
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whole lacked an overarching argument: an absence of textual form suggested the absence of a
comprehensive authorial purpose beyond the collection of data for its own sake, and the image of
the encyclopedist as a man obsessed with the collection of the mundane and the monstrous
emerged in the modern period to complement the older, inherited image of the text as an
amorphous compilation of secondhand materials. 7 Thus, Roger French, one of Pliny’s most
favorable commentators, writes that although “Pliny has some organising principles … the sheer
quantity of his material is difficult to deal with. However, Pliny did not write the Natural
History to be read through as if it contained and was structured by an argument.” 8 In a recently
published work on the reception history of Pliny’s encyclopedia, Aude Doody likewise draws a
connection between the text’s purported lack of structure and Pliny’s supposed failure to
articulate an overarching theoretical argument. In Doody’s words,
[A] reader coming to the Natural History expecting a rigid and consistent ordering
system is destined for disappointment. For Pliny, nature is knowable through the
appreciation of her parts which Pliny has distilled into a series of concrete facts. The
contemplation of individual instances of nature’s power is made possible through Pliny’s
presentation of individual facts; enjoying these facts is central to Pliny’s conception of
what it is to know about nature, and, as he has no overarching theoretical argument to
make beyond this, the arrangement of his facts is designed to amuse readers as much as
to instruct them. 9
7

In consequence, for Conte, that which holds the diverse contents of the Natural History together is not a vision of
science as a unified whole or an overarching theoretical argument, but rather Pliny’s attitude of wonder: “But if
Pliny lacks the desire (indeed, he does not even seem to feel a conscious regret) for a unity of the sciences, his
encyclopedia of nature, despite what seems a simple aggregate of registered data and facts, all the same conceals a
certain degree of systematicity in its results. There is indeed no theoretical center that could function as a unifying
principle and organize around itself the description of the world; and yet the text contains an implicit organicity,
concealed within the form of the discourse. What offers and guarantees this in the final analysis is not Pliny’s
encyclopedic project, but the mental disposition he constantly applies to his i9stori/a, his ‘researches on
Nature.’ The text is a system in fragments, one that is systematic only a parte subiecti, that is, in the author’s
attitude. This is not a systematicity founded upon the object (nature and its kingdoms) or upon the method. Perhaps
it is in the discourse’s surface that the vague nostalgia for a profound and systematic unity of the fields of
knowledge takes refuge. Pliny presents nature with an admiring spirit, just as he views with admiration the word of
the auctores, the discoverers and researchers, and just as he proclaims an open admiration for the work he himself
has completed. Perhaps this is the involuntary unity Pliny succeeds in recuperating: the capacity to be astonished
and the will to astonish.” Conte, Genres and Readers, 103-4.
8

French, Ancient Natural History, 225.

9

Doody, Pliny’s Encyclopedia, 25.

212

As the preceding chapters have demonstrated, Doody is in fact doubly wrong. In his
book on the nature of man, Pliny writes that in order to understand “the power and the majesty of
the nature of things” (rerum naturae vis atque maiestas), a man’s mind must embrace Nature as
a “whole” (tota), and not merely its separate “parts” (partes), and as Sorcha Carey was perhaps
the first to observe, the descriptions of the relationship between man and Nature scattered
throughout the Natural History are always equally applicable to the relationship between the
reader and the text of Pliny’s encyclopedia, itself a microcosmic representation of the natural
world. 10 Just as it is impossible to grasp the full grandeur of the universe or the true significance
of its various parts by examining each of its parts in isolation from the larger whole to which it
belongs, so too it is impossible to appreciate the beauty of Pliny’s encyclopedic text or the
meaning of each of its subordinate elements without first gaining an awareness of “the presence
of consistent authorial concerns determining the structure and presentation of the work as a
whole,” concerns in reference to which each and every datum of information contained in the
encyclopedia can be seen as occupying “its proper place.” 11 Indeed, as was shown in Chapter 1,
it is only in the first eighteen books of the Natural History, as originally conceived, that Pliny
examines the natural world as an aggregation of separate and distinct entities each with its own
unique and timeless nature knowable in isolation from the rest of Nature’s products and from
Nature as a whole. In Pliny’s final eighteen books, however, Nature appears differently, with the
nature of each entity contained in Nature’s manifold being inseparable from its function within a
larger, teleologically-ordered whole created by man through the gradual subordination of
Nature’s disparate products to the needs of human life. Unless both of Nature’s two faces are
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simultaneously held in view, writes Pliny at the conclusion of the first half of his encyclopedia,
the “true nature” (vera natura) of each item contained in Nature’s manifold remains hidden. The
descriptions of the diverse natures of Nature’s disparate products contained in the Natural
History’s first eighteen books thus turn out to be descriptions of their “false” or “apparent”
natures, descriptions not of the things as they are in themselves but rather of their diverse modes
of appearance prior to their subordination to a common end. 12 The historical integration of the
world of nature into the sphere of human life, moreover, is recapitulated by the reader as he
passes from the first half to the second half of the text, and it is only upon completing the text as
a whole that the reader is able to gain a vision of Nature as a unified totality. In other words, it is
only when the ring of Pliny’s text has been completed that the basic duality of Nature is
transformed in the mind of the reader into a unified whole. As Pliny writes, “[T]he plan of my
work has necessitated the division of those things that must be combined again by those who
wish to know thoroughly (pernoscere) the nature of things (natura rerum).” 13
Just as the finite content of the Natural History is infinitized through its annular
arrangement, as a result of which the second half of the text brings the reader back to the
beginning of the text as a whole, so time merges into eternity when the last item contained in the
world of nature has been integrated into human life. As Pliny makes clear, however, prior to the
establishment of a global empire, political boundaries had prevented the unification of the realms
of nature and life and the concomitant sublimation of the world of appearances and change into
an eternal realm of pure being, and in consequence the introduction of the orbis into the urbs
necessitated the supersession of the bounded or “political” forms of human order restraining the
progress of history by an unbounded or “imperial” form capable of embracing the natural world
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in its entirety. Nevertheless, as discussed in Chapter 2, despite the pivotal role thus played by
Rome in the political history of Nature, according to Pliny regardless of the form of order
mediating man’s relationship to the natural world the actual introduction of Nature’s disparate
products into human life – that is, their temporalization as discrete entities for the sake of their
eternalization as elements of a unified whole – occurs by means of the accumulation of
discoveries concerning their salutary properties. In other words, although the degree to which
the realm of nature can be introduced into the realm of life is a function of the form of man’s
relationship to the natural world, the political history of Nature advances through the discoveries
of individual men and their accumulation across the succession of generations. A vision of man
as the one being capable of passing on its discoveries to its descendants thus lies at the
foundation of Pliny’s theories of politics and history. Whereas all other animals “feel the force
of their own natures” (sentire naturam suam) from the moment of their birth, writes Pliny, man
alone, having been born ignorant of all things except how to weep, is able to acquire new
faculties and forms of knowledge as a result of “the first gift of time” (primum temporis
munus). 14 Consequently, man alone bears responsibility for his own nature. Once acquired,
man’s faculties for memory and speech enable the realization of man’s unique capacity to pass
down his discoveries to his children, that is, to form a continuous tradition linking each
generation of men as men through the accumulation of discoveries across time and uniting them
as participants in a single process of species development. The process of development
characteristic of the life of the individual is thereby repeated at the level of the life history of the
human race, and the development of Plinian man as an individual becomes a model for
understanding the larger process of human phylogenesis.
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Within this “biological” historical scheme, the history of the human race traces the
pattern of individual human maturation, with mankind’s “political” and “imperial” ages
corresponding respectively to the childhood and the adulthood of an individual human being.
Significantly, the analogy underpinning Pliny’s biological scheme highlights the role played by
Rome in the historical realization of all of the existential possibilities resting latent in Plinian
man. As shown in Chapter 3, for Pliny, the period of time stretching from Pompey’s conquest of
Pontus in 63 BC, an event associated with the earliest recorded assertions of Roman global
imperium, to the completion of Pliny’s own encyclopedia in AD 77 constituted a liminal phase in
the history of man – the adolescence, so to speak, of the human race. The realization of Plinian
man required the destruction of inherited forms – not only the political form of man’s
relationship to Nature, but also its literary complement, the metrical form of the poem. The
absorption of all things into the city of Rome in the guise of a suckling infant required the
erasure of the boundaries characteristic of man’s political age, while the representation of the
world as a teleologically-ordered whole in a manner transmissible from the city of Rome in the
guise of a loving mother to the diverse nations of the world required both the creation of a single
vocabulary adequate to the task of universal description and the invention of a new literary form
capable of embracing the contents of a universal empire. In sum, Pliny’s encyclopedic text
served as the archetype of a new literary genre for a new age, an unbounded literary form
mirroring the “unbounded form” of Rome’s imperial order. Importantly, Pliny’s encyclopedia,
written in a newly established universal tongue, provided both an inventory of the natural world
and a complete record of the life-sustaining properties of all of Nature’s products, and it thereby
incarnated the collective memory of the human race. In the encyclopedist and his encyclopedia,
the distinctive features of the human animal are simultaneously brought to perfection at both the
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level of the individual and the level of the species as a whole, and in bequeathing his
encyclopedic text to Titus, the son of “the greatest ruler of all time” (maximus omnis aevi rector),
an epithet “growing old” (consenescit) with his father, Pliny becomes the herald of the end of
history and the agent of the sublimation of the world. 15
Doody’s flippant remark that Pliny “has no overarching theoretical argument” beyond the
claim that knowledge of Nature consists in the contemplation of its separate parts and in the
enjoyment of mutually unrelated facts about the natural world, though consistent in both tone
and substance with standard characterizations of the Natural History and its author, must be
rejected. Whether or not the reader agrees with every jot and tittle of my exegesis of Pliny’s
encyclopedia, and whether or not the reader accepts every decision I have made in my English
translations of Pliny’s Latin text, I am confident that the foregoing examination of Pliny’s
Natural History has confuted the long-standing belief that Pliny “was simply not an author at
all,” but rather merely a man of minimal intellectual ability in possession of “an abundant supply
of books, index cards, paste, and scissors.” 16 There is in fact an argument structuring Pliny’s
encyclopedia, and the argument structuring the text is an apology for empire. The annular form
of the Natural History, composed in prose and freed from the constraints of rhythm and meter,
corresponds to the unbounded form of the Roman Empire, and the circular movement of the text
replicates the eternalization of time at the end of history. The text, as an inventory of the
contents of the world, is structured according to the world it reproduces. Global empire had
made such an inventory possible for the first time in the history of man, and the completion of
such an inventory, enabling the final realization of all of the possibilities of human existence,
justified the destruction of the inherited forms that had previously set artificial limits on the
15

Ibid., praef. 1, 2.18.

16

Locher, “Structure of Natural History,” 20; Stahl, Roman Science, 103.

217

process of human development. The publication of Pliny’s encyclopedic text marked the
complete integration of the world of nature into the sphere of human life, the final upward
rotation in the spiraliform history of human progress, and the passage of the human race beyond
history into a realm of pure being, and Pliny’s text was thus itself the ultimate justification for
Rome’s conquest of the world. Moreover, as demonstrated in Chapter 5, for Pliny, global empire
did not simply provide man with an opportunity to acquire new beliefs about the natural world,
but also created the conditions under which such beliefs could be transformed into true
knowledge. Global empire thereby provided a political solution to the epistemological crisis out
of which the Greek philosophical tradition had been born. Pliny is not a neurotic compiler of
facts and prodigies, but rather a first-rank political philosopher aware that universal judgments
require universal knowledge, knowledge he provides his readers in the form of an exhaustive
inventory of the contents of the natural world. Pliny was capable not only of authoring a rich,
complex, and carefully-structured text, but also of contributing meaningfully to a philosophical
tradition inaugurated by the pre-Socratic philosophers and born of the deepest yearnings of the
human spirit.
It has been my aim in the preceding pages to restore the Elder Pliny’s reputation as one of
the greatest thinkers of his time, and I have thus in a sense essayed at Pliny’s redemption. In a
different sense, however, I have also attempted to write an essay on Pliny’s redemption, or more
precisely, on Pliny’s understanding of man’s desire for redemption. The most perceptive
inquirers into the human condition, writes Laurence Cooper, have discerned “within human
beings a discontent not only with this or that limit but also with finitude itself.” 17 According to
Cooper, serious political thinkers as diverse as Plato, Rousseau, and Nietzsche have observed “in
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human beings an apparently ceaseless and insatiable reaching-out beyond the boundaries of the
self, a disposition not just to have more but to be more – to be infinitely more.” 18 It would seem
that man’s longing for the infinite, his desire to transcend the limits that are the very condition of
his existence, is an essentially human experience. If at times in the preceding pages Pliny
assumed the appearance of a proto-Hegel describing human activity as that which mediates the
historical identification of the realms of spirit and matter and thereby brings about the end of
history (as in Chapter 1), the appearance of a proto-Heidegger resolutely assuming responsibility
for the projection of the future possibilities of his existence (as in Chapter 2), or the appearance
of a proto-Marx defending the destruction of inherited forms as the only means through which
man could be freed from a false existence (as in Chapter 3), such associations were less a product
of the anachronistic imposition of modern categories on the ideas of an ancient thinker than a
consequence of all four thinkers’ attunement to the abiding concerns of human life and to their
own deepest longings. 19 Indeed, there is within man a fundamental dissatisfaction with human
finitude, whether it is described as a cave of shadows, a fallen world, or a state of existential
fallenness, as well as a corresponding desire for transcendence. Pliny, no less that Plato,
Augustine, or Heidegger, is aware of man’s longing for transcendence, and as the reference to
Marx suggests, he is not the only thinker to have sought redemption through the practice of a
radical, transformative politics.
Although the Elder Pliny deserves to be in the company of men like Plato, Hegel, and
Heidegger, it is precisely when he is included in their ranks that his true shortcomings as a
18
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philosopher become apparent. There is in fact something deeply unsatisfying about Pliny’s
account of man’s redemption, that is, of his explanation of the process through which the human
race would finally transcend the human condition. In his weakest moments, Pliny simply
equates the destruction of the limits intrinsic to human existence with the destruction of the
political boundaries dividing the human race, an equation which allows him to associate Roman
imperial expansion with the deepest yearnings of the human spirit and to endow his political
history of Nature with the character of a sacred history tending toward eschatological fulfillment.
It is perhaps the case that dissatisfaction with Pliny’s account of human redemption is merely
due to the privileged vantage of the twenty-first century – to modern man’s knowledge of the
Roman Empire’s failure to escape the effects of time and of the horrific consequences of man’s
experiments with salvific politics in the twentieth century. I would suggest, however, that
Pliny’s account of human redemption can be attacked in at least two ways on its own grounds,
without reference to subsequent developments in the history of man.
First, although Pliny’s biological schematization of human history rests on the
supposition of an analogical relationship between the process of individual human development
and the process of human phylogenesis, according to Pliny’s own account, this analogical
relationship breaks down when it comes to the seemingly correlated events of the death of the
individual and the end of human history. Whereas Pliny contends that time merges into eternity
at the end history, with the image of the city of Rome as a “hanging city” (urbs pensilis) floating
above the raging waters of seven confluent rivers serving as a symbol of a global empire elevated
beyond the flux of time, he asserts that belief in the immortality of the soul or in the
transfiguration of man upon his death is nothing more than a “childish” (puerilis) superstition
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and an example of human “untruthfulness” (vanitas). 20 “All men are in the same state from their
last day onward as they were before their first,” writes Pliny near the end of his sixth book, “and
neither the body nor the soul (anima) has any more sensation after death than it did before
birth.” 21 Pliny’s contradiction is built into the very architecture of his encyclopedia: whereas the
text as a whole is arranged annularly, a reflection of the dissipation of the current of time in the
placid pool of eternity at the end of history, the text of Pliny’s book on man is arranged linearly,
moving from conception to death without returning to the subject of conception, a reflection of
the finitude of the human animal and of the finality of death. Pliny could perhaps respond that a
man’s desire for individual redemption is a byproduct of the artificial circumscription of the
political community to which he belongs and that such a desire would disappear once its exterior
walls were torn down and the community itself was subsumed within an eternal empire. Pliny’s
description of man’s belief in life after death as an example of human vanitas suggests that this
would indeed be Pliny’s response. Yet, within the framework of Pliny’s own philosophies of
man, Nature, and history, it hardly seems consistent for the collective aspiration of the human
race to find satisfaction at the end of history while the aspirations of individual men are revealed
as mere epiphenomena arising from a false existence. At the very least, the ease with which
Pliny is able to reject the very analogy upon which he bases his entire argument raises
fundamental doubts about the strength and the cogency of the argument itself.
Second, even if it were possible to compose a text containing an exhaustive inventory of
the natural world and a complete record of all of the life-sustaining properties of all of Nature’s
products, it is unclear that the information contained in such a text would in fact satisfy man’s
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deepest longings. Introducing the topic of insects at the beginning of his tenth book, Pliny writes
that attention to the physiology of insects “gives rise to a long series of questions” (numerosa
quaestionum series exoritur), several of which Pliny records for his readers: How do insects
breathe without a visible respiratory system? How can it be that they possess senses and even
display knowledge of certain arts while lacking the organs possessed by other animals? And
how can insects be alive when it appears as though they do not have any blood? 22 With regard to
such questions, writes Pliny, “let each man judge for himself, for our purpose is to point out the
manifest natures of things (naturas rerum manifestas indicare), not to search for doubtful causes
(non causas indagare dubias).” 23 In refusing to engage in a search for causes, Pliny arguably
seals off his philosophical system from its greatest threat, for once a man begins to trace the
chain of causes and effects backward through time, he must inevitably confront the possibility of
a First Cause lying aback of the whole sequence of causes and effects. The search for a First
Cause, however, would give rise to questions about the meaning and the purpose of the natural
world as a whole, while Pliny’s encyclopedia only provides its readers with answers concerning
the meaning and the purpose of each item contained within the whole. Indeed, even if each and
every entity contained in the universe were to be subordinated to the end of sustaining human
life, man could never get outside of the universe in such a way as to make the universe itself a
mere means for furthering his own life. Moreover, due to Pliny’s own equation of “nature” and
“life” as synonymous terms, questions concerning the meaning and the purpose of the natural
world as a whole could also be asked in regard to human life. Yet, Pliny dismisses all such
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questions out of hand, pushing them beyond the scope of scientific investigation. 24 To
appropriate an observation made by B. K. Ridley about modern positive science, “All the central
questions of humanity – Why are we here? What are we for? Is there a meaning to life outside
brute existence? – are for ever beyond [Plinian] science.” 25
In a passage in The Myth of Sisyphus in which he seems to be responding directly to
Pliny’s limitation of scientific explanation to the description of “the manifest natures of things,”
Albert Camus writes,
I realize that if through science I can seize phenomena and enumerate them, I cannot, for
all that, apprehend the world. Were I to trace its entire relief with my finger, I should not
know any more. And you give me the choice between a description that is sure but that
teaches me nothing and hypotheses that claim to teach me but that are not sure. A
stranger to myself and to the world, armed solely with a thought that negates itself as
soon as it asserts, what is the condition in which I can have peace only by refusing to
know and to live, in which the appetite for conquest bumps into walls that defy its
assaults? 26
It is perhaps fitting to conclude a critique of Pliny’s understanding of human redemption with
Camus’ closing question. There are some walls which the assembled legions of Rome would
never have been able to destroy, and Pliny’s praise of the blessings of Roman peace rings hollow
when confronted with the unsatisfied yearnings of the human heart. “The history of serious
political thought,” writes Cooper, “is the history of thinking about the consequences of
existential longing and discontent.” 27 If so, Pliny deserves to be counted among history’s serious
political thinkers. Indeed, Pliny articulates a sophisticated philosophical system grounded in the
seemingly universal experience of human longing. Yet, when viewed as a response to man’s
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feelings of existential desire and discontent, it becomes evident that the most important lesson to
be gleaned from his encyclopedia is a lesson that he never intended, with Pliny’s apology for
empire illustrating the ultimate futility of seeking redemption through politics.
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